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THE CIA—ENEMY OF PROMISE

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POLITICS AND GENERATIONS

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BEYOND THE POWER BLOCS

A Special Report by JOSEPH BUTTINGER

VIETNAM: FRAUD OF "THE OTHER WAR"

MAY-JUNE 1967 95 c.

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Irving Howe

Is This Country Cracking Up?

The obvious answer is, *No of course not.* But there are signs and portents.

I

It's a strange moment. There is a lot of social uproar in the country. With the possible exception of China, no major power in the world is more restive internally than the United States. Conflict, change, motion everywhere. Yet a heavy malaise hangs over the scene, a little but not really much like that of the early fifties.

The most obvious cause for this malaise is the Vietnam War, but the roots of the trouble must go deeper. When you come to think of it, the war itself seems more symptom than cause. What characterizes American life, at least important parts of it, is a mounting loss of social confidence and solidarity. There is distrust, anger, frustration—and for good reasons.

How widespread this mood may be, I do not know. You can say that the disturbance to which I am pointing is confined to a small segment of the intellectuals and the young; but a dismissal of this sort is too easy, since it ignores the possibility that such people may be articulating sentiments which others keep repressed. Or you can lose your balance in the opposite direction, so that the clamor of a few thousand people becomes identified with "America" or "the young" while the vast quiet majorities are ignored. Yet what does seem to be taking place —the depth and extent of it I do not know how to measure—is a weakening of those social bonds which keep any society, but especially a democratic society, functioning. These bonds of tacit confidence and limited solidarity can exist even between political opponents; they enable conflicts to be acted out and resolved without a total breakdown; they set the boundaries for conflict.

Feelings of distrust cut across political identification in America today. We sense that we are being manipulated and lied to, sometimes even in behalf of ends we might abstractly accept. Seldom has the moral stock of an American government been as low as it is today; seldom has a significant minority of the population—a minority including a notable share of intelligent and conscientious citizens —been so skeptical of the claims which come from Washington. If we have an ounce of brains, we cannot look with anything but contempt upon the rationale for the steady escalation of the Vietnam War. We have equally good reason to be skeptical of the

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President's claim that he is really working toward immediate negotiations. Through a journalistic coup, we learn about the infiltration and corruption of domestic institutions by the CIA. We remain dubious about the Warren Commission. We are chilled by the hypocrisy of the House of Representatives in expelling Adam Clayton Powell for kinds of misconduct which are known to have been practiced by at least a few other congressmen whose skins happen, however, not to be black.

When moral cynicism and contempt for intelligence become widespread among those in power, the same blight tends to infect at least some of those who speak in opposition. That Negro leaders feel obliged to defend Powell against the House is understandable; but need Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick be quite so cavalier about his record? And when George Meany simply denies that the AFL-CIO has ever received money from the CIA, does he really suppose that the whole country can be treated as if it were a cowed local of the painters' union? Has Meany ever tried to give a frank and serious answer concerning the charges that his right-hand man, Jay Lovestone, has systematically cooperated abroad with the CIA, regardless of whether money actually passed from one hand to another?

No wonder many of our idealistic young are profoundly disaffected from the society in which they live. What else can they be? Their political ideas may often strike one as half-baked and their tactics as ill-conceived; but their apprehension as to the sheer *phoniness* of much that is happening in this country seems to me beyond question. Not to share a portion of their feelings is to lapse into a kind of moral death.

Seeing the more sensible protests against escalation of the Vietnam War go unheeded, the young radicals are overcome with frustration. In their powerlessness they react through an escalation of vocabulary and gesture. That this is self-defeating I am inclined to suppose; but that it is also entirely understandable I think we must insist. To describe the Vietnam War, as did the call for the April 15 Mobilization, as "a war against a colored people" seems to me tactically obtuse and intellectually feckless. What drives the Administration to its Vietnam policy would operate quite or nearly as much in respect to a country made up of white people. Yet even as we do our best in arguing that the verbal irresponsibility of certain segments of the protest movement does harm to the cause of peace, we must try to keep our balance too. We must recognize the authenticity of the moral outrage and even the moral despair which leads to the politics of alienation. I see no way, in the coming period, of avoiding recurrent friction with the people who represent that politics, at least for those of us who wish to build a peace movement that will gain wide support among the American people. Yet, impatient as we may be with melodramatic declarations and angered as we may rightly be when attacked as "sellouts" simply because we persevere in our own strategic outlook, we must also remember just where the fundamental source of the current malaise is to be found.

It is to be found in Washington.

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The Johnson Administration has forfeited its credit. Nothing it seems likely to do—short of a radical reversal of its Vietnam policy—can restore it morally in the eyes of serious people. That we do not and cannot trust the President; that we prefer not even to consider the sickly spectacle of the Vice President; that the Secretary of State seems little more than a fanatic ideologue—all this seems to me more important than whether one agrees or disagrees with a particular aspect of the government's policy.

Is this mere subjectivism? the result of moods of anger and depression? Perhaps so; but if such moods are shared by enough people, they become an objective political fact. Those with a Marxist background tend to suspect political judgments which stress personal factors; we are inclined by habit to think that the invocation of impersonal forces is inherently more profound as a mode of analysis. Yet the structure of American government, with its concentration of enormous powers in the hands of the President, makes the scrutiny of such personal factors unavoidable. And one can only conclude that this man, Lyndon B. Johnson, is not fit for the responsibility of making decisions that can crucially affect the survival of humanity.

II

What then of the politics of coalition? What about the hope we have tried to nurture for an alliance of the unions, the Negro movements, the churches, the intellectuals, all working together toward an extension and improvement of the welfare state? I still believe that if significant progress is to be made in American political life, it will be largely through the formal or informal workings of such a coalition. But at least on a national scale, and for as long as the war in Vietnam continues, the prospects that such a coalition will in fact be formed or re-formed seem dim. It is not I who forego this perspective; it is the circumstances of the moment which seriously threaten it.

It is entirely right and indeed essential for the more serious Negro leaders, like Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, to keep fighting for policies which will prevent the government from, in effect, putting the socio-economic burden of the Vietnam War mainly on the Negro people. But so long as this wretched war continues there will probably not be a serious coalition on a national scale such as we have envisaged and such as, at various particular moments (e.g., the March on Washington in 1963), has existed. Locally, every effort should still be made, and in some states the idea of coalition, as a strategy for coping with domestic needs, remains viable. But nationally, how can there be a coalition of progressive forces in the coming period, at least as long as major segments of such a proposed coalition support the war and other, crucial segments oppose it? Undoubtedly, it is possible and necessary for the opponents of the war and *certain* supporters of the war to work together here and there for, say, a better minimum wage and more funds for the poverty program. But on a national scale, it is Vietnam which increasingly dominates our political and moral life. It must.

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And that is why liberals and radicals must repeat, in confronting the President, what Cromwell once said to the Long Parliament: *In the name of God, go!* For we no longer believe what you say; we do not trust you; we do not credit your claims to good will.

III

Where then does this leave us, we few of the democratic Left?

Pretty much where we usually are: in trouble. We know that if coalition politics are not going to work very well in the coming period, neither will any other. For it is not merely that our kind of politics is thwarted by the malaise symbolized by Vietnam; it is that any half-way desirable politics is also thwarted. There are, of course, the apostles of nose-to-nose "polarization," the secret sharers of Ronald Reagan. Confusing criticism with corrosion, and analysis with incantation, these people yield to the indulgence of verbal apocalypse. They revel in the signs of disintegration, failing to recognize that all of modern history teaches us that successful struggle arises from confidence, solidarity, limited victories, and not from the kind of atmosphere which prevailed in the Germany of the twenties. They do not reflect upon the likelihood of a severe rightist reaction to the contemporary political mood, a reaction that would manifest itself in the vocabulary of moralism and a call for a return to traditional American verities. These "leftist" dabblers in apocalypse would do well to ponder a Yiddish proverb: *Come for your inheritance and you may have to pay for the funeral.*

IV

The horizon is bleak. Experience has taught me never to say never, but I cannot now foresee circumstances in which I would vote for Lyndon Johnson. Even if he were to negotiate a truce in the war, how could we have the slightest confidence—after the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—that he would not soon embroil this country in another disaster? The Republicans seem mired in their customary irrelevance and opportunism: imagine political leaders who try to *decide* whether to be hawks or doves on the basis of whether it will help win an election! And as for the third-party venture which seems a possibility, there is little reason for confidence. When one considers the people of the authoritarian Left who are likely to control such a venture, I for one have no confidence at all.

A few smallish signs of hope are visible. Part of the trouble in the United States has been the steady evisceration of liberalism, its uncritical adherence to the slogans of official "anti-Communism," its gradual loss of energy and spirit. There are apparently some stirrings of self-criticism in the ADA, and there is clearly a determination in the UAW to strike out upon a new course. What these will come to in practice, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, we have to try to keep our bearings, both in opposition to the overwhelming deceit of the Administration and by contrast to the reactive fulminations on the "left." The country does seem to be going through a deep crisis, in which the ties of common belief and mutual respect weaken. But it is inane to

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talk as if we were living in Nazi Germany: if we were, we could not talk. (And in fairness, one of the brighter sides of the picture is that thus far there have been few serious efforts to silence or punish critics of the war.) The country is embarked on a wretched, inhumane and reactionary course in Vietnam. But, paradox or no, it remains a democratic society in which intellectuals have as a prime responsibility the defense of democratic values, even as we chafe at our weakness and protest against the men in power. Let us distinguish between using one's mind and thumbing one's nose, between the devastating attack a Theodore Draper launches against the Vietnam War and the puerile talk of those who celebrate *MacBird.*

One of the virtues of democracy is that it may enable a quicker recovery from disastrous policies than can occur under any other kind of government. Our job is to press our criticisms thoughtfully, with humaneness and a minimum of self-righteousness.

Is this, at the moment, a difficult perspective? Of course. All the more reason, then, to press it with energy and force. No one has ever become a socialist (at least in this country) because he thought it meant an easy life. Our job is to speak out, again and again, for a politics that blends fundamental criticism of American society with unshakable devotion to the values and procedures of democracy; a politics that avoids both "crackpot realism" and nihilist "alienation"; a politics of criticism, fraternity, and hope.

Irv Beller

Economic Policy and the Demands of Labor

A generation has elapsed without a general depression in the United States. For six years the economy has not even experienced a recession. Most economists are now quite ready to admit that our kind of economy can avoid depressions permanently and a number are even willing to argue—in spite of an impending downturn—that recessions are neither inherent nor inevitable in a mixed, though essentially capitalist, economy.

Nothing, however, has happened in the postwar period to indicate that capitalist economies, even in modified form, have the capacity not just to avoid economic downturns but to bring actual output up to potential output, to keep it there, and to achieve, at the same time, a generally acceptable degree of price stability and a distribution of income which is not, to use Oscar Gass's phrase, "against good conscience." A revolution in economic policy-making has taken place. But it has been a limited revolution, a conservative and, in a sense, even a reactionary one in terms

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of the measures used to achieve both economic expansion and restraint.

Michael Harrington points out: "It's possible for Washington to stimulate the economy by favoring the corporate rich—and it's possible to stimulate the economy by solving the social problems and fulfilling the economic needs of the vast majority." For the most part, the expansionary measures adopted by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have been of the former kind. Enormous benefits have been granted to corporations and to individuals in the upper-income brackets through accelerated depreciation allowances, special tax credits for investment, and corporate and personal income tax cuts.

Walter Heller, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has described how "the federal government deployed $48 billion of fiscal dividends (at annual rates) between the second half of 1960 and the second half of 1965." This was the estimated amount by which federal revenues would have exceeded federal expenditures under conditions of high employment and rapid growth if no changes in tax or spending policy had occurred. The "major form of dividend," Heller pointed out, was a tax cut of $19 billion—a cut which included $3 billion in special investment incentives and an additional $3 billion in corporate income tax reductions (and, according to estimates made by others, a similar amount in income tax reductions for persons in upper-income brackets). This shift of billions of dollars from "public to private savings" was offset, in part, by a $3-billion payroll tax increase—a form of taxation which imposes a disproportionate burden on lower incomes.

The Tax reduction of $19 billion was less than two-thirds of the $32 billion increase in federal expenditures during the period. However, as Heller, himself one of the chief architects of this program, observed, most of the spending increases went for defense and space purchases and for "*automatic* increases in interest, social security benefits and grants-in-aid. . . ." "*Discretionary* increases in federal civilian expenditures," says Heller, were "dwarfed" by the tax cut. (Emphasis added.)

Despite the conservative nature of such measures, the economy responded well in overall terms. In the three years from 1964 to 1966 inclusive, GNP grew at the extremely vigorous rate of about 5.5 per cent a year, and the rate of unemployment dropped from 5.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent.

As the unemployment rate approached 4 per cent, however, inflationary pressures began to mount. And at this point, following the pattern of the Eisenhower Administration, the Johnson Administration responded with measures of restraint which, like the expansionary measures preceding them, showed little regard for the nation's major social priorities.

For one thing, the Administration's determination to push toward genuine full employment waned quickly. The Council of Economic Advisers welcomed the slowdown in growth during the spring and summer of 1966 even though it meant no further decline in unemployment. And, in its Economic Report in January of this year, it looked forward to a rate of economic growth of no more than 4 per cent in 1967, a rate which, at best, could only maintain unemployment at existing levels. For all practical purposes,

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the Administration had decided to call a moratorium on further reduction in unemployment.

A plausible argument might have been made for the thesis that a 5.5 per cent rate of real growth, the average rate of the past three years, was undesirable in 1967 because it could be achieved only with an excessive rise in prices. One might have argued convincingly instead for a rate of growth which continued to whittle away at unemployment at a somewhat slower pace. The priority that the Administration accorded to price stability and to improvement in the balance of payments, however, was so overriding that it was willing to call a complete halt, for an indefinite period of time, to any further reduction in unemployment, precisely when tighter labor markets were beginning to open up job opportunities for the most disadvantaged Americans.

What's more, the Administration sought to achieve its aim in part by curbing the growth of demand in areas of the greatest social priority—the very areas which had been short-changed when expansionary measures were being adopted. For the fiscal year 1967 Congress appropriated approximately $1 billion less than it had previously authorized for Great Society programs. Subsequently, President Johnson ordered such expenditures pruned even further.

II

For the coming fiscal year, the Administration has proposed modest increases in Great Society expenditures. Given their magnitude, however, the proposed increases offer little hope for significant progress. Moreover, in view of the change in the Washington political climate, even the President's modest proposals remain in doubt.

By downgrading social priorities, the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Board and the wage policies pursued by the Administration last year have preserved the symmetry of the measures adopted to achieve both economic expansion and economic restraint. The Board pushed interest rates up to their highest level in 40 years, brought on a recession in housing, and forced a number of local government agencies to abandon their plans to build schools, hospitals, and other badly needed public facilities. In the process, ironically, it contributed significantly to the increase in the consumer price index which occurred last year.

The nation's wage policy was equally misguided. As the AFL-CIO and others have argued, the wage-price guideposts, the government's major inflation weapon until 1965, was inequitable in its formulation and proved inequitable in practice as well.

The formula devised by the Council in effect compelled labor to pay for the failure of business to abide by the guideposts. The wage guideposts tied increases in compensation to trend increases in productivity without any allowance for higher living costs. As a result, *as long as there was any increase in prices,* workers would be short-changed if they accepted an increase in compensation equal in money terms only to the guideline productivity figure. When prices rise, a 3.2 per cent increase in money terms is not 3.2 per cent in real terms. When prices rise as they did last year at the rate of 2.9 per cent, a 3.2 per cent increase in money terms leaves a worker with only a 0.3 per cent increase

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in purchasing power. When they rise that rapidly, not even a 5 per cent increase—the increase which the Machinists succeeded in winning last year and which many regarded as outrageously high—will yield the 3.2 per cent increase in purchasing power which presumably the guideposts would provide.

In spite of their obvious unfairness in equating *money* wage increases with *real* increases in productivity and ignoring or minimizing factors other than productivity which are relevant to the determination of wages, the guideposts succeeded in depressing wage increases significantly below what they had been in similar periods in the past. Professor Otto Eckstein told a meeting of the American Economic Association last December,

> it is striking that every econometric wage equation devised by scholars so far—and this now includes at least half-a-dozen studies embodying different product and labor market variables —*substantially over-predicts the rate* of wage increase in the last several years. . . . What is striking is not that the rate of wage increase was lower than in the mid- or early 1950s, but that the rate of wage increase was lower by over 2 per cent a year than the equations based on the postwar relationships would have predicted.

There is no evidence that the guideposts had an equal effect upon prices. It is true that the Administration succeeded in rolling back a few proposed price increases, but it failed to prevent many others from exceeding the guideposts. Moreover, aside from a few verbal appeals, it did nothing to *reduce* prices—not just to roll back proposed increases—in industries which enjoyed rapidly advancing productivity (reductions called for by the guideposts in order to offset rising prices in a number of low-productivity industries and achieve overall price stability).

In its 1964 Economic Report the Council of Economic Advisers stated, "The guideposts called for [price] reductions in those industries whose trend productivity gains exceed the national trend. It is fair to say that large industrial enterprises thus far have not widely heeded this advice." Some three years later, the advice still remained widely unheeded.

As a result, workers have been shortchanged. They have not shared equitably in the gains made possible by increasing productivity during recent years—not even by the Administration's guidepost standards. From 1960 to 1965 the real hourly compensation of all employees in the private economy (including salaried employees, including fringe benefits, including employer contributions for social insurance, and even before the deduction of taxes) *went up 2.6 per cent,* not 3.2 per cent, as they would have, had the guideposts for prices and wages been fully implemented. And in 1966, this all-inclusive measure of real hourly compensation of all employees rose only 2.9 per cent. In manufacturing, the corresponding real increases were even less; they were 2.2 per cent annually during 1960 to 1965 and only 1.9 per cent last year.

Even more striking are the figures which show how badly production workers alone fared. In a year in which gross national product rose by 5.4 per cent, the real buying power of the average factory worker's weekly take-home pay actually declined. *In spite of a lengthened workweek, the weekly take-home pay of a factory*

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worker with three dependents, after taxes and after adjusting for price changes, dropped three-tenths of one per cent in 1966. In contract construction, the sector in which wage increases appear to be shockingly large to some people, the increase in the buying power of weekly take-home pay was less than 1 per cent last year. This is what happened to labor income in a period of *expanding* economic activity.

Corporate profits after taxes, on the other hand, have risen almost twice as fast as Gross National Product and about twice as fast as the compensation of all employees. As a result, the distribution of income has grown more unequal. For the six years 1961 to 1966 as a whole, the total compensation of all employees in the private economy fell more than $50 billion—more than $8 billion per year—short of the amount it would have been if the incomes of all employees had risen sufficiently to provide them with a real hourly increase of 3.2 per cent a year, the increase required under the guidepost formula to maintain the proportionate shares of labor and nonlabor income. This is one measure of how workers have been short-changed in recent years and it helps to explain why they are now determined to obtain some perceptible improvement in their own standard of living when the rest of the nation is moving ahead, and why wage settlements this year are likely to be higher than they have been in the past.

The disparities have been so striking that Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, felt compelled to warn a Chamber of Commerce audience last May that "now that profits after taxes . . . are providing the highest sustained rate of return on owner's equity in our modern history, it is time to ask whether a further rise in the *share* of profits in the national income is in the interest either of the health of the nation's economy or in the interest of business itself."

Ackley knew, of course, that excessive profit could lead to an excessive and unsustainable volume of investment and to inflationary pressures in the capital-goods sector. He knew, moreover, that no self-respecting trade union could allow itself to be straitjacketed while no controls were imposed upon executive salaries, professional fees, dividends or interest, and while profits were soaring beyond the wildest dreams of businessmen.

III

A few months ago Walter Lippman, describing the basis of the "Johnson consensus" under which "the conflicts between labor and capital and between the races were assuaged and tranquilized," declared:

> During President Johnson's honeymoon period—say up to the spring of 1965—a comparatively small war in Vietnam and the small beginnings of the war against poverty were paid for easily out of the revenues of our expanding economy. Thus the poor were provided with tangible small payments on large promissory notes, and this gave them hope and patience. At the same time, the well-to-do and the rich never had it so good and in addition they had a fairly substantial hope that they might be given another tax cut with still better things to come. . . .
>
> The real cost of the escalation of the war in Vietnam is not measured in dollars and cents. The real cost is that the surpluses of an expanding economy have been swallowed up and

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> this has removed the lubricants and the cushions against the conflicts of interests and the rivalry of ideologies. We are moving more and more into sharp and raw confrontations. This is the tragic consequence of one of the most serious miscalculations in our history.

The misdirection of resources resulting from the war and its social consequences are indeed tragic. However, there is a real question as to whether the technique used to achieve the "Johnson consensus" would prove as successful if the war in Vietnam ended tomorrow or whether it would have held up even if we had not become so deeply involved in Vietnam in the first place. Would the trickle-down approach of stimulating the economy by tax cuts to the well-to-do and using part of the resulting fiscal dividend for "small payments on large promissory notes" really be enough to resolve the "conflicts between labor and capital and between the races" indefinitely? Would a continuing shift in income shares in favor of incomes from property and against income from labor be acceptable even in the face of an absolute increase in labor income?

Furthermore, can any Administration which stops short of realizing the economy's full potential because of the fear of inflation avoid "sharp and raw confrontations" even in peacetime? Wouldn't an overall rate of unemployment of 4 per cent, a rate substantially higher than any reasonable definition of full employment in the U.S., mean the continuation for a long time to come of depression-like levels of unemployment for Negro youth and others? Wouldn't a 4 per cent rate of growth in GNP, an Administration goal which understates the economy's potential for growth at full employment, stunt the growth of the fiscal dividend required to eliminate poverty in a tolerable period of time?

In any case, whatever its political consequences, the formula for achieving a "Johnson consensus" is clearly not the formula for achieving a truly great society as rapidly as the nation's resources permit. The latter can only become a reality if the measures adopted to achieve both economic stimulus and restraint give top billing to the nation's real social priorities.

We need, as Harrington says, "to stimulate the economy by solving the social problems and fulfilling the economic needs of the vast majority." How to do this is far less of a problem, I am convinced, than the willingness to do it. *The great problem in America is not a lack of constructive ideas for attacking poverty and meeting the needs for public facilities and services; it is the lack of massive, organized pressure to implement such ideas boldly and fully.*

The need for giving major recognition to social priorities in applying measures of restraint is equally obvious. There is less certainty and agreement even among liberal economists about how to restrain inflationary pressures without sacrificing the goal of full employment or resorting to one-sided wage restraints and reductions in public expenditures. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that, given certain institutional changes, full employment can be made reasonably compatible with relative price stability and that such compatibility can be achieved without imposing an inequitable burden upon those who can least afford it.

Often overlooked is the fact that an

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economy which achieves full employment and grows steadily thereafter at a rate corresponding to its potential, generates certain anti-inflationary forces of its own. Steady growth at full employment levels reduces the ratchet effect which occurs when prices shoot up during periods of recovery and remain rigid during periods of stagnation; it avoids the increases in unit costs which put pressure on prices at low levels of utilization; it encourages a steadier and more sustainable pace of investment in modern machinery; it provides an important rationale for policies to curb excessive profits. With regard to the latter, the Council of Economic Advisers points out that in a steadily expanding economy "the profit margins which were feasible only in the boom stage of a boom-or-bust economy . . . are inappropriate." "In fact," it says, "profit margins not only should be lower than in the boom phase of a cyclical economy but should be reduced on the average because operations in such an environment carry lesser risk."

The full employment and steady economic growth which can provide such benefits is not likely to be achieved, however, without further institutional changes—without more adequate long-range planning techniques which maintain a viable balance between investment and other demand sectors and anticipate and prepare in advance to meet the needs for skilled manpower and other resources which require a long lead-time to produce; without greater Presidential discretionary authority over fiscal policy; and without an end to the senseless dichotomy between monetary and fiscal policy-making which now prevails.

In addition to such basic changes in policy-making machinery, the nation needs more effective machinery for dealing with price problems in highly concentrated industries. Where competition does not exist, justifiable wage increases and taxes upon employers to pay for social legislation have too often been passed along to the public via higher prices. A number of proposals have been made to close this escape route from social responsibility. One such proposal would establish a price review board which would impose no mandatory controls but would require advance notice of price increases contemplated by dominant firms in key industries and make public its findings concerning the justification of such proposed increases. Another proposal would create a special government agency with the continuing function of providing information concerning price, wage, and productivity developments in specific industries, and of calling attention to situations in which price reductions were justifiable.

Other positive and constructive ways of reconciling full employment and price stability have also been suggested. They include:

1. Tripartite efforts to reduce price pressures in critical sectors of the economy such as construction, transportation, and medical care via greater research and development, improvements in training programs, better vesting provisions to encourage greater labor mobility, reductions in seasonal fluctuations, and other devices.
2. Government stockpiling of key materials for price stabilization as well as for defense purposes.
3. Additional government yardstick undertakings similar to the TVA in sectors of the economy under oligopoly control.
4. Elimination of state fair-trade laws which permit manufacturers to dic-

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tate the minimum prices at which retailers can sell their products.

5. More encouragement and aid for consumer cooperatives and consumer action groups.

These and a host of other selective measures make it unnecessary for the nation to rely upon a reservoir of jobless human beings as a means of combating inflation. They also make it unnecessary to demand that workers settle for less than a fair share of the gains of advancing productivity (as the Council of Economic Advisers has done, first, by refusing to adjust its wage guideposts for changes in the cost of living and, more recently, by opposing the spread of escalator clauses in forthcoming negotiations).

Unfortunately, there is little basis for believing that this Administration, or any other likely to succeed it in the near future, will adopt such measures to curb inflation while seeking to operate the economy at full blast. It's more likely that billions of dollars of the most vitally needed goods and services and hundreds and thousands of badly-needed jobs will be sacrificed on the altar of price stability. Furthermore, in the absence of the kind of organized political pressures referred to earlier, future economic stimuli are more likely to take the form of tax cuts which give only minimal and indirect aid to the millions still living in poverty, rather than the kind of massive expenditures called for by the Randolph Freedom Budget.

Under the circumstances, it appears that America's disadvantaged will continue to receive "small payments on large promissory notes" and that the Great Society will continue to be more myth than reality for a long time to come. In fact, one may be justified in viewing with some degree of skepticism the possibility of restoring and sustaining a "Johnson consensus" even in an America without war.

Stanley Plastrik

Political Regroupment in India

> What has happened is that all of a sudden India has been brought face to face with the total drama of its democratic professions and at a point equidistant from calamity and opportunity. It is impossible to say which way the country will move now. But if it is to move toward opportunity, there will have to be more democracy, not less.
>
> Pran Chopra, *The Statesman,* March 7, 1967

On the eve of India's recent election (February, 1967) the fourth national election since independence in 1947, the Delhi correspondent of the London *Times* sent home two alarming dispatches. In one he announced the end of India's parliamentary democracy, predicting this would be the last election ever held in that country. In the other, he solemnly announced the impending disintegration of the Indian Union.

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Unfortunately, India is not among the most respected of nations. Its early demise has been forecast since its birth; the London *Times* doomster is but the latest in a long series. But even though a considerable part of British intellectual hostility toward India is accounted for by an ill-concealed contempt for one's former "subjects," we cannot discount the gravity of India's problems. The British and others may prefer the "neater" solution of Ayub Khan's "directed democracy" in Pakistan, but the Indian people have clearly rejected such temptations and shown their intention to continue along the democratic path: weaknesses, shortcomings, and all. This is the basic meaning of the elections.

The Fourth General Election was a tremendous democratic feat. About 60 per cent of an eligible electorate amounting to 250 million people voted. They cast their ballots from dwellings in cosmopolitan cities like Bombay and Calcutta; from great industrial and steel-producing centers like Rourkela and Bhilai; from the 500,000 peasant villages dispersed throughout the land and, finally, from the remote hills and mountains of the Himalayas, Assam, and other regions. The electoral campaign was conducted in an atmosphere of total freedom; with the single exception of Kashmir, where intimidation of voters and illegal actions by election officials seem to have been significant, the polling and the counting were conducted without complaint, violence, or disturbance. Not one of the parties, covering the whole political spectrum, was pledged to any course but acceptance of the voters' verdict.

That verdict came through with drama and clarity. The Indian people firmly rejected the "Mexican way"; they would not, that is, tolerate the freezing of the political scene through domination by one party. In smashing the myth of monolithic rule by one political movement (in Mexico they call it, with seeming irony, the party of "Institutional Revolution"), the Indian people performed a significant political act. Far from a docile vote for time-honored leaders and institutions, the electorate rose up in indignation to smite the dominant Congress party, hip and thigh! Monolith, monopoly of political power, social and economic domination: all lay smashed a week after the voting. If ever the power of the ballot needed demonstration, the people of India have given us this lesson. A political revolution begun; a tradition destroyed; an old leadership repudiated; the era of Gandhi and Nehru brought to an end.

And all this, mind you, was accomplished in an "underdeveloped country," one that had been suffering from the terrible consequences of poverty, drought, mismanagement. Perhaps we will now hear a word or two from those theoreticians of the "authoritarian Left" who keep lecturing us in pseudo-Marxist wisdom as to the impossibility (they mean undesirability) of democracy in the Third World. The reigns of power have been handed over in more than half of the Indian states without bloodshed, without the suppression of any political tendency, or the denial of anyone's freedom to speak and organize. Why don't at least a few "Left" American

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intellectuals find this impressive—even if it does not satisfy their appetites for "revolutionary" rhetoric?

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Any effort at full analysis would obviously be premature, but we offer a few tentative notes:

• (1) The Congress party lost control over a majority of India's 16 states, nine of which today have non-Congress governments. This process of Congress disintegration has continued after its electoral debacle, leading to the loss of two additional states, most importantly, Uttar Pradesh (with a population of 80 million) which has traditionally been Congress's great stronghold. Internal factionalism threatens to be speeded up by the defeats.

• (2) In terms of state and local control, over half of India's 500 million people are no longer under Congress rule. Instead, a series of experimental patterns of government have emerged, ranging from "Left" Communist (Maoist) control in the state of Kerela to "rightist" Swatantra party control in the state of Orissa. Any number of coalition governments have been formed, but, as in all coalitions, one force or the other predominates. Some states are now run by dissident Congress groups; others (Bihar) by the radical socialists (SSP), led by the erratic Lohia; still others (Rajasthan) are under direct control of Delhi, because they are unable to form a government of their own. This crazy-quilt pattern indicates the will of the electorate to experiment; to offer a chance to this or that political movement; and to prepare for an eventual rejudgment of all parties.

• (3) The Congress gives every indication of having learned little or nothing. The size and entrenched power of the party apparatus (as distinct from the party membership itself where many more than a "hundred flowers" bloom in inelegant discord) makes change a torturous process. Stunningly repudiated though it was, the old party leadership proposes "business as usual." After the elections it engaged in vulgar maneuvers in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh to maintain control against the clear sentiment of the electorate that it ought to remove itself. In the end, these efforts backfired and Congress lost out.

Can one expect a party such as Congress to reexamine itself, reorganize itself, question itself? Never has history witnessed such a reappraisal by the *whole* of a repudiated party; it is unlikely to occur here. Elementary decency would have obliged the entire party leadership to resign after the drubbing it experienced; elementary sense would have called for the summoning of an emergency party convention for the election of a new leadership and reconsideration of the entire policy.

• (4) In bringing down Congress the electorate did not as yet indicate a preference for any other party. This is a major consideration for the future; it means the democratic process still has every opportunity to function. Further, the electorate deliberately made sure that Congress was returned to power at the center even if repudiated in more than half the states. I say "deliberately" because this required millions of voters to split their ticket by voting for an opposition candidate for state office

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but a Congress candidate on the national level. In my view, this indicates an extraordinary sophistication on the part of Indian voters. Writing in *Janata,* a publication of the Indian Socialists, Shri Vivek has stated this clearly:

> The Congress has in effect been told "You have behaved badly; we no longer have much confidence in you, so we cut down your majority and throw you out in several States. However . . . we don't disown you completely. We'll put you in a position where you'll constantly have to be *on the qui vive if you wish to keep* your place. The rest depends on you. Decent government, scrupulous conduct, full regard for the interests of the country, no more scandals, proper action on important problems like population control, maintenance of order, holding down of prices, increase of agricultural production, etc., and you may survive. Fail in these and out you go, certainly at the next election, perhaps even earlier . . ."

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India is on the edge of the most dramatic moment in its modern history. The old ways of lethargy, passivity, acceptance will no longer make do; the old-line politicians steeped in smugness can no longer lead. Congress as we have known is no more; but Congress is still a potent force. It did, after all, receive 56 million votes (39 per cent of the total)—which is far in excess of its nearest party rivals. But its tendency to operate as usual and allow the opposition to take the initiative away from it, could quickly prove fatal. The seven opposition parties, organized in one of the most unprincipled political alliances the political world has ever seen, have found a formula for undermining Congress —an electoral pact to avoid triangular competition between candidates. The only thing that unites the Opposition is the determination to bring Congress down nationally and in the remaining states. The opposition will pursue a relentless course—a reckless one as well, the sole exception to this being the weak Praja Socialist party which takes its responsibilities to the nation seriously.

If Congress falls nationally, what then? How much strain can the frail political and social structure of the country stand? In our view, the Indian people do not want Congress either to fail or to fall. The opposition parties run the risk of going too far in their harassment of the government and finding themselves in turn repudiated. Already, many of the state coalition governments are reported to be experiencing the first signs of falling-out among the coalition parties. It is still far from clear whether they can rule.

Democracy remains India's most potent political force and democratic leadership her most pressing need. The friends of Indian democracy watch this complex situation with anxiety and fascination: can a great national movement, which brought independence and kept a young nation firmly attached to democratic procedures, surmount its decline? And if not, will the people have sufficient political maturity and discipline to create another political agency to review their tormented struggle for plenty and freedom?

Note: The author wishes to thank the Indian writer Anand Mohan for the information he provided for this article.

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Lewis Coser

THE CIA—ENEMY OR PROMISE

> We witnessed the extreme of servitude when the informer robbed us of the interchange of speech and hearing. We should have lost memory as well as voice, had it been as easy to forget as to keep silence. Tacitus

I

Mutual trust is indispensable to any democratic polity. Without it, without a sense that the political men we deal with can be assumed to be self-actuated, autonomous actors engaged in pursuing their material or ideal interests in an open and publicly visible manner, a democratic policy is bound to falter.

In small democratic communities, in New England town meetings for example, each member is personally known to the others and his actions are publicly visible. Such is not the case in modern mass democracies where political actors can no longer be controlled through the direct scrutiny of their actions by their fellows. Hence, such democratic communities are based on the prior assumption, on the wager if you wish, that the great majority of public actors, like you and me, mean what they say and say what they mean. If this basic trust no longer prevails, massive paranoia and a Hobbesian view of the world is bound to ensue. It follows that no matter what his motives, whoever undermines basic human trust is an enemy of democracy. He attacks the very foundation on which the democratic community is based.

The recent disclosures of the infiltration of agents of the CIA in a multitude of American organizations, in the student and the labor movements, in educational institutions, and publishing enterprises, poses as serious a threat, and I say this advisedly, as the infiltration of the Communist party in similar organizations during the thirties and forties. That in the earlier case this infiltration was motivated by the desire to destroy American democracy and in the more recent by a proclaimed intent to defend it is irrelevant in this context. We must deal with public consequences irrespective of private motivations. These public consequences are similar in both instances. If you can no longer deal

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with your fellow men, with scholars or student leaders, with labor officials or educators, without suspecting that they express the hidden directives of their paymasters rather than their own self-willed intentions, then public dialogue, without which democracy is inconceivable, is no longer possible. When one knows that a multitude of agents have infiltrated the very organizations in which you put your trust, then you can no longer confront a man without suspicion. In a world controlled by agents everyone must be suspected.

II

Perhaps the most perturbing feature of the recent revelations is the fact that the CIA concentrated much of its corrupting effort on organizations of American youth. It is the young in particular, as wise psychologists such as Erik Erikson have shown, who in their search for a stable identity require a large measure of trust if they are to grow into mature and responsible adults. If their trust is undermined, their growth is stunted and thwarted. If these young men and women, in their fresh idealism, their trusting commitment to organizations that express their revolts and their search for meaning, are confronted with the realization that they have been betrayed, then the result is not just private tragedy but public disaster. Such young men are likely to become cynical operators or to withdraw into a private world robbed of public meaning and significance. And when the future leadership of a country is made up of cynics and egocentric sensualists, God help us all.

III

One detects a certain obscene glee in the inquisitorial fervor of certain New Leftish spokesmen when they accumulate documentation on the extent of the cancer that has eaten into American organizational life. They document, as well they must, the ravages of the disease. But they might be advised to eschew the comforting feeling that this is only an illness which has inflicted others. Would that it were possible to neatly separate the normal from the pathological! To document once and for all the extent of the corruption is indeed a necessary act of public salubrity. But the housecleaning requires freedom from pride and self-indulgent arrogance. I cannot help but feel that many untained youth leaders, if they were willing to scrutinize themselves, might be moved to say: "There, but for the grace of God, go I." For, after all, if those who succumbed to the blandishment of the CIA were bad men, there would be no problem. The real tragedy is, so it would seem, that

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many of them were good men. True tragedy arises, Max Scheler taught us, "when the idea of 'justice' appears to be leading to the destruction of higher values." Substitute "anti-Communism" for "justice" and you have described the situation of many of these victims of the CIA.

Yes, we need to expose the corruption of all human and humane values that the CIA has brought about. Yes, we need to clean the atmosphere. But let us do it with a befitting sense of awe and humility. And one thing more: let us be aware that what has happened is likely to undermine to a significant extent the sense of idealism on which *all* radical or liberal politics must necessarily rest. The New Left and the old Left must realize that if the wellsprings of commitment and idealism run dry, not only American democracy but their own sources of support will wither. Young men who, in their search for fraternal bonds, discover that some of those they took to be brothers were in fact agents, are likely to be suspicious of *any* future commitment. Unless the problem is attacked with the utmost responsibility and delicacy on the Left, it is likely to lead to suicidal reactions.

IV

Burning indignation is certainly in order when one is confronted with the CIA's corrupting influence. But it is not enough. We must also make an effort to discriminate. In particular, distinctions must be made between persons and organizations that received CIA funds in order better to further a cause in which they were engaged, and persons and organizations that allowed themselves to be deflected from their original purpose by the CIA. (I leave aside, of course, those people in progressive organizations who were duped into accepting funds from foundations which later turned out to be CIA conduits; they may be open to chastisement on grounds of lack of alertness, but not to moral attack.)

There is a considerable difference between the behavior of certain leaders of the NSA who were manipulated by the CIA into rigging the whole political structure of their organization, so that top officers were chosen by a network of "old boys" in the pay of the CIA, and the behavior of certain leaders of international organizations who, in the pursuit of self-chosen objectives, allowed themselves to accept CIA money. Both cases are politically reprehensible, but morally they must be weighed on somewhat different scales.

In cases such as that of the NSA, the CIA corrupted some of its leaders so that they became in effect tools that could be used for alien purposes. But there are other cases where men honestly engaged in

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worthwhile activities—be it the training of Latin-American labor leaders or the fostering of trips of student volunteers to Africa—deluded themselves into believing that their work would not be vitiated by accepting CIA support. The men in the first category were contemptible; many of those in the second, although also tainted by accepting undercover support, were plain stupid. They were stupid for the simple reason that they never seem to have reflected upon the obvious fact that exposure of the sources of some of their secret funds would necessarily wipe out their self-chosen goals, so that the alleged benefits derived from these additional funds would be as naught when compared to the complete debacle which necessarily would follow upon exposure. The first category of men are so compromised that they can no longer be considered a part of any Left-liberal community. The second category should be relegated to the back benches for a considerable span of time.

V

But, some people argue, why should we cavil at efforts to support good causes, say that of democratic unionism in India or Chile, even if it be with questionable means? Granted, they argue, the CIA may support such organizations for reasons which are very different from the reasons of liberals or radicals, but the effect might nevertheless be a good one.

There is basic confusion here. It might indeed gladden the hearts of democrats to see that a Maoist organization in, say, India, is defeated by what appears to be a genuine indigenous trade union. But the minute it is revealed that this supposedly indigenous organization in effect relied on American secret subsidies, it will inevitably succumb to the onslaughts of its Maoist rivals. It is really incredible that even at this late date there are still men on the so-called Left who have not understood that nationalism, a fierce desire to be free from foreign domination and interference, is a most potent force not only in Europe but above all in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To bring freedom at the point of bayonets is an illusion, to bring it with the help of CIA checks is plain folly. When an autonomous American organization, say the UAW, decides to support its counterpart anywhere in the world, this is an act of international solidarity, a transaction between autonomous organizations, which deserves the support of anyone on the Left. When the sinister Mafia of Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown is reported to subvert the international labor movement with the help of CIA funds, we deal with an entirely different matter. Such operations run counter to the very cornerstone of traditional labor organizations

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both here and abroad: the idea of autonomy. A labor movement that lacks independence has lost its basic reason for being. And that is true whether we deal with bought and hence controlled movements in France or Latin America or with state-controlled unions in the Soviet Union.

The sense of distrust and suspicion that is likely to characterize domestic American life in the period to come will have a heightened counterpart on the international scene. The most genuine scholarly research, the most independent offer of help from America for student or labor organizations abroad, will inevitably meet with so much distrust that it will be stymied. This is the disaster that the CIA has brought. It has insured that the many generous impulses that flow so freely from Americans will tend to wither from want of an object. There has been much cant about the alleged evil consequences of the so-called innocence of Americans. Would that we could continue to enjoy this reputation abroad! From now on Americans will no longer be seen as innocents abroad, but as tainted purveyors of corruption and perversion.

VI

It would be highly comforting if one could believe that the CIA exceeded its mandates out of excessive and misplaced zeal. But there is unfortunately no reason to believe this at all. It has operated with the explicit approval of successive Presidents and of the whole executive establishment. *Ultimately, therefore, the responsibility rests not with the CIA, but with the White House and the National Security Council.* The very men who are responsible for the execution of policy in the American democratic system have helped to subvert it. The sickness is not located in one of the branches of the American government; it has eaten into the very roots.

Ever since the Bay of Pigs, the White House and the executive establishment have been requested by many political voices to confine the CIA to its original purpose of gathering and analyzing information. All these appeals have been of no avail. They must now be raised with renewed insistence and vigor. The unchecked power of the CIA corrupts absolutely everything it touches.

Any scholar, any student leader, any publisher, any labor official who collaborates with the CIA is contributing to the corruption of American democratic life. Not only must the CIA influence be excised from domestic and foreign political life, but these men must be made accountable to their peers. And let them not drape themselves in the mantle of patriotism. This kind of patriotism, we have been shown again, is but the last refuge of the scoundrel.

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Anti-Communism and the CIA

A Comment by Michael Walzer

I have one major disagreement with Lew Coser's article: this concerns his firm belief in the long-run ineffectiveness of CIA subversion in the fight against Communism. His example is a democratic union in India struggling against a Maoist union. He writes: "the minute it is revealed that this supposedly indigenous organization in effect relied on American secret subsidies, it will inevitably succumb to the onslaught of its Maoist rivals." Well, maybe. But there is nothing inevitable about the outcome. It depends on how strong the democratic union has grown during the period when the subsidies were secret, on its capacities for internal reform once secrecy is broken, on what has happened in the meantime to Maoism in China, on the internal cohesion of the Maoist union, on the strategic skills of its leaders, etc. Surely, there is no invisible hand at work, guaranteeing that policies that make us indignant will also be politically ineffective. The case becomes much more interesting (and indignation less easy) if we assume what I expect is the case, that CIA subversion is at least sometimes effective in weakening local Communist forces. Then we must ask: does this victory justify the means employed? When the act accuses, does the result excuse?

It seems to me that the only way we can say no to these questions is by denying in each specific case that the danger posed by Communism is as great as the CIA, the U. S. government generally, and a very considerable number of American citizens believe it to be. For if the danger of a Communist take-over of India were really very great, and if the result of such a take-over was certain to be a totalitarian regime, surely a secret U. S. subsidy to an anti-Communist union—assuming there were no better way of giving assistance—would be perfectly justified. But if we want to say, as Coser does and I do, that defeat of the Maoists cannot justify the secret subsidy, then we must argue either that their victory is not imminent or likely, or that its consequences would not be morally catastrophic. If we are not willing to make either of these arguments, then I do not see that we have any business being indignant with the CIA. And I suspect that making either of them will require some re-examination of the anti-Communism both of the U. S. generally and of the democratic Left.

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A modern political tragedy occurs, Coser suggests in his paraphrase of Scheler, when the idea of anti-Communism "appears to be leading to the destruction of higher values." But if this describes the present situation, and if it were really tragic, there would be no reason to sympathize only with the "victims" of the CIA. Why not with the agents of the CIA as well? Their anti-Communism led them also to risk higher values, and doubtless many of them were aware of the risks they were taking and thought themselves justified. Not justified merely by success: they thought themselves justified in advance of success or failure by the terrible threat of Communist totalitarianism. Are they tragic figures? If not, why not?

I think that CIA agents and victims are not tragic figures because their anti-Communism was not simply a moral commitment parallel to a commitment to Scheler's "idea of Justice." It was also a convenient ideology, a compound, in varying proportions, of interest, patriotism, conformity, apocalyptic vision, and sometimes helpless, sometimes willful, ignorance—all of these justified (but inadequately) by the genuine moral importance of opposition to Stalinist regimes and parties. What is necessary now is to separate out the morality from the ideology and to distinguish the actions which follow from each. I won't pretend that this is an easy separation to make, but it seems to me that it is only by making it that we can express what was wrong with CIA activities: that they served political and material interests which often had little to do with anti-Communism, and that they rested upon a gross and to some degree deliberate exaggeration of the dangers posed by Communist subversion. The exposure of the CIA must be followed by a less exciting but more important exposure of the myths, misunderstandings, and distortions of cold-war thought that justified the CIA. (These are not, I think, tragic errors; they don't have that dignity; nor is it obvious that the people who made the errors are the ones who suffer for them.) It is especially important that the democratic Left participate in this second exposure, for many of us (I don't mean to exclude myself) acquiesced in the myths, even if we generally opposed the policies that followed from them. The price for the right to be indignant is self-scrutiny and public worry.

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A Modest Proposal: Abolish the Damn Thing!

A Comment by Stanley Plastrik

There is little I see to quarrel with in Irving Howe's original statement on the CIA and students (March–April DISSENT) or with Lewis Coser's forceful statement published above. I would only call attention to the disappointing fact that too many of the NSA leaders have tried to brazen their way through the moral jungle into which they have wandered, while others have failed to grasp what was wrong in their action. Certainly, the least one might have expected was some gesture on their part—a mass resignation of the NSA officers and executive board, for example, or that the whole issue be submitted to discussion in the form of an emergency national convention that might elect a new leadership.

I wish to discuss briefly a somewhat different side of the question —namely, the failure of most people to grasp what, precisely, the CIA is. The sensational side of the revelations has distorted this and given the impression that its main activity revolves around the feeding of money to various organizations with the aim of subverting them to CIA purposes. I submit that this is a minor part—one-tenth of the submerged iceberg—of the CIA. It is such misunderstanding which leads, for instance, to such feeble conclusions as those contained in a *New Republic* editorial (March 4, 1967). After detailing the, by now, well-known instances of CIA payments, use of conduits, etc., the editorial concludes:

> There is nothing evil in working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Many who have taken Agency money to do what they believed needed doing are not villains. The results have not been all bad and were often good—and would have been just as good, or better, if the financing had been open and above-board. . . .

If this is true, why all the fuss? Clearly, the author of these naive comments hasn't much notion of what the CIA is all about.

In a column entitled "Inside the CIA," Washington correspondent Drew Pearson showed he understood much more about the real nature—the nine-tenths—of the CIA. He understands that the CIA engages in activities beyond our borders which would be considered highly immoral and bordering on the criminal if done within our borders; that the agency operates as a state within a state under the direction of "faceless men."

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In its insatiable quest for "intelligence," the CIA has supported many corrupt and unpopular politicians around the world. Their political operations have received CIA financing actually as payment for "intelligence."

There is also an impatience inside the CIA with sophisticated diplomacy, a lack of understanding of the social ferment which is building up steam in many underdeveloped countries. Some CIA men have difficulty distinguishing, say, between a democratic Socialist and a Marxist Communist.

The *New York Times* estimates the CIA's annual (secret) budget at half a billion. Since the CIA was established 20 years ago, this comes to a total of $20 billion. Is it conceivable that more than 10 per cent ($200 million) has been spent on the activities revealed to the public thus far? 90 per cent of its budget remains unaccounted for. Deducting operating expenses still leaves billions spent overseas in political actions. This is the real CIA.

The 1949 CIA Act says its director may spend money ". . . without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." He does this on a voucher certified by him alone. Nor does the CIA report to Congress or to any federal department; it is an independent agency, responsible only to the President. It does, however, give some (limited) information about its activities to a select group of sympathetic congressmen.

The CIA has had its own significant internal evolution in the 20 years since it was set up. Until World War II, intelligence work was carried on by the armed services and the State Department who employed agents—"spies who came in from the cold"—at so much per head. During the war, intelligence mushroomed into a huge and complicated affair, most notably centered in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). With the Cold War, all intelligence functions outside of those strictly military were lumped together in 1947 into the new agency, the CIA. Thus, the CIA is the creation of the Cold War. It was the government's answer to Stalin's revived Comintern and aggressive Communist activity. It became a *political arm* (as often as not, *the* political arm) of the Administration. It initiated and conceived policy (Bay of Pigs). President Truman wrote in 1963 that it had become "a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for Cold War enemy propaganda." He urged that its operation be halted immediately and its role be limited to the evaluation of information.

There is not a single country in the world today without a CIA presence. Its "vanguard" operators in overseas spy roles are active interventionists in political struggles in every corner of the globe: as-

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sassination, bribery, sabotage and subversion, political intervention at all levels. The record of their activities includes Cuba (Bay of Pigs); Guatemala; the Dominican Republic; Iran (ousting of the late premier Mossadegh); the Congo; Vietnam; etc., etc. The history of our time is impossible to understand without reference to the CIA; it is a force with its own momentum and influence on events. Behind the relatively small percentage of CIA "vanguard" operatives stands a vast, logistical array of research and scientific personnel and a dazzling computer and monitoring system; but this exists basically for the guidance and feeding of the CIA "activists." The role of the CIA cannot be separated from its use in American aggressive interventionist policy. Never before have we had anything like the CIA; it cannot be separated from the turn toward belligerence, interventionism, expansionism. Properly understood, the CIA cannot be separated from an analysis of American foreign policy and the role which Administration leaders have cast for the country on a global scale.

If this view is correct, then it follows that our opposition to the CIA is much more fundamental than opposition to its criminal activity in subverting American domestic movements and organizations. It becomes part and parcel of our opposition to present American political policy throughout the world. For my part, the only possible stand one can hold regarding the CIA is to propose its immediate termination, its abolition, and the cessation of all its activities. What of the "normal" gathering of intelligence and information? The answer is quite simple: send the spies out into the cold again; remove them from the warm, sheltering arms of the CIA headquarters. In short, return the formation of both domestic and foreign policy back to the proper institutions of government.

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE

"When his former speechwriter, Richard Goodwin, accused the White House of deceiving the public on the war in Vietnam (Address to National ADA Convention, September 17, calling for a "National Committee Against Widening The War"), Mr. Johnson is reported to have commented: "It's like being bitten by your own dog.' "

—Charles Bartlett, "In Washington,"
The Arizona Republic, 10/3/66.

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Michael Walzer

MORAL JUDGMENT IN TIME OF WAR

> When you resorted to force as the arbiter of human difficulty, you didn't know where you were going. . . . If you got deeper and deeper, there was just no limit except what was imposed by the limitations of force itself.
>
> Dwight Eisenhower, at a press conference, January 12, 1955

> I have said to these young men that they make too much of American brutality. The Viet Cong is equally brutal. Whether one is among the battling Pakistanis and Indians, or in Watts, or in warfare anywhere, the law of violence is such that each side becomes equally vicious. To try to distinguish which is more vicious is to fail to recognize the logic of war.
>
> Bayard Rustin, in *Civil Disobedience*, an occasional paper of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1966

From opposite sides of the spectrum of American politics, Eisenhower and Rustin suggest the same general theory of moral djugment in wartime. They both suggest that only one judgment is possible. War itself (Rustin is a pacifist), or some particular war, can be called just or unjust. But apparently nothing whatsoever can be said about morality *in* war, about justice or injustice in the midst of the strife, because the "logic of war" imposes brutality equally on all participants. Once war begins, there are no moral limits, only practical ones, only the "limitations of force itself" and of the "law of violence." This is a very common American view and one sufficiently serious to warrant careful refutation. I want to argue that it is profoundly wrong and that what the old lawyers called *jus in bello* (justice in war) is at least as important as *jus ad bellum* (the justice of war). War is indeed ugly, but there are degrees of ugliness and humane men must, as always, be concerned with degrees. As we watch the continued escalation of the war in Vietnam, this truth is driven home with especial force. Surely there is a point at which the means employed for the sake of this or that political goal come into conflict with a more general human purpose: the maintenance of moral stan-

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dards and the survival of some sort of international society. At that point, political arguments against the use of such means are overshadowed, or ought to be, by moral arguments. At that point, war is not merely ugly, but criminal.

There are limits to what can be done in wartime, even by men convinced that they are pursuing justice. These limits are never easy to specify, and it may be that they need to be newly specified for every war. It may be that morality in war is a discretionary morality. But that does not absolve us from making judgments. It only requires that we be undogmatic, pay close attention to the facts, and struggle to grasp, as best we can, the anguish of each concrete decision.

I

There is an immediate improbability about Rustin's statement which is worth noting at the outset. If brutality is something that can be measured and apportioned, as he seems to suggest, then there are an infinite number of possible apportionments, and it is extremely unlikely that equality will ever be attained. In every war, the likelihood is that one side is more brutal than the other, though often the differences are too small to matter much, even to the most scrupulous of moralists. But in the case of Vietnam, where the destructive powers of the two protagonists are so radically unequal, a casual insistence on equal brutality cannot satisfy even the least scrupulous of moralists.

But perhaps what Rustin means is that each side is as brutal as it can be, given its relative power. Brutality stops only when force is limited or when it encounters superior force. That is presumably also Eisenhower's meaning. But then what the two men are talking about is, so to speak, the logic of intentions and not of behavior. Even here, however, they are probably not right. In many wars it is possible to say that different degrees of brutality are intended by the different sides. Sometimes these different intentions are an inherent part of different strategies, sometimes of diffferent military situations. It is fairly obvious, for example, that armies fighting in friendly territory are likely to intend less brutality—whatever the limits of their power—than armies fighting amidst a hostile population. Insofar as wars are territorially limited (most wars are), one side probably has to be more brutal than the other. There are moral as well as strategic disadvantages to fighting wars in other peoples' countries.

Even if there is an identity of brutal intentions, however, it does not follow that the judgments we make of the two sides should be the

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same. Military decisions are guided by a kind of reciprocity: one side must do, or thinks it must do, whatever the other side does. In every war, however, there exist agreements, mostly informal, which rule out certain actions. Such agreements are usually enforced by mutual deterrence, though self-restraint also plays a part. Sometimes mutual deterrence doesn't work; perhaps one side is so strong that it need not fear retaliation from the other, whatever it does. Then self-restraint may break down also, and the agreements will be violated. After all, it might be said, the purpose of soldiers is to escape reciprocity, to inflict more damage on the enemy than he can inflict on them. Soldiers can never be blamed for taking advantage of superior strength. But that is not so, for there are many different ways of taking advantage of one's strength. In every case where superiority is attained and the war escalated beyond some previously established set of limits, a hard judgment has to be made. If the escalation breaks down limits useful not merely to the enemy, but to humanity generally, if precedents are established which make it likely that future wars will be more brutal than they would otherwise be, the initiating party can and must be condemned. This is so even if it can plausibly be said (for it can always be *said*) that the other side would have done the same if it could. Men are guilty of the crimes they commit, not the ones they are said to have wished to commit.

II

When we speak of brutality in wartime, we do not mean the killing of enemy combatants. It is generally recognized that virtually anything can be done to combatants. They have every reason to expect the worst and presumably are trained to defend themselves. It is their business to kill others until they are themselves killed. That is a brutal business when compared to peacetime pursuits; nevertheless, it involves behavior which is appropriate in time of war. Brutality begins with the killing of prisoners and non-combatants.

In the case of prisoners, the line between legitimate and illegitimate behavior is fairly easy to draw, in part because the condition which makes a man a prisoner is fairly easy to specify. A prisoner is an ex-combatant, helplessly in the hands of his enemies. He is entitled (according to explicit international conventions) to benevolent quarrantine for the duration of the war. There has been a tendency in recent years to deny the quarrantine and maintain a state of warfare, a struggle for the minds of the prisoners, even in the prison camps themselves. This is indeed a struggle limited only by the nature of

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available force: confessions and conversions cannot be won by killing prisoners. Virtually every form of violence short of murder, however, has been used. (See "The Destruction of Conscience in Vietnam," by Marshall Sahlins, DISSENT, January–February, 1966, for a description of ideological warfare against Vietcong prisoners; the theories behind this warfare and the methods employed in it seem to have been adapted from the Chinese Communists.) All this is criminal brutality. There is surely nothing in the "logic of war" that requires it.

With regard to non-combatants, the theoretical problems are much more difficult. This is so for a great number of reasons, several of which have been brought forward in recent months as justifications for American actions in Vietnam. First of all, modern military technology makes it very difficult to limit the damage one inflicts to enemy soldiers alone or even to military installations. Even if a decision is made not to wage a full-scale campaign of terror against civilian populations, civilians are bound to be hurt and killed by what are called necessary efforts to prevent the production and transportation of military supplies. The function of the word "necessary" in arguments of this sort is worth examining. It serves to foreclose the very possibility of moral protest. Bombing is legitimate in war, the argument goes, whenever it is necessary to victory (or stalemate, or attrition, or whatever purpose is being pursued). Military necessity cannot justify wanton destruction; at the same time, moral principles cannot invalidate necessary destruction. In effect, necessity is the only standard, and trained officers and strategists of the armed forces are the only competent judges. They solemnly conclude that civilian deaths are part of the inevitable ugliness of war.

They are sometimes right; but the argument does not hold in every case. It does not hold, for example, against all efforts to limit the geographic areas within which military judgments can apply. Rearward areas are not always subject to the same political jurisdiction as are the armies at the front. In the past, serious attempts have been made to recognize different degrees of neutrality for such areas and to admit the possibility of benevolent neutrality short of war—the kind of position the U. S. adopted vis-à-vis Great Britain in 1940 and 1941. We would have said at the time that despite the supplies we were providing for the British, German bombing of American factories would not have been morally justified. The same principle applies with even greater force, I should think, to "little wars" where limitation of the struggle is much more likely than in big ones. Thus the U.S. participated informally in efforts to prevent the French from bombing Morocco and Tunisia during the Algerian war (February, 1958), despite the con-

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structions which French strategists, perhaps quite reasonably, put upon the notion of military necessity. Limits of this sort are very precarious and need to be re-examined in every case. Exceptions are always possible. Allowance might be made for the interdiction of supplies, for example, if it could be carried out with sufficient precision or at the very borders of the battle area. And, of course, a point may be reached when assistance from some ostensibly neutral country passes over into active participation: then the limits have been broken by the other side, and the soldiers must do what they can. Until then, however, decisions are moral and political as well as military, and all of us are involved.

In one sense, however, that is always true, for there are limits to the arguments that can be made from military necessity even after the disappearance of every distinction between battleground and hinterland. The distinction between civilian and soldier still stands, and among civilians that between partial participants in the business of war (workers in munitions factories) and virtual non-participants. In the past, systematic terror bombing of urban residential areas has been defended in the name of military necessity—and it has been carried out, as it probably will be again, even when the defense was none too good. But I find it very difficult even to conceive of circumstances in which such a defense could be good enough to warrant the denial and eradication of these distinctions. For the bar against the systematic slaughter of civilians is of such immense benefit to mankind that it could only be broken by a country absolutely certain not only that the immediate gains would be enormous, but that the shattered limit would never again be of any use. That is why wars to end war (or to end aggression, subversion, or anything else) are potentially so much more brutal than wars fought for realistic and limited objectives. They encourage men to think that *this time anything goes,* for there will never be another time. But there is always another time, and so *jus in bello* is always of crucial importance.

III

The second argument currently being made relies on the character of guerrilla warfare. By the special use they make of the civilian population, it is said, the guerrillas themselves destroy all conventional distinctions. But it has to be added that guerrillas do this only when they are successful in winning popular support. Failure clearly destroys no distinctions at all. It leaves the guerrillas isolated and subject to attacks which will be horrifying to non-combatants only if the attackers are wantonly careless and cruel. Limited success is a different matter.

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It can open the way for anything from endemic banditry to actual civil war, with the local authorities never certain just who or how many their enemies are; never certain, either, what actions against the population might be justified. The problems faced by foreign troops fighting local guerrillas are different again: their very presence is generally enough to extend the limits of guerrilla success in such a way that the foreigners must assume that all natives are at least potential enemies. Foreigners fighting local guerrillas are likely to find themselves driven to justify, or rather to attempt to justify, virtually every conceivable action against a hostile population—until they reach that climactic brutality summed up in the orders issued by General Okamura, Japanese commander in the struggle against Communist guerrillas in North China during World War II: "Kill all! Burn all! Destroy all!"

At this point, the questions of morality in war and of the morality of a particular war come together. Any war that requires the methods of General Okamura, or anything approaching them, is itself immoral, however exalted the purposes in the name of which it is being fought. It is simply not the case that every war requires such methods or that violence has some inherent logic which imposes this ultimate brutality on every combatant. The violence of the guerrillas themselves, for example, takes a very different form. But any effort to destroy a guerrilla movement which has won some substantial degree of popular support is almost certain to involve the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, the shelling and bombing of inhabited villages (it may even require the development of atrocious "anti-personnel" weapons), the burning of homes, the forced transfer of populations, the establishment of civilian internment camps, and so on. It is no use saying that the guerrillas bring all this on themselves, or on their own people, by not wearing uniforms and fighting set battles. Strangely enough, men seem to prefer to wear uniforms and fight set battles when they can. They fight as guerrillas only when they lack the material resources to fight as soldiers. Guerrilla warfare is a means the weak have invented for fighting the strong. It is not for that reason automatically justifiable: the weak have no monopoly on morality. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that guerrilla warfare is effective, in part, precisely because of the moral onus it imposes on the strong. The popularity of the guerrillas (they are not always popular) forces their powerful enemies either to give up the fight or accept responsibility for actions universally condemned by the moral opinion of mankind. I see no reason not to admit that it is almost always better to give up the fight.

Guerrilla warfare is brutal on both sides, though the brutality of

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the guerrillas is likely to be inhibited by their need to maintain support among the population. The terror campaigns of even moderately successful guerrillas tend to be more discriminating than those of the authorities, partly because the guerrillas have better sources of information, but also because their enemies are forced by their positions to make themselves visible. Under the circumstances, attacks on local magistrates probably constitute legitimate warfare. Such men have consciously joined one side in a civil dispute and presumably know the risks their choice entails. They are, for all practical purposes, combatants. On the other hand, the arbitrary selection of hostages from unfriendly villages, the murder of suspects and "class enemies," the public administration of atrocious punishments—all fairly common guerrilla practices—are illegitimate actions, inadequately justified by some underground version of military necessity.

Let us assume that in a particular case the balance favors the guerrillas. It still might be said that this provides no basis for a final judgment. For what if the guerrillas advocate the establishment of a tyrannical regime, while the foreign troops are defending democracy? I cannot think of any historical case in which these two conditions are met, but they are possible conditions and need to be discussed. The view is common enough that the side fighting a just war has greater latitude in choosing means than does the side fighting an unjust war. After all, war is not a game; crucial issues are being decided; sticking to the rules may well be less important than winning. But this is a very unstable position, since both sides always claim to be fighting a just war and so might argue that the limits don't apply to them. The real issue, then, is not whether the justice of one's cause legitimatizes this or that act of unlimited violence, but whether one's own conviction as to the justice of one's cause does so. The very least that can be said is that most often it doesn't. The maintenance of some internal limits on war-making is almost certainly more important than the military or political objectives of either side. Once again, however, exceptions are always possible. One would have to be morally obtuse to insist that near-certainty is certainty itself. All that can finally be said is that there is an extraordinarily powerful prima facie case for *jus in bello.*

IV

I do not mean to deny the possibility of justifying some degree of wartime brutality by reference to the purposes of the fighting. War is never an end in itself, and so it either can never be justified or it can be

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justified only by reference to ends outside itself. The resort to war is at best a desperate wager that things will be better, men happier or more free, when it is over than they would be if it were never fought. There are times, it seems to me, when that wager is morally acceptable. Then we fight, and since we hope to finish fighting as soon as possible, and since we are convinced that our cause is just, we resort to the means that seem to promise victory. Yet ends, we all know, do not justify *any* means, both because ends are contingent and uncertain (the results of the war depend in large part upon the ways in which it is fought), and because there are other ends in the world besides the ones we have most recently chosen. Unlimited violence, whatever its immediate effects, compromises everyone's future: for some it is a final solution, for others a warning of things to come.

Obviously, judgments of relative brutality are not the only basis of our political choices. We also pay attention to the purposes that brutality serves or supposedly serves; we may even choose, not necessarily rightly, greater brutality for the sake of greater purposes. So a man may decide that he wants to fight alongside soldiers who burn peasant villages, because he approves of their long-term goals or fears the consequences of their defeat. I have only tried to suggest that such choices ought to be worrying (that they do not simply trap us in the inexorable logic of war) and that they have their moral limits: there come moments when the sheer criminality of the means adopted by one side or another overwhelms and annuls all righteous intentions. One further point should be made: even short of such moments, our political choices do not free us from the business of judging. We judge our comrades and our enemies, in the name of ourselves, our comrades and our enemies. "I have to take part in the struggle, not to humanize it," Jean Paul Sartre has said. That seems to me precisely wrong. If one must take sides, it is not in order to escape having to impose limits on oneself and one's comrades, but (in part) in order to do so effectively.

The same argument holds, I think, in the interior moments of war, when officers sometimes face the most difficult and agonizing choices. They, above all, have a clear responsibility to uphold the limits. But it may be the case that only some act of brutality against the enemy will save the lives of the soldiers under their command, to whom they have an even clearer responsibility. Prisoners are sometimes killed, for example, because there seems no other way to guarantee their helplessness and protect one's own men. Whatever one thinks of such acts, when they are literally *incidents,* they are at least understandable. And when the exigencies of each incident are taken into account, they are possibly

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justifiable: here the end may justify the means. But it is something else again when brutality becomes a settled policy. Then it is probably true that officers ought to disobey, or at least to protest, the commands which follow from the policy (and which are unrelated to the exigencies of some particular situation). They ought to do so even if they still approve of the ends for which the war is being fought. Protest and disobedience are now the necessary consequences of their judgments, the only way they have to "humanize" the struggle.

Even if the lives of one's own troops are spared by a policy of unlimited violence, and even if more lives are spared than are lost on the other side, the policy is not justified. Morality in war is not settled by any single measure; it is a matter of long-term agreements and precedents as much or more than of immediate arithmetic. Here the rigorous "law of violence" comes into conflict with what are more loosely called the "laws" of international society. With regard to these laws soldiers must keep two facts in mind: that war is only a temporary rupture in international society and that it is a recurrent rupture. For both these reasons, it ought never to be a total rupture.

It is never the case that wartime actions are limited only by the force available to one side or to the other. Not that such limits are no limits at all; the second is especially effective. Fear of the enemy often has a wonderfully moralizing effect. We must all pray that we never find ourselves at war with an utterly powerless country, deprived of every retaliatory capacity. Still, many wars will be fought between states of radically unequal strength. In such cases, more than in other types of war, it is enormously important that the moral opinion of neutral nations and of all mankind be mobilized to uphold those precarious barriers, distinctions and limits which stand between conventional warfare, ugly as it is, and criminal brutality.

It is, to be sure, disturbing to see a few men seize upon this other logic and make it the basis for hysterical and self-righteous denunciation. Moral judgment, like moral choice, is highly vulnerable to distortion. Both can become occasions for the shrill expression of personal malaise. The tensions and ambiguities implicit in the very idea of *morality in the midst of war* are all too easy to ignore. And then moral judgments are made in bad faith. But it is, I think, only another kind of bad faith to refuse altogether to total up the gruesome balance, to apply one's moral reason even to the business of war. Let us judge with due hesitation, judge without certainty; and then defend our judgments with all the passion we can command.

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Pat Watters

MISSISSIPPI: CHILDREN AND POLITICS

The almost esoteric controversy and clamor that have surrounded the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM) show in clear perspective some basic facts about America in the time of the Johnson Administration: what's happening to the poverty program, convolutions of national (and the new Southern) politics, "black power," effectiveness and dilemmas of the nation's liberals, and the way it is with the poor themselves who have so much to gain—and even more to lose.

CDGM was established as a Head Start program in the days of the poverty program in the summer of 1965. According to the lore (and it is well to point out that there is a great body of it, and that while the main lines emerge with consistency, no two people or documents tell its details exactly alike), civil rights activists were at the time casting about for a follow-up to the tumultuous 1964 Freedom Summer. These included the tough, grass-roots oriented Delta Ministry of the National Council of Churches; remnants of the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) that largely SNCC-dominated civil rights alliance which had run the Freedom Summer; the Freedom Democratic party people; others, including free-lance community organizers. They were persuaded by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to undertake the job of setting up Head Start schools across the state. Establishing this least controversial of poverty programs was a formidable job in Mississippi; the people and agencies (in the terms of demonology, the power structures and normal channels) who ordinarily would have been given the task wouldn't touch it.

Whether deliberately or not, CDGM played a role which became crucial in later controversy. It served as an agent of fear to force the power structures and normal channels to involve themselves in the poverty program; otherwise all that money and those jobs would be in the hands of the nefarious civil rights "agitators." There followed frantic (and from all reports fairly typical) organization of Community Action Programs (CAP) across the state, peopled by respectable whites (in a state not too

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long past the days when the ultimate in respectability was membership in the Citizens' Council) and middle-class Negroes. One who was intimately and conscientiously involved in this effort recalled that the pressure from OEO was for quick action, not quality of board membership.

The first CDGM grant was for $1.4 million; it financed 84 Head Start centers for 6,000 children from May to August, 1965. By July, Sen. John Stennis had completed his own investigation of the program and had one made by the Senate Appropriations Committee staff, and concluded that federal money was being used to subsidize civil rights groups and that there was evidence of irregular handling of funds. These are the essential charges that were to be repeated in each crisis of CDGM. Most of the story is summed up in the fact that the OEO moved from a position of denying them to making them. Part of the lore is the August 21, 1955, *New Republic* article by Andrew Kopkind which claims that Rep. John Bell Williams, the Goldwater Democrat, persuaded Sen. Stennis to use his influence against CDGM for the obvious *Realpolitik* reasons. This meant more than the opposition of Sen. James Eastland which would have been expected as automatic; Sen. Stennis is adjudged a more rational Southern racist, and more importantly, was on the very committee from which the poverty program had to get its money.

It took until February, 1966, that first time, for CDGM to get refunded. "Glory, glory, hallelujah, we want our Head Start School," a "romper lobby" of 48 five-year-olds from Mississippi sang to Congress at one of a number of demonstrations for refunding. The most important demonstration, however, was the fact that 50 of the 84 centers remained open, the staffs working for no pay, during the months of delay. It was in this action by the "poor," the "uneducated," who had found not only the rarity of regular-paying work in CDGM, but a sense of achievement and vision about the children, that the real meaning of CDGM (with implications beyond the yet Neanderthal stratagems of Mississippi politics) began to emerge.

The nation had in the previous summer learned to be properly choked up by the valiant little freedom schools in Mississippi. Publicity was lavished on them and their largely white college-student staffs. But there were no full-page pictures in the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Look* of the Negro staffs in the CDGM schools nor of their larger accomplishments.

In the first refunding crisis, the program's first director, Dr. Tom Levin, a New York lay psychoanalyst, was quietly eased out, and the headquarters was moved from the Delta Ministry's Mount Beulah Conference Center near Edwards, Mississippi (with its movement tone and

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people), to a proper office building in downtown Jackson. Dr. Levin's main contribution was the unique spirit of the schools, no small matter of significance in the CDGM saga. What invariably impresses visitors is the confident bearing and bright-faced demeanor of the little Head Start children; this miracle seems to have been wrought by no more than the application of undiluted "progressive education" on them, a commentary on mediocre norms of most Southern education. Dr. Levin seems also to have been of that variety of Northern missionary familiar through the history of the South whose revulsion from the grosser evils of the Southern way of life allowed no rapprochement with its smaller charms and its perhaps smaller opportunities for encouraging local reform. The tone of the first funded period of CDGM seems to have been largely that of the previous year's Freedom Summer when local propriety was affronted by beards and bohemianism never to be forgiven (while murder by local whites went unexpiated).

This early CDGM tone was understandable, but created perhaps a needless handicap. There were some local whites and many of the Negro middle class who might have been CDGM allies who were among those put off, and there resulted probably the weakest part of the CDGM program. This is the inability to get the kind of local support required for health examinations and the like, including in some cases even food supplies needed in Head Start centers. The problem in such a state as Mississippi, however, is that those who normally manage such resources do it in such a way as to demean the recipient. As one local observer put it, the doctor doesn't establish a relationship with the child and his parent which would mean future treatment and better health. Instead, the person who got the doctor establishes a relationship of power over the parent and child; if a doctor is needed again, they know to whom they must go to get one—if they are desperate enough.

Under the second funding, after Sargent Shriver, director of the OEO had defended the program generally—while acknowledging some irregularities—CDGM received $5.6 million in February, 1966, to administer 121 centers in 28 counties for a six-month period. John Mudd, a white graduate student who came to Mississippi during the Freedom Summer to direct a summer seminar project at Tougaloo College, emerged as the new director. Miss Marian Wright, who is Negro, of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is said to have suggested him for the job. She is on the board of directors of CDGM. The two of them, in the despairing way of the post-1964 regulars who stayed on in the South, have been eloquent in describing Mississippi's terrible problems of the race and poverty and persistent in seeking solutions. It would not be proper to call

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them the brains of CDGM, but their influence has been considerable. Both are well-educated, sophisticated, and movement-seasoned young people of that extraordinary kind who have persistently held to the old goals of the civil rights movement and the old dream of a fundamental change in American society—against virtually nothing but disappointment and, of late, a desertion and giving-up on both the goals and the dream by the vast majority of those, both white and Negro, who felt the same in the early sixties.

II

The new grant meant that CDGM was pumping nearly a million dollars a month into the poorest part of the economy of the nation's poorest state; a lot of jobs, a lot of power was involved. In the way of statistics, a CDGM handout proclaimed that 98.9 per cent of the 2,272 employees during the period were local residents, and the vast majority of them poor people. In this, as in education, CDGM was a startlingly successful operation; it seemed to be doing what the poverty program called for in the most straightforward manner.

Like the education theory, the organizational framework had the virtue of rational design. The staff and the advisory boards were set up on three levels: local, regional, and state; the middle layer to serve as go-between for the top and bottom. Poor people, less than well educated, including teachers, filled the jobs; there was real mobility from bottom to top, as well as communication. There were people who began as teachers on the local level, moved through the middle level, and served in administrative posts at headquarters. Here, in part, was the source of the spirit of CDGM which, far better than most big organizational structures, maintained a connection between action-taking power and the reality with which the action was supposed to deal. As far along as the period of the third funding, with super-strict regulations from OEO breathing a poison of caution into the superstructure, Mrs. Pearl Draine, associate director of the program for children, could reassert the old spirit by becoming fed-up with weeks of wheel-spinning to get the schools ready to open under the new regulations; she sent out the order to open 'em Monday, ready or not.

There were supposed to be 9,000 children in the centers under the second grant; the count was closer to 12,000 because none was refused. Beyond this, another 49 centers in counties not covered by CDGM were being operated by volunteers and on whatever money they could raise, serving some 4,000 children. Those in Sunflower County (home of Senator Eastland) were in this category, competing successfully for children

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and local Negro support with well-heeled "regular" Head Starts under the county's Community Action Program (CAP). A visit I made in early 1967 to Sunflower City, a hamlet with a majority Negro population, suggested some of the strengths underlying CDGM. The center, built of corrugated metal, was on a row of small, neat Negro homes fronting the usual rutted dirt road. "Don't Teach Children; Teach a Child," said a sign on the wall.

Inside, and spilling out into the yard, about 30 children were enjoying a play period—pushing each other in home-made wagons, laughing and horsing around (in that way of gentleness notable in Southern Negro children), taking turns sliding down a home-made sliding board—a "usual scene" in the schools. 60 children were on the rolls; half were out because of "flu." Mrs. Eddy J. Townsend, a large-framed, retired teacher with a no-nonsense face, told how she walked a mile, to work from 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., and a mile home—for nothing. A little boy was holding on to her, quietly protesting because three others on a tricycle wouldn't let him ride. She said to him, "You go ride," and to the three, "Y'all share," and the accommodation was made. She said she had taught 23 years in public schools, and had decided to work with the Sunflower City Center, "as long as the children come."

Otis Brown, the young Negro man who is director of the school, told how it was sort of a continuation of one that was started as a freedom school in nearby Indianola, and was "burned out" by whites. The building and a second-hand bus used to haul children represented a $500 investment of money raised by a "newsletter" (typed with carbons) sent to Northern patrons. Local Negroes had built the building six months before on land owned by a Negro woman next door, Mrs. Lula Mae Brooks, who was fired from her job as a maid because of her 1964 involvement in the movement, and, vowing she would rather die than be a maid again, has been a local leader since. Mr. Brown hoped to be elected mayor of Sunflower City in an election-ordered re-run by a federal court so that Negro candidates might be placed on the ballot. The election, to be held in May, was considered a test of whether movement leaders (including Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer of Ruleville) with their CDGM and FDP orientation could muster a strong local Negro vote against the usual obstacles—everything from economic and physical intimidation to apathy.

Looking about him at the children and the well-kept "center," Mr. Brown struggled for the words that would describe what the effort there represented to the people. He said it wasn't really a question of taking sides between CDGM and the whites in power. The main thing

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was to get to share in the Head Start program, but not in the old way of charity, with the whites giving orders. There ought to be an opportunity to talk things out. *"It's got to not be race,"* he said.

The opposition from Mississippi's two U. S. Senators and the whites of the state resumed with the second grant to CDGM. There were the usual charges and a flurry of concern, in a state notable for unconcern about education, over a textbook prepared by CDGM in ungrammatical language—that is, the language spoken in the homes of most of the Head Starters. On August 22, 1966, the Jackson *Daily News* (long a leading voice of Mississippi racism), announced a three-way investigation underway by not only the General Accounting Office and the Senate Appropriations Committee, but the Office of Economic Opportunity as well. In this article, CDGM was linked with the "militant black power wing of the civil rights movement," a charge that was later to figure in leaks to such journalistic reflections of the Johnsonian spirit in Washington as the Evans-Novak column. Mr. Shriver has denied ever making such a charge, but the leaks were generally attributed to OEO and they cited the "black power" complaint as the real reason for the impending end of CDGM funding. Another new charge was that nepotism figured in some CDGM hiring. The irony of this coming from Mr. Shriver's office did not go unnoted. One explanation was offered for the "nepotism" in one hamlet: all the Negroes there were related to one another.

The CDGM staff and board, meanwhile, encouraged by the genuine success of the schools and the program's involvement of poor people, had in July drawn up a request for $41 million to operate a statewide program. This was sent back as fiscally out of the question, and a new request for $21 million was submitted in what the CDGM headquarters people declare was complete good faith. Mr. Mudd described one of the more subtle terrors of the trade he has found himself in: the second proposal, a document of some 115 pages of text and numerous appendices of facts and figures, setting out with some eloquence the rationale and philosophy of CDGM, was prepared in an incredibly short time by people going nights without sleep. It was praised by educators as a remarkable social document—but from OEO in Washington it soon became evident that no one had read it in its entirety. Specialists read it piecemeal. The proposal was based on actual registration of 30,000 children in 44 counties, with local communities not already in the program setting up committees on their own to form schools. The reduced proposal was submitted to a public hearing and finally approved by more than 2,000 in attendance with a resolution saying

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that the full $41 million was needed, and that $29 million was a bare minimum. A copy of the resolution, beginning, "We, the poor people of Mississippi, assembled at this CDGM public hearing, August 13, 1966, declare our full support of the CDGM Head Start program," was sent to the President. His reaction is not recorded.

On September 30, the Jackson *Daily News* broke an exclusive story gleefully saying that "the controversial" CDGM would not be refunded, and that it would be replaced by a 12-man board of white and Negro leaders set up under the "personal supervision" of Mr. Shriver. Senator Stennis was quoted as saying he had been working toward just such an end. This bit of journalistic enterprise inadvertently gave CDGM a month's early warning of impending disaster, embarrassed the OEO with the disclosure that it had been setting up a new Head Start agency before ever notifying the old one that it was to be ended, and moved powerful liberal forces in the nation to the defense of CDGM.

III

At this point, the CDGM lore begins to lack definitiveness. It is not clear, for example, whether the plot to scrap CDGM and replace it with Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP), originated in Washington or Mississippi. Some on the CDGM side suspect that the group of white moderates and liberals and mainly middle-class Negroes who have sought to build a loyalist Democratic party in Mississippi, sold the idea to Washington. Hodding Carter III, a prime mover in MAP, denies this vehemently. He said that the first call came in August from an OEO source in the Atlanta regional office, saying that CDGM could not be refunded, and who in Mississippi might set up a more acceptable group to run Head Start? Others tell the same story, but suggest the groundwork was being laid as early as May.

Whichever and whenever, MAP was set up to replace CDGM. Its board was headed by wealthy industrialist Owen Cooper, a chemical plant owner of Yazoo City. The most influential Negro member was Aaron Henry, stalwart of the civil rights movement, the Clarksdale druggist who kept a precarious balance between the NAACP and the COFO radicals through 1964. Mr. Henry, something of a folk hero in his time, seems to have been doing merely what comes naturally for a tough-minded politician and state NAACP president. Offered such an opportunity for power and patronage, he took it. Some say it was the gravest mistake he has ever made. The bitterness of the CDGM-MAP split, with much of the Negro CDGM wrath falling on Mr. Henry, reflects continuing animosity that started with the 1964 Freedom

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Summer and a split between the NAACP and SNCC, and continued between NAACP and the Freedom Democratic Party (FDP). It is to some extent a class split, with the middle-class Negro approach embodied in the NAACP and MAP. Also involved perhaps is the subterranean feuding between the NAACP and the Legal Defense Fund, a national phenomenon. On the national level, Roy Wilkins was caught in a terrible squeeze—under pressure to support his Mississippi people in MAP (including state NAACP director Charles Evers) and threatened with loss of funds from Northern liberal sources unless he got behind CDGM. He ended up asserting support of both, saying they were not mutually exclusive. There are those, however, on the CDGM side who see the NAACP as a prime mover in the plot.

There are many stories of Mississippi politics which make the state seem like one spread-out, gossipy small town. One about Aaron Henry and Owen Cooper is that they met at a Human Relations Council banquet at which Mr. Cooper had appeared, perhaps reluctantly, to introduce the liberal former Congressman Brooks Hayes. Mr. Cooper said during dinner to Mr. Henry that he felt he had done his Christian duty in most civic affairs, but not by the Negro poor (he is much given to saying this), and that if a chance came where Mr. Henry thought he might help out, he would like to hear from him. The story is that Mr. Henry immediately thought of his new friend, Mr. Cooper, when the MAP proposition was offered. However Mr. Cooper got into it (and some see him there to further a long-range desire for the governor's chair), his presence is attributed by many to the absence of one of the key members of the moderate political coalition, Claude Ramsey, state director of the AFL–CIO. Mr. Ramsey, a shrewd survivor in a state whose white people hate labor almost as much as desegregation, demurs from this view, though making no bones of his distaste for Mr. Cooper and his labor relations. He said merely that MAP didn't look good to him from the start, and that when they asked for a labor representative, he had enough sense to know it should be a Negro one. He demurs, too, from the theory that the anti-union flavor of MAP helped induce Walter Reuther and his Citizens Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP) to throw formidable weight behind efforts to save CDGM. Ramsey's awareness, however, of CCAP's predelictions (CCAP supported CDGM in the first fund fight) might have had a bearing on his reluctance to be involved with MAP.

MAP was chartered by Gov. Paul Johnson on September 13, and received a $3 million grant on October 11. Funds to CDGM were ended on October 3. From that date until December 17, when Sargent Shriver

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capitulated to the liberal pressures, and until January 30 when after what seemed churlish delay, he finally signed a new $5 million funding, a big-time battle was joined on the national level over little old CDGM.

In CDGM's corner, in addition to Mr. Reuther and CCAP, were the Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church (by virtue of their sponsorship of CDGM through Mary Holmes Junior College, a stratagem which originally prevented veto of the program by Governor Johnson); functionaries of the Congregational Church and the National Council of Churches; the Field Foundation (which provided limited funds to let CDGM limp along); the New World Foundation; and a battery of high-powered attorneys, including Joseph Rauh, the ADA and Civil Rights Leadership Conference leader, and the prestigious law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. CCAP coordinated the attack; one of its major achievements was keeping it alive in the newspapers, with not much help from the *New York Times*. The battle was marked by that deadly coldness and ruthlessness we have come somehow not to take as frightening in our national (not to mention international) affairs. OEO seems to have fought dirtiest (it accused, found guilty, and sentenced CDGM without bothering to notify its staff, let alone allow it to defend itself, a disregard for due process seriously being considered for court or legislative remedy in pro-CDGM circles; it asked fiscal purity far beyond its usual norms, according to much competent testimony). But the coalition against OEO—including all those churchmen—fought the fire with its own white-hot flame. Not the smallest of its tactics was to set old friends (including even his former legal counsel) upon Mr. Shriver, this culminating in the mobilization of Vice President Humphrey, an ace card which, if not the deciding factor, was certainly one that hurried along Mr. Shriver's defeat.

Also important was the work of a blue-ribbon panel of liberals headed by Dr. Robert Spike, professor of theology at the University of Chicago (later mysteriously slain, to add a somber note) and A. Philip Randolph. The panel investigated CDGM and found the charges against it false. CCAP also coordinated letters of protest from professional groups, with plans to keep these coming in increasing numbers. To much of this, as to a full-page ad in the *New York Times*, Mr. Shriver's response can be most charitably described as overly defensive.

In the lore it is varyingly stated that this titanic battle was joined somewhere along the way, if not from the beginning, by the President himself, through the good offices of Harry McPherson, special counsel to President Johnson, and Douglas Wynn, a Greenville, Mississippi, attorney considered a special friend to the President. Here again, the

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lore is hazy. If all the accounts are to be followed and believed, the highest power in the land at first acquiesced in the MAP plot, but then turned about and allowed (if not directed) the Vice President to step in and save CDGM—which in effect betrayed those like Aaron Henry who had put considerable political and personal prestige into following the first signals, not to mention the unhappy Mr. Shriver.

IV

A student of Johnson's off-balancing ways, however, might make sense of the sequence of events. Stennis and Eastland were given the pleasure of seeing CDGM almost destroyed. The Mississippi moderates were given an extraordinary, if not unique, boon at the expense of the regular Democratic party right-wingers, a real hunk of patronage. In the political annals, this may eventually turn out to be the most important thing that happened, and to substantiate a claim in a highly regarded piece of lore published in *Christianity and Crisis,* by Larold K. Schulz (who is Executive Coordinator of the Anti-Poverty Task Force of the National Council of Churches). His contention was that the real aim of the President in the affair was to help out the moderates. This analysis is given credence in some Washington circles, but is viewed with more skepticism in Mississippi—where the question is asked, why should he when the real power is still in the hands of the rightist regulars? One answer is that anyone setting out to kill CDGM and replace it with a moderately controlled program would be helping the regular party rightists, because they would prefer to cope with conventional deal-making politicians than with the kind of uncompromising force CDGM seemed capable of producing—people capable of giving up all, rather than make a deal. Certainly the avoidance of such politics is a part of the art of government in the areas of concentration of poor and Negro voters, as poverty leaders in Syracuse discovered, and as Dr. King learned in Chicago. Moreover, a man like Mr. Carter complains eloquently (while disclaiming that MAP has an iota of political content) that the Administration has done nothing for the moderates but double-cross them, or why else would they have turned to a Bobby Kennedy cocktail party for funds? The truth seems to be that the moderates (even as Aaron Henry of old) keep a precarious perch with a foot in each of these volatile party camps.

Certainly, when the Vice President came in on the funding negotiations, on the side of the angels, there was the sense that various people had been betrayed, and yet some impressive authorities hint that the Vice President acted not with Presidential disfavor. So—in the end,

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everybody got a little and lost a little, and that is the way with it in a consensus, isn't it, no matter how it collapses.

Not the least of the debilitating effects of the battle royal over CDGM hit the Office of Economic Opportunity itself. Staffers were split in their reaction to the way the situation was handled; some of them got up a petition protesting it and were treated to a long, fatherly interview with Mr. Shriver. All three men in the unit's civil rights division quit, two of them over CDGM alone. In early 1967, a staff member in Washington said morale was at an all-time low over CDGM, over the inability to get programs of merit through political opposition in Northern cities and bad CAP boards in the South, and over the rumors that the department would have its functions and whatever was left of its spirit of innovation turned over to the mercies of the regular bureaucracies. Many old hands had left and others were working with their bags packed.

At any rate, MAP was created and proceeded with difficulty to try to set up standard-model Head Start schools in 24 counties. Similar schools are operated by CAP boards in the state. Some 40 of these were set up during the second funding negotiations, with a special task force from OEO working to convert CDGM schools to what is called delegate agencies, which means they have their own board and virtual autonomy. This seems to have been a concession to Mississippi reality by the better half of OEO when it was thought CDGM really would be killed, and suggests one hopeful fate of the remaining CDGM schools if the program finally is killed.

Also growing out of the final funding crisis was a dispute over five of Mississippi's counties which originally had CDGM schools, but were assigned to MAP. This is a sorest of sore spots, with many of the old CDGM people refusing or being refused the opportunity to cooperate with MAP. The fate of the five counties was not a pretty part of the funding fight. These counties were placed under MAP when it was set up, but on December 17, the OEO announced it would refund CDGM and place the five counties back under CDGM. During the interim, before the new grant was signed, they were to stay with MAP and that's where they still are. It was dirty pool on the part of OEO, like agreeing to a strike settlement and then, after the workers have returned to the job, changing the terms of the agreement. If they had been aware of this situation, CDGM and its allies would have fought for the five counties during negotiations and probably would have refused the refunding—as they seemed ready to do if conditions had been to get rid of director John Mudd, or the Rev. James McCree of

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Canton, a Negro and chairman of the board. There was some sentiment in CDGM for a fight when the five counties were taken away. But there was also some feeling (including that of some Negro grass-roots leaders) to be more pragmatic, to take what was still a victory, and not to jeopardize the greater good for the sake of a few. Such, too, was the advice of important elements among liberal CDGM supporters who were still unwilling to face the fact that the treatment of the five counties had diminished that victory considerably.

Many of the CDGM schools continued to operate during the negotiation fight (as they had during the previous one), and the willingness of its people to work for the children on a no-pay "volunteer" basis was probably CDGM's chief strength. The CDGM schools in the five counties continued this volunteer operation for months after the grant was signed. A private organization called Friends Of The Children Of Mississippi, an offshoot (in terms of personnel and approach) of CDGM, administered (with some foundation support) the volunteer units in the five counties and in one other. As late as mid-March, 1967, Friends Of The Children was operating 28 centers with 1,912 children —more than MAP was handling in these areas.

A strategy was devised for bargaining with MAP—and, if MAP refused, with OEO. As MAP had the money and Friends Of The Children had the children, the proposal was that Friends Of The Children be allowed to operate the schools on CDGM principles, with MAP money. A meeting was held on April 1, 1967, to discuss this and alternate strategies (including that of just struggling along without support) by the people, mainly Negro women, who had done all the work and lavished all their hope on the schools. Though the strategy was finally given approval there was considerable opposition to sitting down and bargaining with MAP. The move was one of sheer practicality, beyond pragmatism—born out of past sad experience, out of the feeling that you can't out-fox the fox.

These people had a profound distrust of the basics of American practical political procedure, and CDGM's achievement of having built in them real trust in a federally financed (power-structure oriented) program became fully clear. "If Friends Of The Children falls through, if those people lose their schools," said one of Mississippi's toughest pragmatists, "How will they ever again believe in anything?"

Another offshoot is Mississippi Action for Community Education (MACE), which hoped to get private funding, to provide technical assistance and training to community organizations for any kind of action, from poverty program to boycotts, they might want to take.

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Such an organization was needed southwide; SNCC and CORE, before they went off on "black power," seemed headed in such a direction. MACE, with its roots in the CDGM experience, might be the beginning or the model of something big in the continuing transition from demonstration to implementation in the South.

But meanwhile, Mississippi's better people, its few white liberals and moderates, its Negroes, were split asunder in the aftermath of the CDGM battle's bitterness. Mr. Shriver's office, after the dust settled, was citing a news article that pleased it, and this was a rarity. It was in a series on CDGM by James C. Millstone in the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch,* and it suggested that happily enough, and all by accident and blunder, Mississippi now has two mutually complimentary programs, MAP, which "prepares whites to accept Negroes on equal terms," and CDGM, which "works to bring Negroes to the point where they can deal with whites as equals." More on the mark of truth are points made by Leslie W. Dunbar, director of the Field Foundation, in a lecture at the Ezra Stiles College at Yale—that it is "especially saddening to see Negro and white liberal Southerners . . . at war, as they are over CDGM," and that though "we weep and we worry at what we fearfully apprehend to be the progressive abdication of Negroes and youth from the general society," there was a strong effort to kill in CDGM probably the most important endeavor in which Negroes and white youth were still working together within the normal framework of the larger society.

It is necessary to wade through the density of detail in the CDGM saga to get the feel of what really happened. The mainstream modes of high-powered modern America are complicated and mean, and even so pure and simple a plan as the Head Start schools becomes caught up and altered. It is good even to sit for awhile in one of the outer offices of the Office of Economic Opportunity in Washington, and observe without rancor (because we are all what we are, shaped by culture and accident) the secretaries and tired-looking men busy with all the paper work of big-organization ritual, and listen as a little flurry of excitement runs through them at a hurry-up order to ship a film to a Mr. Martinez way off somewhere in unreality. Phone calls are made for plane schedules, a messenger is sent for, effort is made to get the right name and address on the label. It is good to sit there and try to picture Mr. Martinez and whatever his poverty program effort and reality of hungry children might be, as a secretary makes her harmless, unintentionally offensive little joke in old-movie mock Mexican-English, and to remember the little girl in Mississippi at Strike City.

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At Strike City, a lot of history comes together. There, the desperately poor people of the cotton plantations who attempted in 1965 to strike against the law of labor supply and demand lived in tents until Frank Smith, one of the old SNCCs who ran a voter registration effort with style in Holly Springs, came and single-handedly built fine concrete block and wood housing units and a community center. The little girl and her family lived in one of the units, and she and her mother came out to greet visitors, and took them inside to see the nice interior with the modern kitchen and the walls all blackened with kerosene oil from a faulty stove and against one wall in the living room, a bookcase, filled with books. "They are the children's," said the mother who came from the plantations and had no opportunity for education. The little girl went and took down a book and brought it to the adult visitor and, like any little five-year-old who has grown up with books, she turned the pages and pointed to the pictures and told what they were: fish and monkey and cow and clown.

To know the norm of such a family in the South is to know the achievement of such a scene, and the hope. Earlier when she first came up and looked the visitors in the eye and told her name without shyness and stuck out her black little hand to the white ones, one of the visitors had asked, "Do you go to school?" and she had answered: "To the CDGM."

That has been the chief accomplishment, the most complete one. The headquarters staff, the young white and Negro intellectuals, like to say that this is only the smallest part of it, that the bigger part is involving the poor people in a high-powered organization and letting them learn its jungle trails and trials by combat so that they can survive and flourish in the new America, change their lives and societies, and even shake the vapid foundations of those big bureaucrat-culture offices up in Washington. On this level, the Head Start, the children were an issue around which the poor people might organize. For they would see the fine effect on their little pre-schoolers and they would inevitably ask, "But what happens when they get in those regular schools?" And no one would have to answer; they would know that something had to be done about the regular schools. And one way to begin would be to register and vote and join the PTA. And soon such a community would be in action, even as the poverty program envisioned. Marian Wright said children were an obvious issue; they were precious, and whites wouldn't be too worried, wouldn't harass them. (There has been some sporadic white violence, but far less to CDGM than to the old civil rights efforts, and even less than to MAP which stirs the violent

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racists because of its white employees and strained efforts to enroll a few white children.) Miss Wright was asked if there were other such obvious issues. "Welfare," she answered. "Eating and kids. They're basic."

The light and the space make things plainer to see in Mississippi, or maybe it is the plain talk of the poor Negroes whose earnestness and honest values fed the civil rights movement and was the real strength of CDGM. Here are leaders, their leaders, two of them talking on the main achievements of CDGM. Amzie Moore of Cleveland, Mississippi: "The kids in CDGM are not put in a bind. They are told what to do, and what not to do. But they are let to develop as they are. They're not bashful. They talk, sing. Their little spirits have been lifted. They have become individuals. But once they get in the regular school system, I don't know if a teacher with 60 kids in her class will know this, will know how to handle them." Mrs. Unita Blackwell of Isaquena County: "The people had given up on PTA, schools, etc., teachers, etc. They wouldn't have anything to do with it. Teachers said they were ignorant. They were discouraged. You had to work on them to get them to come to CDGM parents' meetings. But when they came to CDGM, they said it feels good to know they had something to give, to help run things."

That was what was going on, and to an extent continued under the last funding, though John Mudd at its outset spoke of his pessimism about being able to achieve the "real goals." The organization was hamstrung with probably the strictest regulations and surveillance in the poverty program; its staff and grass-roots followers worked in the belief that this would be the last funding. The hope was that the people in CDGM would be able to continue its spirit and its aims in the other poverty programs, in privately financed programs or in community organizations after it is gone. But the polluted waters of the mainstream were seeping in early in that last funding period. A major policy dispute developed between the staff and the board; ostensibly it was over who should fill one of the administrative jobs, but below the surface was distrust and suspicion centered on patronage and the power involved in all those jobs to give to people.

The liberals who put together their remarkable coalition to save CDGM congratulated themselves justifiably on having won the first major victory for justice in the South since Selma. But it was a strange victory. Few in the nation knew that it had been won, let alone what was at stake. Out of the CDGM experience, CCAP began building a national complaint center program to try to provide technical aid to similarly beleaguered groups. But generally, there was little attempt to

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make the obvious connection between CDGM and the rest of the poverty program, to force the issue for the whole program and not simply CDGM in Mississippi.

The issue was clearly, as John Mudd and Marvin Hoffman stated it in *The Nation,* October 24, 1966, the flaws built into "community action" programs of OEO whereby the whole community, rich and poor, theoretically work together to solve problems of poverty.

> The poor are again deprived of control of factors which most directly affect their own lives, and, as a result, lose the opportunity to acquire the competence which would allow them to sit as equals, able to represent effectively the claims of their group. In fact, a traditional authoritarian pattern, which at best approaches humanitarian paternalism, is reinforced. The few immediate beneficiaries of the programs among the poor will receive a short-term boost to their incomes through their dole as "aides," but even these gains are contingent on the acceptance of whatever strings of dependency may be implicit. The danger of spawning such short-sighted poverty programs lies in the unwitting creation of a "low-level equilibrium trap" in which the human basis for continued growth is throttled rather than liberated.

The victory of the liberals then was to preserve one deviant program, the exception that proved the rule of the general failure of the poverty program. Why wasn't the battle fought over the issue of basic policy, or why was the issue of basic policy not pressed after the victory? The answers include everything from awareness that OEO itself was about to be dismantled to discouragement over the Vietnam War, to acknowledgment of the "mood of the nation" which was no longer thought to be liberal. Another large question might well be whether most of those who fought for CDGM in Mississippi would similarly support it in any other state of the union.

V

The riddle of Mississippi remains unanswered, but it seems clear that the kind of creative and purposeful direction in the lives of the poor that CDGM set in motion is not going to be set in motion under the forces which, like the big offices in Washington, are so far from any comprehension of the reality of poverty that they cannot act meaningfully. Some put it more harshly; how can the people and institutions which in direct and indirect ways are responsible for the existence of poverty be expected to change it? Yet another way of looking at it is to say that the middle class of white and Negro Americans are no more in control of the forces that shape their lives (as witness the Vietnam

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War) than are the poor. Indeed, as we keep learning, so many of the poor are passed over by the controlling forces of conventional welfare that they do have the kind of potential for free action and independence of thought that sprang up so quickly in Mississippi and other parts of the South in the Negro movement and such efforts as CDGM.

One of the awarenesses in CDGM was that to lose out to MAP and the CAP committees or to the mainstream spirit of power-seeking and accommodation did not necessarily mean that poverty in the form of physical and fiscal deprivation would continue, but that alleviation of poverty would be used by the conventional forces to control those who need help. The implications for the years ahead of diminishing jobs and increasing welfarism are clear. The middle-class of the nation stands ready for whatever new halter is being prepared; the old Marxist hope that the poor might be a revolutionary force breathes anew in an ironic way in the notion that they might form a political force to fight for freedom and individualism, for control of institutions instead of vice-versa. But the struggle for survival (as with the black-belt farmers trying desperately to assert their right to live on the land—a kind of right the middle class so far seems to be not even aware of) consumes the energy and efforts of the poor.

The charge that "black power" permeated CDGM was demonstrably untrue if it meant to say the organization was under the sway of the exhibitionist sloganeers of what is left of SNCC and CORE. But if any understanding was to be had of the meaning of CDGM it had to include the knowledge that the kind of stirring among poor Negroes that it achieved had to be done by the poor Negroes themselves. The same would seem to hold true for poor whites. The Mudd-Hoffman article makes the point that such a separatist phase is necessary while the poor learn how to cope with high-powered organizational modes and methods. Only after the poor learn to cope can they deal effectively with the sophisticated forces they find on a conventional CAP board. But where outside of bad old Mississippi would most liberals concede this—and make a fight for a CDGM?

Dr. Dunbar in his Yale speech cites as a major political miscalculation the belief that a loyalist Democratic party can be built in Mississippi (or any other Deep South state) without the poor Negroes—as the forces behind MAP seemed to be trying to do. ". . . They can't go without the poor; without them they don't have the votes even to be interesting—and the Negro poor have, at least yet for awhile, a new vision in Mississippi."

This seemed to be the deepest political meaning in the CDGM

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battle. The Negro vote is large enough at 32.9 per cent of its potential in Mississippi to be worth a major struggle on the national level, from most accounts involving even the President. The percentage of registered Negroes is higher in most other Southern states, but, not having experienced a Mississippi summer like that of 1964, and for other reasons, none of the other Southern states have as mature a Negro movement. What has happened in Mississippi will in probably quieter ways be a continuing struggle across the South in the immediate future. The nation needs to realize better what the stakes are, and how liberals in their Democratic-party politics need to do more than save CDGM for one more funding, if there is to be real progress against racism and poverty, and for freedom for all Americans.

HE SAW IT 60 YEARS AGO

"Within a few years the United States has been affected by an ambition to be a world power. (A world power is a state which expects to have a share in the settlement of every clash of interests and collision of state policies which occurs anywhere on the globe.) There is no reason to wonder at this action of a democracy, for a democracy is sure to resent any suggestion that it is limited in its function, as compared with other political forms. At the same time that the United States has moved towards the character of a world power it has become militant.

"Other states in the past which have had group purposes have been militant. Even when they arrived at commerce and industry they have pursued policies which involved them in war (Venice, Hansa, Holland). Since the group interests override the individual interests, the selection and determination of group purposes is a function of the greatest importance and an act of the greatest effect on individual welfare. The interests of the society or nation furnish an easy phrase, but such phrases are to be regarded with suspicion. Such interests are apt to be the interests of a ruling clique which the rest are to be compelled to serve."

William Graham Sumner—*Folkways,* 1906, pp. 63–64.

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Alexander Erlich

ECONOMIC REFORMS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

In view of some very sweeping pronouncements that have been made about the meaning of recent economic reforms in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, it seems appropriate to begin by baldly stating my view as to what these reforms do *not* mean. They most definitely do *not* herald the restoration of capitalism in any form or shape; nor do they constitute a retreat toward the "mixed economy" of the Soviet NEP of the twenties or to a very similar system which was in existence throughout Eastern Europe during the late forties. Yet while the scope of these developments is much more limited than is frequently assumed, they are certainly important enough to merit our attention.

I. The Reforms in Outline

The proximate purpose of the changes in the system of economic administration which have recently been introduced in the Soviet Union and in most of Eastern Europe consists in enlarging the autonomy of the individual enterprises within the framework of centrally planned and predominantly collectivistic economies. To put the same thing somewhat differently, these changes attempt to bring about a shift in emphasis from administrative direct controls to pecuniary inducements as the guiding force behind the managerial activities. The specific devices used to achieve these objectives vary significantly from country to country, both in points of detail and in over-all degree of consistency and determination. But all of them share certain distinctive features:

(1) Under the established system, the enterprise manager was confronted with a large array of planned indicators which were handed down to him from above and which determined the size and the composition of the output as well as the way of producing it; they also decisively, although indirectly, influenced the level of his own rewards. Now the number of these indicators will be sharply curtailed, and the most

* This is a slightly expanded version of a paper presented at the second Socialist Scholars' Conference in New York on September 10, 1966.

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important of them—the *gross* value of output produced by the given enterprise—will be abandoned in favor of the total value of output actually sold or of some kind of index of the total *net* value accruing within the enterprise.

(2) The standing of profitability among the planned indicators will be enhanced and the stimulus to raise it powerfully strengthened as the bonuses of the managers will be more closely linked to the level of profits earned and as enterprises will be allowed to retain and to reinvest a much higher share of their profits and depreciation allowances than exist now. (This particular category of changes is most frequently associated with the name of the Soviet economist Evsei Liberman.)

(3) There will be a pronounced shift from outright grants to long-term repayable credits as the chief method of supplying investible resources to enterprises, and an interest-like charge on the use of fixed capital assets will be imposed (until now there was only a purely nominal charge on short-term bank credits).

(4) An extensive price reform will be carried out in order to make relative prices correspond more closely to what is called in official parlance the relative amounts of the "socially necessary labor" expended in the production of goods.

(5) There will be a stepping-up in the process of amalgamation of individual enterprises (most of them of a single-plant type) into broader organizational units ("firms" or "associations") which could relieve the central authorities of the tasks of intra-industrial co-ordination.

(6) The direct contractual supplier-customers relationships between enterprises in interlinked industries are to increase in scope.

II. The Underlying Motives

The typical weaknesses of the Stalinist planning system have been so often stated and restated during the last decade in the East as well as in the West that they can be summed up in a near-telegraphic style:

(1) The Soviet and East European planners lacked proper criteria for rational allocation of scarce resources. Neither did they have a meaningful and operative price system that could inform men in charge at various levels of economic administration about comparative advantages of different product mixes and factor combinations that lie within the range of choices open to the economy.

(2) The far-reaching centralization of decision-making, in face of the stupendous multitude and complexity of the choices to be made, has caused the solutions to be slow in coming and not infrequently lacked in mutual consistency, not to speak of optimality (in the sense of extracting the greatest output of the desired composition from the given

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amount of productive resources). While a delegation of authority in matters of detail to the lower echelons helped to avert chaos, it still left the superior agencies with backbreaking tasks of evaluation and reconciliation of competing claims from below.

(3) Some of the built-in incentives of the lower echelon men have been operating at cross purposes with the intentions of the central planners. The literature on the subject is replete with references to the "cat-and-mouse" game between managers and planning authorities, with the first lobbying for easy output targets and ample capital allocations, and the latter pushing for the opposite. Also, the perverse inclination to maximize rather than minimize the use of expensive raw materials as a result of output targets being formulated in terms of gross value or of weight has been widely commented upon; and it was pointed out that the same target-setting procedures made it possible for individual managers to earn a bonus for successful execution of the plan by including in their outputs goods which were actually not wanted but which happened to be relatively easy to produce.

(4) Last but not least, attention has been repeatedly drawn to impediments against steady and rapid diffusion of technological innovations, except when they seem truly striking and/or when an area of particularly high priority is involved. Such impediments, it was stressed, were bound to arise at different levels of the administrative hierarchy; they reflected the central planners' desire to reduce the number of decisions they had to make, and the managers' fear of a temporary slowdown in operation in the wake of technological change-over, with underfulfillment of the output plans and a loss of the bonus as an inevitable concomitant.

It is generally agreed that all these inefficiencies are more critical now than they were in the formative period of the economies in question; the gaps left by mistakes in planning are now harder to fill. The reasons are manifold:

(1) The steadily growing size and complexity of the economies causes the slapdash nature of decision-making to be more wasteful than before.

(2) Transition from the "extensive" to the "intensive" stage of economic development is in full swing. Large labor reserves due to open or "disguised" unemployment are either exhausted or significantly reduced; the same is true of underutilized high-quality natural resources; rapid urbanization and improvement in skills set off the "revolution of rising expectations" whose demands can be ignored only at an increasingly high cost in terms of efficiency and socio-political stability.

In such a situation, it is no longer sufficient to clamp down a very high rate of investment on the economy and to make it stick by hook

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or crook. A dramatic change in efficiency of resource utilization and in the quality of decision-making becomes imperative in order to prevent the rate of economic growth from slackening as it did in most of the Soviet-bloc countries during the sixties. Nor is it surprising that Czechoslovakia—for which these considerations have acquired particular urgency and which experienced not merely a slowdown in her rate of growth but an actual drop in her national income in 1963—is at present in the forefront of the reform drive; her strong dependence on exports of high-quality manufacturing goods to Western markets is an added stimulus for moving rapidly in this direction.

It is likewise understandable that Rumania—with her vast manpower reserves still untapped, but above all with excellent prospects for further developments of her oil-based industries—can ride high by combining tight-fisted Stalinist methods of planning with an aggressive utilization of the good old "law of comparative advantage": she makes the most of the blessing conferred upon her by nature and unabashedly pushes the sales of oil and oil products in Western markets at the expense of much less remunerative trade with her Comecon associates.

(3) The reduction of the technological lag makes it increasingly unrealistic to assume that a bold forward stride in adopting advanced foreign technology would more often than not represent a substantial improvement over the previous state of affairs even though the underlying investment decisions had been made in a "blunderbus" fashion and based on unreliable cost estimates. On the other hand, whenever new technological frontiers do come within sight or when old substitution possibilities appear in a new light as a result of shifts in relative costs, it is, at least in one important respect, more difficult to make the switch than it was in the past because this entails not sacrificing "expendable" mass consumption and sucking in unemployed labor, but slowing down the development of powerful and well-entrenched high-priority industries. Chemicals and oil vs. steel and coal are good examples.

(4) According to a view shared by many non-Communist economists in the West, the Stalinist methods during the early period were not merely less harmful than now but positively advantageous in an important sense. Given the imperative need for rapid growth, the argument goes, a wide measure of centralized control and interference with the market was indispensable. Inflationary pressures which were bound to develop could not but strain the efficacy of the price mechanism and generate specific shortages that could not be adequately dealt with by across-the-board measures of monetary and fiscal policy. Rapid and drastic shifts in the composition of the output and in the level of technology called for deliberate synchronization and coordination of major

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investment decisions affecting large and interrelated areas of the economy. In this connection, Oskar Lange's comparison with the "war economy" situation in the Western countries was often invoked; and it was pointed out that after the economy had been fundamentally restricted and made more complex, the advantages of the "warlike" methods would be increasingly dwarfed by their shortcomings. Yet while the reasoning is undoubtedly suggestive, it calls for strong qualifications:

(a) Even in a "war economy" situation the tendency to concentrate the decision-making powers at the top can overreach itself and prove partly self-defeating: low priority and/or low-shortage areas should be allowed to shift for themselves, and some interdependencies are less stringent, and less crucial for the whole economy than others. Lenin was very candid in admitting by 1921 that the economic centralization during the years of "war communism" had gone far beyond the call of duty. His Soviet and East European followers are gradually beginning to concede that much also with regard to the early industrialization plans in their countries.

(b) Disregard of, and interference with, the price mechanism can be pushed too far also within the context of the high-pressure-growth strategy. For example, the policy of keeping prices of producers' goods artificially low in the face of an escalating demand for them made little sense. The unwillingness to use the rate of interest or some workable substitute for it was likewise unfortunate: in view of the pressing need for quick and cumulative output increases, the Soviet-type economies would have been well served by a rationing device which could eliminate slowly maturing investment processes unless they promise strikingly high returns in the future, and forcibly remind the constructors that time is money.

(c) Most importantly, we are not obliged to follow the Eastern and Western neo-Hegelians in accepting the actually adopted growth strategy as an inexorable must. In terms of our analogy, not all wars are alike, and men in charge do have in most cases at least some possibility to exercise options between more or less limited war objectives, more or less unrestrained methods of warfare, smaller or larger numbers of enemies to be fought at the same time. This is, if anything, still more true when the "war objective" is socio-economic modernization of a country. Indeed, it stands to reason that if sacrifices imposed on the people of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe during the initial period of Stalinist planning had been less harsh, and if the planned rate of growth as well as the investment targets had been more consistent with the actual size and structure of the productive capacity of the countries in question, a more balanced and an ultimately larger expansion of effective economic potential might have resulted.

No doubt, the growth performance of the Soviet-type economies in

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the past has been remarkable by comparative standards, and development strategies suggested by various "deviators" from the Stalinist line would have had their share of tensions and risks. But if the above-indicated considerations are plausible, impressive results could have been achieved at a smaller cost in human welfare and without generating, on anything like a comparable scale, whole clusters of institutional and behavioral patterns which were bound to become increasingly counterproductive and to develop a formidable staying power after the circumstances had changed.

III. The Prospects

The over-all philosophy behind the reforms as seen by their leading intellectual protagonists was effectively summed up by Liberman:

> The system of centralized planning will be merely strengthened when we will free it of clogging detail. Only then will centralized planning be able to concentrate on providing a scientific basis for the rate and proportions of economic growth, on matters of technological policy, on the system of prices, public finance, and on optimal relationships between consumption and accumulation. . . . Some economists hope that miscalculation and mistakes under maximally centralized planning can be avoided by creating a vast network of computing centers, by combining them into one system and by subordinating them to a sort of operational electronic Gosplan. Yet it seems highly dubious whether it is possible to manage from one center (even if fully equipped by modern electronics) a complex organism such as a modern national economy. I have no great faith in a push-button economy. (Interview in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, April 24, 1966.)

As the earlier paragraphs indicate, I am in general agreement with this attitude. To put the same point negatively, and to restate what has been said at the outset, I find it very difficult to take declarations about impending "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seriously, no matter whether such statements originate in the U.S. or in China. Also, the much more sophisticated view, according to which the devolution of authority to individual enterprises will tend to reproduce some typical weaknesses of the atomistic market economy in a non-capitalist setting, seems unjustified.* Under the new system the

* For reasons which should be readily understandable to the readers of DISSENT, I would not call the Soviet-type setting socialist. To put it in a nutshell, to Social Democrats like myself, a large measure of public ownership is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for considering a society socialist; and it hardly needs emphasizing that the second crucial component, i.e., a consistently democratic political framework, has been conspicuously absent in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European "people's democracies," although the oppressiveness of the dictatorial one-party rule has undoubtedly abated during the post-Stalin era.

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central planning authorities will remain in charge of distributing the large bulk of investible resources over the major segments of the economy in conformity with the long-range development plans; they will be directly controlling monumental investment projects of country-wide importance; and they will obviously have a much more than adequate power to intervene whenever a profit-and-loss calculation of an individual manager or of an industrial branch directorate should be seriously deficient in accounting for all positive or negative external effects of the productive activities of the respective enterprises and industries. The trouble with the recent reforms is not that they go too far from the standpoint of rational socialist policy, but that they do not go far enough, and that the pace of change is likely to be halting and uneven. Here are, in all brevity, some of the reasons for apprehension:

(1) The reforms as they stand now left a number of unresolved questions which can give rise to difficulties:

(a) While the number of planned indicators is now reduced, there are still quite a few of them left around. It is far from clear how the enterprise manager is supposed to act if the stipulations based on diverse indicators will turn out to be mutually inconsistent, and who is going to adjudicate the conflict. On the face of it, this holds true to a much attenuated extent, if at all, for the Czechoslovak reform which has only a few centrally fixed targets for directorates of industrial branch units rather than for individual enterprises, and which provides for compensating any economic losses caused to the enterprise by such fixed targets. Yet it should be kept in mind that these changes (as well as the less radical changes envisioned in other Soviet-bloc countries) are supposed to be carried out gradually through 1968; hence their immediate impact is not likely to be significant.

(b) Greater latitude in spending retained parts of the enterprise's gross profits constitutes a clear gain in overall efficiency provided that managers are able to get what they actually want; this, however, presupposes a much greater degree of flexibility on the supply side than the Soviet-type economies have known thus far. It would surely be rash to expect that the reforms as such will significantly ease the "seller's market" situation prevailing in these economies, unless the planners will be reconciled to introduce an element of slack in the system by paring down their overall plans. (For a very clear recognition of the point, see Liberman's article in *Pravda* of November 21, 1965.) I shall have more to say about it presently.

(c) As was repeatedly pointed out, the enhanced standing of the profit criterion can improve efficiency only if the prices of goods and factors of production will be reflecting the underlying scarcities; otherwise individual managers might, in response to faulty price signals, economize on factors which are relatively abundant, and show excessive lar-

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gesse in use of the short-supply items. Yet the outlines of the impending price reforms are still, in most cases, fairly vague. It is not known that ground rules for the price determination will be adopted (the average cost seems a more likely candidate than marginal cost, in spite of the justified preference of the leading theoretical economists of the area for the latter), nor how often the prices will be revised in response to changes in supply-and-demand conditions, and who will do the revising. On the last-mentioned point, the Czechoslovak reform is more explicit than all others. It envisages three basic categories of prices: centrally fixed prices for 64 per cent of the industrial output, flexible prices with centrally determined upper limits (or in some cases upper and lower limits) for 29 per cent, and fully flexible prices for the remaining 7 per cent. Yet the dangers of excessive rigidity in the first group and of oligopolistic manipulation in the second cannot be discounted; moreover, the final outcome of the new policy will decisively depend on the spirit in which it will be carried out by the powers-that-be, a point to which I shall return.

(d) Assuming that the profit criterion will be rigorously enforced, it is quite possible that the workers whose contribution to the output is very low will be dismissed—a situation which would bring relief in the labor-shortage economy of Czechoslovakia, but which could generate some unemployment in all other countries. On principle, quite a few of the discharged workers could be quickly and usefully reabsorbed by a labor-intensive and largely private small-scale manufacturing, construction, and trade. But chances of substantial expansion of such a sector are dim, for reasons which are, in major part, political and ideological.

(2) The macro-economic setting within which the reforms operate is not too propitious. No doubt, the recently released Soviet Five-Year Plan is more moderate and less "voluntaristic" in its planned growth rate and investment targets than its Stalinist and Khrushchevian predecessors; the same is true of the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish Five-Year Plans. All of them, nevertheless, are still quite ambitious, and they seem to operate on the implicit assumption that the recent reforms will bring about a quick and substantial improvement in over-all efficiency. (It might be worth noting, incidentally, that although Kosygin in his September, 1965, report envisaged an increase in the share of consumption in the national income, the draft of the Five-Year Plan adopted by the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU six months later did not bear him out.) Should the fulfillment of these plans fall significantly short of expectations, tendencies toward recentralization will be strengthened. Moreover, the international situation as it appears now is not conducive to the relaxation of pressures on the economy, to say the very least.

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(3) The unusually frank discussion which preceded and followed the recent changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe has confirmed that influential elements within the existing political and administrative setup are still clinging to methods of the Stalinist command economy and are doing their level best to make the reforms a dead letter in a variety of ways: There is evidence that Stalinist administrators in several East European countries managed to subvert the previous attempts to promote industrial associations and to transform these organizations into additional devices for the central planners' control over individual enterprises.

Some of the more nimble defenders of the old creed have been trying to steal a march on their adversaries in the prestigious area of the mushrooming mathematical economics by advocating extensive use of electronic computer techniques as a substitute for economic decentralization rather than as an important complement to it. (It might be added that none of the leading Soviet and East European linear programmers and input-output analysts was taken in by this maneuver.)

While the position of the enterprises with regard to the central authorities has been strengthened, the dice are still heavily loaded in favor of the latter: this holds true (for the duration of the transitional period, at least) also for Czechoslovakia. The consequences of this situation were succinctly stated by Liberman in his already quoted interview:

> One can easily visualize the possibility that a ministry through some of its representatives will try to intervene administratively in matters in which it is not supposed to intervene. Such an administrator who does not want to part with his old habits would harm the cause of economic reconstruction. A clash could ensue. The enterprise may be objectively right, and the representative of the industry not. But for the manager of the enterprise it will be hard to get embroiled every time in a conflict with the ministry he is subordinated to.

Last, and most important: should the difficulties outlined in the preceding paragraphs materialize on a significant scale, the "centralizers" could be relied on to use them in order to turn the clock back as they did in Poland in the late fifties and in Czechoslovakia in the early sixties. In other words, the cycle of reform and counter-reform may well be resumed unless some major external or internal developments of a non-economic nature should make this somewhat tame prediction look either unduly cautious or excessively optimistic.

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Joseph Clark

OF VIEWS, AIMS, AND DOGMAS

A Letter to my Son

Joseph Clark was active in the left-wing student movement in the thirties and edited Communist publications. He served in a rifle company during World War II and was awarded the Silver Star. He was reporter, city editor, and foreign editor of the Daily Worker, and its correspondent in the Soviet Union 1950–53. He broke with the Communist party in 1957.

Dear Son,

Our discussion of the "New Left" started with a rather small event related to the wretched war in Vietnam. Two GIs, captured by the Vietcong, were being released in tribute to the "American peace movement." At a press conference staged by the Communists in Cambodia, with the GIs still in the hands of their captors, the prisoners were quoted as saying that they would return to the U.S. to fight for peace.

As you recall, a message was quickly sent to the two GIs by the staff leaders of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) hailing their statements. By contrast, a spokesman for SANE (Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) expressed regret about the apparent duress and brain washing attending the event. Was this, then, a contrast between the "New Left" on the one hand, and the "liberal apologists for the establishment" on the other? Were the SDS spokesmen demonstrating their courage and independence while the SANE spokesman was being cautious, seeking respectability and cocking an eye to the establishment?

Of course, we made no attempt to reduce the "New Left" to a single organization, such as SDS. The "New Left" becomes pretty elusive, when you try to determine what it is and who comprises it; just as it would be hard to place the conglomerate radicals of the thirties into a single category.

This incident did give us an opportunity to reflect on some questions of principle. What is, or should be, the aim of social action? Surely, the style or "image" we present to the world is less important than the

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goal we seek. With respect to Vietnam we agreed the goal was rather plain —peace. Still another question arose—could the epithet "anti-American" be applied to the "New Left"? We didn't doubt that SDS leaders and members were as American as apple pie. But they could be oblivious to the effects of what they said or did on many other Americans. In their reactions to the case of the two GIs the SDS spokesmen didn't seem to care about the impression they gave of going along gladly with a Viet-cong propaganda blast. The SANE spokesman, at least in this incident, was very much concerned that it should not be utilized by those who are opposed to peace in Vietnam. He was conscious of the rather elementary principle that Americans must be persuaded to support a policy we were advocating for America—in this case a policy seeking negotiations to end the war.

We also ruminated on how little regard some leaders seem to evince for the wishes of their members. It struck me that the SDS leaders acted suspiciously like an "elite" with sweeping disregard for how their members might feel about all this. On a previous occasion they had also been indifferent to the sentiments of their members; that was when they took a position to flout the draft, only to discover, after they did consult their members, that the leaders' views had been repudiated. It's sometimes easier to talk about "participatory democracy" than to practice it.

I

As a member of the class of '35 communicating with a member of the class of '68, there are certain canons which I must not violate. I must not, for example, compare the good old thirties with the bad new sixties. Nor may I presume to advise today's young radicals from the disadvantage point of really ripe middle age. Assuredly, I must not quote Marx about history repeating itself, "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce." Nor dare I recall the adage about those who refuse to learn from the mistakes of the past being doomed to repeat them.

The issue is not one of generations. As a history major you've had to resign yourself to the existence of young and old. The essence is not "new" or "old" Left, but policies and politics, with younger people among those who had bad politics in the thirties and older folks who might have admirable policies today. What's more, you can reverse that; and you and I know some quaint young fogies in the here and now.

So let's put it this way—here are a few things one participant in the student and youth movement of the thirties learned from sometimes joyous, sometimes bitter experiences, and how these seem (to him) relevant to what is happening in the sixties. You may not have realized how serious I was when I said I'm expert above all in one respect—I

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know about the failure of movements. Nor will I console myself, as Hal Draper does (*New Politics,* IV, 3), that it is the fate of all revolutionary efforts to fail—except the last. (Perhaps the saddest lesson we learned was that the greatest failures were just those revolutions that succeeded.) For none is certitude and rectitude more complete than for those who have survived a lifetime of factional struggles in sects that have divided into smaller sects, which in turn have divided into still smaller sects, until only the one pure revolutionary flame is left to light the way to the final conflict and the final triumph. Perhaps the most important lesson for some of us was that there is no final conflict and there is no final triumph. "Permanent revolution" may indeed have a far more profound meaning than the doctrinaire definition given to it by both Marx and Trotsky, who saw it as the continuation of the "bourgeois democratic" revolution into the "proletarian revolution." So we learned that each generation has its share of conflict and to some extent its triumph.

You will already have noted and smiled with some shadow of compassion at the tendency of middle-aged commentators about the "New Left" to be critical of other middle-aged commentators about the "New Left." Who am I to be different? But before I take on some fellow members of my generation, a glance at the past. Here's a frayed leaflet, yellowed with age. *UNITY AGAINST WAR* is its message. It calls upon students to assemble at an N.Y.U. auditorium to hear your old man and Joe Lash and Joe Starobin and Professor James Burnham demolish the war-makers. (The professor soon moved as far to the Left as the political spectrum permitted, only to repair equally far to the Right, and with equal fervor.) Student speakers represented the two sponsors of the meeting, the National Student League and the Student League for Industrial Democracy. Organizations were very much politically oriented in those days (1934); NSL was Communist-led, SLID Socialist-led. SLID was about to learn a lesson: that unity with the Communists brought with it a propensity for synthesis on a "higher level"—a Communist level.

Still, the message of the leaflet sounds admirable: "to establish a basis for united struggle against war and retrenchment in education and for equal rights for Negro students." But what was happening in the world? Above all, Hitler was happening. To many radicals of the thirties, however, there was much confusion about what way the Yanks were coming. Indeed, the Communists had them coming and going, at intervals, depending on whether Stalin was allied with Hitler or not at the particular moment.

And here's a 32-page pamphlet of the National Student League, issued in March, 1935. (Later that year the NSL merged with SLID to form the American Student Union.) The pamphlet, entitled *STUDENTS*

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FIGHT WAR, condemns Hitler and Franklin D. Roosevelt with equal ferocity, but it devotes more space to the denunciation of Roosevelt. "The New Deal has done nothing but mobilize the nation for war," the NSL declaimed (and SLID agreed). NSL and SLID joined to make the Oxford Pledge a high point of the peace strikes and demonstrations: "I pledge never to support the government of the United States in any war it may undertake."

How certain we were that our country and its "system" were wrong! Wasn't modern war "fought for the conquest of new markets, for economic expansion," in the words of the NSL pamphlet? "It is impossible to say that one is against war and still talk of defending one's country from invaders," the pamphlet went on, explaining that it is the system —capitalism—that causes war.

In this connection, there was a revealing little incident at Brooklyn College; it happened, as so many of the best things did, in Professor Jesse D. Clarkson's history class. An NSL spokesman was addressing the class, appealing for the strike against war, to which almost the entire student body soon responded (in April, 1934). "As you know," the student was saying, "wars are caused by economic factors." The professor raised his head and interjected, ever so gently: "And what were the economic causes of the war between France and the other European powers in 1792?" The speaker became slightly flustered. He, and the rest of the class, knew precious little about that war, not to speak of its economic causes. So, for the better part of the remaining semester we studied that war including the role of the Scheldt. But we could find no simple combination of factors that caused the war, let alone a single set of economic reasons. Some of us allowed nearly a quarter of a century to pass before the professor's lesson made much of an impact on us.

So, perhaps the "New Left" started with an immediate advantage over the old, since it was not bound by ideology. (I choose to use ideology as something other than just a word for generalized ideas, or for programs devoted to a given purpose, or even for philosophy. Ideologies in our time have tended to function as dogmas; conclusions, rather than hypotheses have preceded investigation; congealed doctrine has been upheld much in the same manner as revelation in theology; and fanatically defended systems of belief have been used to inflict merciless injustice, endless suffering and bloodletting; Fascism and Communism are the awful examples of such ideology.)

To what extent ideology can be an impediment to thought was discovered in Moscow in 1920 by Bertrand Russell (himself a formidable thinker except when the tag-ends of ideology seized him in his nineties). He visited with the Bolsheviks, coming as a friend and a socialist him-

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self. After interviewing Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, Russell concluded that:

> Bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine; it is also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures. When Lenin wishes to prove some proposition, he does so, if possible, by quoting texts from Marx and Engels. [Russell was struck by the] elaborate and dogmatic beliefs in the mind of the Communist, which may be true, but are not, to a scientific temper, capable of being known to be true with any certainty. [Russell added:] This habit of militant certainty about objectively doubtful matters is one from which, since the Renaissance, the world has been gradually emerging, into that temper of constructive and fruitful skepticism which constitutes the scientific outlook. (*The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism,* Simon and Schuster.)

Perhaps the "New Left" has been spared the dead hand of ideology, but that's not the way various mentors and friends of the "New Left" want it to be. Hal Draper, one of the few representatives of the "Old Left" whom the Berkeley students in revolt would listen to, laments this lack of ideology among the students of the "New Left." This you gathered from his article in *New Politics.*

We can assay the role of ideology in one of the saddest uses to which it is put—as a means of analyzing the thought of an adversary. By the time Hal gets through working over the liberals of the sixties, they are shredded as completely as Proudhon at the hands of Marx, Kautsky or Bernstein at the mercy of Lenin, Martov by Trotsky. Draper's handling of the liberals is strangely reminiscent; it reminds one a little of how the Socialists, who believed that socialism had to be democratic, were treated by the Communist movement.

With his essay, "The Mind of Clark Kerr," Hal Draper raised at least a transient ideological banner for the Berkeley revolt. You can read both this essay by Draper and Kerr's essay (*Revolution at Berkeley,* edited by Michael V. Miller and Susan Gilmore, Dell paperback), to see how ideology can obscure the vision of even the most acute intelligence. You read Draper and in his mind, the mind of Kerr is at the very threshold of fascism. You read Kerr's chapter and however you appraise it, it's surely a defense of democratic values; he sees perils as well as advantages in the partnership of education and the federal government and argues for preservation of "the traditional freedom of higher education from excessive control." Such freedom, Kerr says, should "enlarge the horizons of equality of opportunity." He criticizes the subtle discounting of the teaching process and neglect of educational policy from the undergraduate point of view. A crusader for opening-up higher education to the masses of youth, he expresses concern about

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"how to treat the individual student as a unique human being in the mass student body; how to make the university seem smaller even as it grows larger. . . ."

Goodness knows these goals were far from attainment at Berkeley, and Kerr erred when he failed to intervene immediately and decisively to rescind the ban on setting up tables, raising funds, making speeches and social action on the sidewalk area in front of the Berkeley campus. But it was Kerr's ideas which evoked the furious indictment by Draper. In his "The Mind of Clark Kerr" Draper assails that "mind" especially as it was revealed in the book *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, by Clark Kerr and others, published by Harvard University Press. "By adding a single sentence," Draper writes, "Kerr's book would become the work of a proto-fascist ideologue." Casting about for a comparison, Draper likens Kerr to a German professor who announced in 1932 "that, in his utterly scientific opinion, the triumph of the Nazis was indeed written in the scrolls of history and must be accepted."

A reading of Kerr's book may or may not evoke agreement—I found much to disagree with—but the "proto-fascist" bit is as accurate as the social fascist appelation for David Dubinsky. Possibly the most damning passage Draper cites seems to imply that Kerr opposes free trade unions because, Kerr writes, under some conditions, "free trade unions . . . become no more than Communist unions sabotaging efforts at economic development." However, a reading of the entire passage shows that Kerr is not attacking free trade unions but the specific possibility he describes, "Communist unions" masquerading under the banner of freedom.

Kerr lists some of the things the authors of the book "unlearned." One of these, which exists only as three dots in Draper's rendering, describes an original conviction which Kerr found was nothing but a once-held prejudice. Draper's dots concealed Kerr's discovery that political strikes by workers, under some conditions, are not at all undesirable, as he once thought. Where Draper had dots, Kerr wrote: "The political strike, as it exists under colonialism, may not only be inherent in the situation, but the only effective manner of attaining some transfer of power to the indigenous population."

In other words, whether you agree with Kerr or not that political strikes are justified, he is explaining that he once had a prejudice against political strikes, but his research taught him that under certain conditions—for example, under colonialism—the workers may have no alternative to political strikes, in order to win freedom. Similarly, with regard to the free trade unionism issue, he explains that he had a prejudice, *favoring* unions under any conditions, but his research uncovered instances where the principle of free trade unionism was undermined by

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Communist unions. Hal Draper, surely, knows even more of such instances than Kerr does.

So this book, which Draper held up as a devastating example of Kerr's alleged closeness to "neo-fascist" views, is not at all what the ideological assault claimed it was. It seems to me that a reading of the texts involved, specifically Draper and Kerr, tells us far more about what happens to the mind of a Marxist ideologue than it does about the mind of a college president-pragmatist. Muddy, poorly written, far from profound—these are criticisms that can be leveled with justice at Kerr's book. But it is no more the work, with or without a single sentence, of "a proto-fascist ideologue" than Norman Thomas or Otto Bauer were social fascists. Making liberalism a target at Berkeley was hardly helpful to the effort to remedy the justified grievances of many students; only the radical Right, which had been out to get Kerr for a long time, could and did benefit from such tactics. (Indeed, during the last election there were "New Leftists" who contributed quite gayly to the defeat of Brown, which had to mean the victory of Reagan.)

II

One of the things that did bother some of us when Marxist ideology seemed to be the "open sesame" to a new and better world was the history of all the socialist thinkers and fighters who had fallen from grace. Why did so few of Marx's friends remain his political comrades? Why did so few of Lenin's early associates remain at his side? Above all, why did Stalin butcher his associates? The rationalizations we used to explain such matters still bring a blush to your father's face.

It was amazing how much we knew of Marx's indictment of Proudhon and how little of Proudhon's views about Marx. How well we knew the anathemas Lenin had hurled at Kautsky, but how poorly versed we were in Kautsky's criticism of Lenin. For that matter, though some of us were acquainted with Kautsky's criticism of Bernstein, how limited was our knowledge of Bernstein. I mention all this by way of quoting a pertinent and prophetic letter from Proudhon to Marx. Replying to an invitation from Marx to join in political collaboration, Proudhon wrote:

> Let us by all means collaborate in trying to discover the laws of society, the way in which these laws work out, the best method to go about investigating them; but, for God's sake, after we have demolished all the dogmatisms *a priori,* let us not of all things attempt in our turn to instill another kind of doctrine into the people ... I applaud with all my heart your idea of bringing to light all the varieties of opinion; let us have good and sincere polemics; let us show the world the example of

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> learned and far-sighted tolerance, but simply because we are the head of the new movement, let us not set ourselves up as the leaders of a new intolerance, let us not pose as the apostles of a new religion—even though this religion be the religion of logic, the religion of reason itself. Let us welcome, let us encourage all the protests; let us condemn all the exclusions; all the mysticisms; let us never regard a question as closed, and even after we have exhausted our last argument, let us begin again, if necessary, with eloquence and irony. On that condition, I shall be de lighted to take part in your association—but otherwise, no! (Quoted in *The Worldly Philosophers,* by Robert L. Heilbroner, Simon and Schuster.)

In every generation this dogmatism, about which Proudhon had warned, continued to plague the Left. Though, at its outset, and in its earlier period, the "New Left" has been fairly free of dogmatism, apostles of a new religion may yet drown "the movement" in the familiar seas of ideology.

Words once uttered by Brecht seem to capture the early spirit and promise of the "New Left" when he sang: "Beloved is the feeling of a new beginning, a pioneer situation!" That's how we felt in the youth movement of the thirties, just as the young people of the "New Left" could revel in their pioneer situation. Indeed they did pioneer: those brave young men and women, Negro and white, from North and South, who sought to break down the barriers of Jim Crow; and those who entered communities to help organize the most deprived, the forgotten poor; and those who demonstrated for banning the bomb-tests; and later, those who protested the inequities of the draft which discriminated against the poor.

Why then, since the untrammeled mind and the pioneer situation are so rewarding, do the spokesmen for the "New Left" associate themselves, sometimes ideologically, often organizationally, with maneuvers and stratagems of that part of the "Old Left" which was responsible for importing totalitarian attitudes into left-wing politics? I don't, of course, refer to the noteworthy and commendable association with a noble representative of the "Old Left," a man of conscience, an enemy of totalitarianism—Norman Thomas. There's a continuity of politics and protest that cannot, should not be avoided. But what I have in mind is the kind of association of the "New Left" represented by the mission to Hanoi, organized by Herbert Aptheker and joined by Tom Hayden and Staughton Lynd.

Am I implying guilt by association? No; but I am suggesting that if you become partners in political action, if you collaborate for a common aim, if you join together for a specific purpose or goal, you

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must be judged by that action, by that collaboration, and by that goal. To be critical of the Administration for its disastrous Vietnam policies is not only justified, in my opinion, but necessary if we are to serve our country's interests. But to associate oneself with the Communist cause in Vietnam is as wrong and unjustified and harmful as any political stand can possibly be.

At a press conference in Hanoi, *all three,* Hayden, Lynd, and Aptheker, said they had learned the answer to the question: why weren't the Communists negotiating with the U.S.? Because, they explained, the U.S. had never asked them to negotiate. They were charging specifically that the U. S. government had not made any proposals to the government of North Vietnam. The truth is that there had been many proffers of negotiations to Hanoi, one of them just about a week before this press conference. Later Lynd explained that, of course, he could not get the news while in Hanoi.

Being unable to get any news, let alone getting answers to questions about the Hanoi regime, didn't deter the troika from lending themselves to propaganda broadcasts on Radio Hanoi. There's plenty of need for criticism of an Administration in our own capital which has dodged a forthright offer to negotiate with the Vietcong and which has persisted in bombing the north, although that clearly obstructs efforts to place effective pressures on the Communists to enter negotiations. But to support Hanoi's position, one which has consistently opposed negotiations, and to bear false witness in behalf of a totalitarian regime is hardly a service to peace. And to go along with the deliberate falsehood of Hanoi propaganda while quoting scriptures on Radio Hanoi, as Lynd did ("Our Bible says 'You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free' ") was a hypocrisy that compares with the depths to which Stalinism descended during the Nazi-Soviet pact.

You have, of course, shared my repugnance for that mission to Hanoi, but, you explain, that isn't what interests you about Tom Hayden, for one. His work in the slums of Newark is what's important. That brings to mind so many alumni of the "Old Left" who remember the furniture we brought back into homes from which the unemployed had been evicted and the demonstrations for unemployment insurance and our participation in the organization of the CIO unions, and who say, *those are* the things that count. Can those fond memories wipe out the support of Stalin's tyranny, support which continued even when Stalin's tyranny joined in *Blutbruderschaft* with Hitler's tyranny? Can one look at one side of the coin and ignore the other? Certainly, much that was done was good and most of it with the best of intentions. But

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the sum total was a movement which, by associating itself with totalitarianism, brought harm to all the good endeavors in which it was involved, whether fighting for unemployment insurance or against Franco.

One of the oddities of the new apostles of ideology in the "New Left" is that they often assume a pacifist coloration while supporting such obvious advocates of force and violence as Nkrumah and Sukarno (when they still had power) and Castro and Ho Chi Minh. Lynd and others in the magazine *Liberation* have managed to synthesize "pacifism" with support of regimes which have made a philosophy of violence as the midwife of progress.

III

Recurring in much of the "New Left" writing is an echo of one of the most faithful dogmas of the "Old Left"—that little can be improved under the "system" and that the overthrow of the "establishment" is a precondition for redress of grievances. A discussion last winter by participants in the "New Left" movements in the *New Republic* was useful and well written, often persuasive and thoughtful; but much of it exemplified an attitude which boils down to what Bayard Rustin justly calls a "no win" policy. Thus, Todd Gitlin, a past leader of SDS, finds that political freedom is illusory because of the "tightly-planned corporate complex" that dominates our lives. (*New Republic*, December 25, 1965). He feels that institutions of the New Deal, for which labor fought so long and so hard, "intended to circumscribe that power do so marginally if at all." Gitlin deprecates labor unions because they "bargain for incremental dollars and cents."

Perhaps it was useful, after all, for us "Old Leftists" to have experienced the depression. Can those who did ever sneer at dollars and cents won at the bargaining table or through strikes? Gitlin also is contemptuous of the pluralism of our society and, there again, perhaps those of us who have experienced totalitarianism in other lands, or felt its hot breath when McCarthyism was riding high in our own land, can better appreciate the difference between a democratic-pluralistic society (with all its shortcomings) and a dictatorial social order. The government, as Gitlin sees it here, is very much like the old picture of an executive committee of the capitalist class; countervailing forces don't seem to exist in this reminiscent description of a society that exists partly in reality and to a considerable extent in vivid ideological imagination. But still, despite these echoes, I wouldn't be fair if I didn't note that in addition to the old dogmatism there *is* a freshness and "revisionism" that the more orthodox "Old Left" would never have tolerated. Thus,

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Gitlin suggests, for example, that "the great corporations should, somehow, be made responsible to workers and consumers."

Echoes of dogma come through loud and clear in Tom Hayden's article (*New Republic*, Jan. 15, 1966). He foresees a crisis for the radical movements which seems to be based solely on protest rather than on redress of grievances. "The same crisis, I imagine," Hayden writes, "has withered past movements and led radicals, such as the current labor leadership, into sorry marriages with the system they once tried to overthrow." Hayden seems seriously to be suggesting that labor leaders can be true to their calling only by rejecting the "system" and bringing about its overthrow. Nevertheless, there's a sobriety in all this and in Hayden too. When he projects a five-point program in the same article, there's little of overthrow and the goals are meaningful, such as rent control, apartment repairs, and coalitions to effect reforms.

Many of the young radicals who have gone "to the people" are themselves from comfortable, middle-class, sometimes even upper-class, homes. Perhaps one needs a Marxist approach to understand why some of these new radicals are impatient with the "middle-class" ambitions of America's poor. The tactics of some of the youthful militants in Alabama who refused to support liberal candidates was a classic example of the dogmatic sacrifice of the present generation to some future millennium. Their rationalization, that if the worst racists were elected it would be easier to expose them, was a reversion to the old "revolutionary" belief of "the worse, the better." In the same vein the "new radical" who attacked the entire social security system as a bureaucratic enemy of the poor, managed to reduce revolutionary ideology to the absurd.

IV

Of this much we can be certain, there will be a militant Left no matter what its follies. And, oddly enough, there will be an active continuation of that "Old Left" which was sponsored by Moscow, despite harassment and persecution. These will continue regardless of any of their own absurdities because there is a much greater absurdity which conspires to perpetuate the worst aspects of both the old and the new Left. I make reference to the old and the new Right, to J. Edgar Hoover, to the Smith and McCarran Acts, to the failure of both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to put the FBI under the law and the Constitution.

Take the resurrection of the YCL–AYD in a new reincarnation, the DuBois Clubs. It wasn't just the ineffable, inevitable, intolerable J. Edgar Hoover who gave life to these clubs, but it was the Department of Justice

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itself that revived the DuBois Clubs. The Justice Department did just that when it ordered them to register for self-destruction under the McCarran Act, which they of course justly refused to do, this being the U.S., not Russia or Spain. Hundreds of young people decided to join these DuBois Clubs just to opose the revival of McCarthyism.

Then, what greater propaganda coup could have been attained by these remnants of "old leftism," Moscow style, than that derived from Richard Nixon who announced to a believing world that the DuBois Clubs represented a plot to bring disrepute upon the Boys Clubs of America! Only in America, only at a time of the greatest strength and power that any nation has ever attained on earth (and beyond), could lunacy of this quaint caliber convert our country into a theater of the absurd.

But what a wonderful residue of common sense and stiff-necked adherence to democratic principles continue to prevail. I have in mind the administration of Wesleyan College which rejected the arrogant demand of our night-clubbing top-cop, J. Edgar Hoover, for a list of the members of the campus SDS. This brought forth a furious tirade from Hoover who informed the world that his political snooping on campus was authorized by the Department of Justice! That there hasn't been a louder outcry against such a deplorable imitation of Communist and fascist states, may be a sign that McCarthyism might be revived, in this Vietnam war situation; or, maybe people just underestimate what an aroused public can do to restore sanity.

One should learn many things from a lifetime in "movements." Perhaps the main lesson I learned is that the important thing is what the people attain through any movement. The most heroic action and the smallest deed are worthwhile only if they're concerned with people, with improving their life, here on earth.

We once sang in derision about the "pie in the sky" which the preacher promised. How many radicals, for a promise of "pie in the sky," have sacrificed the very people in whose name they spoke! I would reverse Bernstein again and say that the movement is nothing, the goal is everything; but I would hasten to explain that the goals must be for the here and now. Then I would affirm that one issue, one quality of life, one aspect of social organization precedes all others: democracy. And the "Shapes of Democracy total" will be determined in never-ending struggle and effort.

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Norman Birnbaum

A JOURNEY TO EASTERN EUROPE

"Have you ever been abroad?" I asked the taxi driver in Budapest. "No," he replied, "only in Vienna." The answer was not, apparently, intended as a joke. It reflected something essential in the new East European atmosphere: the recrudescence of national peculiarities. Hungary was, after all, part of the Hapsburg empire; Budapest and Vienna are less than an hour apart by air, four hours by road. (The Austrians take their heritage seriously: they seem to have found or made a vocation as a spiritual and economic meeting place for the nations that were once in the empire, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles especially.) What I have termed the recrudescence of national peculiarities in the case of Hungary, and the other East European nations, has led to a new internationalism in Eastern Europe. Old traditions, among the intellectuals, of contact with Western Europe have been renewed—and this at a period when the intellectuals and the intelligentsia as a whole have gained more importance than they previously had in the Communist societies, and constitute a much larger social grouping than they did even 15 years ago.

What I have termed the new nationalism cannot be narrowly circumscribed. It may well entail phenomena like distinctive national patterns of Communist economic development, although experiments in areas like economic planning seem to be crossing frontiers. Perhaps the simplest statement of the case is also the most accurate one: the new nationalism is part of a general emergence of spontaneous, often unexpected, sometimes not entirely pleasant social developments as a consequence of the relaxation of rigid Party controls, the abandonment of dogmatically derived attempts to impose a detailed map upon reality. A noble intellectual critique of Communist reality and strong popular currents which reject any collective aspirations whatsoever, courageous political dissent and a totally cynical careerism, a new internationalism and old nationalisms—these are the result. During my travels in Eastern Europe in 1965 and 1966, I was able to glimpse some of these forces at work. I visited Hungary, Poland, and the German

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Democratic Republic—as well as Yugoslavia which, politically, is in a class by itself.

During my visits, I saw friends and colleagues with whom I (and no doubt many of my readers) share much: a certain skepticism about authority, in particular the authorities under which we have to live —each in our parts of the world; a certain hope for a world changed for the better, not unmixed with despair that this will ever come about; a persistent interest in Marxism as a doctrine, at once of social analysis and human liberation.

I visited Hungary in October of 1965, nine years after the revolution and its tragic aftermath. Let it be said that the revolution's long-term consequences have not been entirely tragic, despite the bloodletting, repression, and moral savagery attendant upon its defeat. At this moment, Hungary is a relatively porous society: the border with Austria is easily crossed, travel to the West is not difficult, and the limits of intellectual freedom within the country have been steadily widened. An increase in intellectual freedom is not, of course, automatically productive of similar developments with respect to political freedom—but it can lead to the latter. At any rate, I found no oppressiveness in the Hungarian atmosphere. It is quite true that the foreign newspapers sold on the newsstands are *Unita* or *l'Humanité,* but those who wish to do so can subscribe to Western periodicals. (Lukacs himself has a subscription to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* the extremely mediocre daily which in Western Germany is an object of contempt for every right-thinking leftist.) Most of the intellectuals have traveled to the West, frequently on official grants.

The persons I saw were, indeed, not very close to the Party; they were critical Marxists. The breadth and openness of their culture was quite impressive—they were in this respect no different from the intellectuals of Paris, London, Frankfurt, or Milan. What did make them different (and at the same time curiously like some socialists in Western Europe) was their sense of obligation to what we may term the unfinished revolution. They felt that it had indeed begun, with the expropriation of the means of production—but that nearly everything else needed to be commenced again. In particular, they thought that popular education or re-education for socialism was exceedingly defective, that the entire quality of life in Hungary was questionable. They were deeply critical of what is known as goulash communism—despite no visible aversion to that excellent national dish. Their revulsion for the construction of a society organized primarily around material progress and material emulation seemed as great as that of the British New Left as I knew it in the late fifties—and their rhetoric was not all that different.

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Here, perhaps, are some of the psychological sources of that discussion of alienation which is now beginning in Eastern Europe. It is a remarkable fact about the entire discussion of alienation, East and West, that it reflects the response of the intellectuals to their society —their condition generalized. It would be the most arrant philistinism, however, to suppose that this exhausts the problem. The discussion of alienation in Eastern Europe is also exactly what it is in the West—a response to a generalized condition of unfulfillment by those whose privileged position in society enables them to think and feel. The powerlessness and lack of autonomy of important parts of the population, their recourse to available substitutes for genuine participation in their society, seem to mock the hopes of mankind for a better life. On this view, the intellectuals' concern with alienation entails an assumption of moral responsibility toward others.

II

Discussions of alienation in Eastern Europe have had to proceed elliptically. There was a time when discussions of the theme of alienation in Marx's early writings were denounced as "revisionism," "bourgeois falsifications," and the like. We have now reached a phase in which philosophical considerations of Marx's early writings are acknowledged to be legitimate. (It is a sign of the total degradation of official intellectual life under Stalinism that we should have to treat this as progress.) There is evidence, also, that the next phase has begun: the effort to apply the notion of alienation in concrete analyses of the Communist societies. When I visited Hungary, the discussion was still generally on a fairly theoretic and abstract note. A conference had been held, under more or less official auspices, at which a number of views had been expressed.

Some took the view that alienation had in principle been overcome with the establishment of state socialist regimes. Any remaining difficulties had to be understood as transitional phenomena, or as due to political mismanagement, but not to essential aspects of the structure of the new society. Still others held that alienation in a socialist form was present but that in principle it was eradicable, a position of course compatible with the view that a good deal of alienation (however defined) could be found in socialist society. I was told of no one who held that alienation or some form of it was inevitable, due either to certain social arrangements in socialist society (for instance, a single party's monopoly of power) or to perennial features of any society's existence.

Lukacs himself, if I have correctly understood his views, thinks that

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alienation was a necessary phase in the development of socialist consciousness in capitalist society, and that in the same society the crushing weight of direct exploitation has been replaced by the more subtle forms of domination associated with the integration of the working class into an economic system which requires high levels of consumption expenditure. He was not reported as having expressed a view on alienation in socialist society, directly, although he has said that the problem has changed within the past 50 years.

This was all fairly abstract, but I gathered that there were a good many tensions just beneath the surface. The Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences had in effect begun a concrete series of inquiries into occupational attitudes. They had shown that the larger the sphere of autonomy and command in the exercise of an occupation, the more identification with the task on the part of the worker: a finding not all that specific to socialist society, and interesting on that account. The director of the Group, incidentally, is the man who was prime minister at the time of the revolution in 1956, András Hegedüs. He left politics thereafter for socio-economic research, took a doctorate in economics (in Moscow), worked in the Central Statistical Bureau of the government, and has now turned to sociology. I have read a number of his essays and also talked with him: I have the impression that he uses sociological research in the pursuit of new political ends which I shall describe as a form of technological humanism. He is skeptical of formulas and clichés, East and West, had noted that "optimization" (of efficiency and production) often conflicts with "humanization" in all management systems, and holds that no real progress toward this goal in socialism can be made until socialist elites and their decision-making processes are subject to the most rigorous public criticism. He seems much closer to the followers of Lukacs, who are very much on the fringes of the Party, than to his old associates in the Party itself.

How far can the discussion of alienation go, if concretized in this fashion? The intimation that alienation exists in socialist society opens the way not alone to a thoroughgoing critique of Hungarian social life under the new regime, but by implication challenges one of its moral fundamentals. A thorough critique can be contained, however distasteful to those in power: abuses could be attributed to a set of circumstances which did not necessarily cast doubt on socialist principles. But the admission that alienation was not necessarily terminated by socialization of the means of production could de-sacralize the regime. It would have to be judged by its capacity to meet human needs rather than by

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imputed final ends. Some aspects of the current ideological crisis in Eastern Europe are reminiscent of the crisis of liberalism (resolved in nearly every country but our own); when it became clear that a large measure of civil liberty combined with parliamentary rule were insufficient to attain liberalism's ideal ends, socialism gained adherents among those previously liberal. In the event it was a democratic socialism which incorporated elements from liberalism. Expropriation and centralized planning have not been sufficient to attain the ends of Marxism as a political philosophy: the right *praxis* has as yet to be found. When it is, it will clearly incorporate much of today's Marxism—certainly it will be more Marxist than today's democratic socialism or neocapitalism is liberal. But it will also have new elements, the outlines of which we can hardly discern at present.

In the meantime, my friends in Budapest seemed to live the same busy lives as the rest of us. No discussion of persons ignored the political views of those being discussed, nor did they ignore their strengths and weaknesses of character. In one thing I noticed a certain similarity between Budapest, London, Paris, and New York: weakness of character always seemed to be a more prominent feature of the moral profiles of those absent than of those present. Life is crowded in Budapest, in a literal sense: apartments are small and many persons live in extremely cramped quarters. Money as such seems not to be very much of a problem for the Budapest intellectuals, but currency for foreign travel is scarce; obtaining it depends upon the often arbitrary decisions of obscure bureaucrats. The penalties for deviation have changed: those who ten years ago faced jail are now irritated by the denial of travel subsidies, or by being confined to less attractive posts, or by exclusion from the activities which lend influence, money, and prestige. But if Budapest intellectual society lacks the openly parallel and competing networks of intellectual activity we are used to, it does offer any number of interstices in which persons of a critical disposition can work. And, it should be said, these are often protected and patronized by those with rather more adequate political connections.

One evening, some of my friends took me to supper with Lukacs —an excellent central European cold supper. I found Lukacs at eighty astonishingly young; he gave the impression of a very spry sixty. He was of course quite in touch with events in France and Germany, less so with the English-speaking world—although he did not complain of an absence of visitors. He questioned me about the New Left in America; did it have contact with the trade unions and the working class? If I understood him correctly, he seemed to think that in the U. S.

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the politics of coalition is the only possible socialist politics. He talked freely of his own work, a complete edition of which is being published in West Germany. He was busy on a treatise entitled *The Ontology of Social Existence,* which may well constitute a later version (forty-five years later) of his celebrated *History and Class Consciousness.* He has withdrawn from the critique of daily political existence and is free to work quite unhindered pursuing his major theoretic interests. He pronounced himself as more optimistic than ever on the future of the socialist societies, although his optimism seems to concern the distant rather than the near future. One remark did astonish me: if he had to relive his life, he said, he might well choose to study political economy rather than philosophy and literature. Perhaps it was one of those offhand remarks which require no deep analysis.

I left Lukacs bearing one indelible impression: the decor of his apartment, his manner, the intensity and discipline of his application to his work, all mark him as a representative of that cultivated Central European *Bürgertum* which recent history has either destroyed or overtaken and to which Karl Marx himself belonged. After having met Lukacs, I understand his esthetic doctrines better, including his lack of sympathy for many of the modern movements in art. There is a sense in which Marxist humanism is a very direct successor to *bourgeois* ethics (in the historical and not the pejorative sense of *bourgeois*); the most distinguished of the Communist Marxist thinkers attests the link.

A day later, on a café terrace, I met a Hungarian social scientist who is distinctly post-bourgeois. Z has suffered horribly in the past, had been imprisoned under Rakosi for "espionage," and was now enjoying a quite different sort of life. He has dropped Marxism. He had spent a good deal of time flying between Siberia and California in connection with some gigantic research project, and he was especially proud of his connections with the American universities. [He seemed to have an infallible gift for selecting those most immune to any social ideas whatsoever.] He assured me that there was little difference between socialist and other economies: we had General Motors and they had the national planning boards, in which they too were shareholders. I observed that I was not myself a GM shareholder but that in any case I doubted the analogy. It was clear that Z could be used by the regime in a way in which Lukacs (and some of those he had influenced in an empirical direction) could not. The regime required, not critical Marxism but technical specialists and Z was prepared to be as technical and specialized as possible. He justified this in precisely the same terms

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as his counterparts in the West: the collaboration of men of science with existing regimes served to increase the rationality of the latter. Perhaps so, but even Marx's greatest opponent in German thought, Max Weber, held that scientific rationality could not in itself provide men with goals. These had to come from without the scientific process, narrowly defined. As I understood it, Z seemed to think that he had escaped what some of us still feel to be a dilemma, connected with our doubts about the moral uses of such knowledge as we have. Z supposed that the regime (or regimes) he served were intrinsically moral, or at least no less moral than other historical regimes and capable of being educated to do better. He also supposed that he was a pure scientist: insofar as his technical services to men in power caused him doubts, he could view them simply as an exercise in technique and refuse responsibility for the uses to which his services were put. I felt half envious of his complacency, as I left Budapest and went on to Warsaw.

III

The atmosphere in Warsaw was much different. Hungary is a country of ten million; Poland is four times as large. I sensed (and perhaps this was simply one of those idiosyncratic judgments which travelers make) a larger view, a less cramped and parochial feeling in Warsaw—but then I saw more people. At any rate, the Polish intellectuals had an acute sense of the importance of the conflicts within their own society: in particular, they had the conviction that their problem was less to make contact with movements of ideas outside of Poland than to make a distinctive Polish contribution to those movements. This, perhaps, accounted for the despair of some who took the view that the Polish ruling party was ineradicably narrow and frequently inept, as well as for the relative satisfaction of others who had concluded that they had won enough scope for the exercise of a certain amount of influence. Again, the distinction I had observed in Budapest seemed important in Warsaw as well: there were humanistic Marxists who were made to feel rather like utopian socialists, and there were those who wished to lend the regime more intelligence. The latter, it should be said, seemed more downcast in Warsaw than in Budapest; more of them seemed to wonder how much intelligence the regime could absorb.

When I arrived, the acute question was how much critical thought the regime could stand. Adam Schaff is Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Academy of Science, a member of the

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Central Committee of the Communist party, and a prominent representative of Poland and official Marxism generally at international conferences; he had just published a sensational book. The sensation consisted in the fact that among his assertions were the following: The conception of alienation found in Marx's early writings was a central element in all of Marx's thought and gave it a humanistic component the ignorance or suppression of which deformed Marx's thought and intentions. Alienation had not disappeared with the expropriation of the means of production since, above all, the state in socialist society continued to function in a manner which was frequently oppressive. The Communist party, which could not entirely renounce its educational aims, would do well nonetheless to end its arbitrary and rigid attempt to control art and science. Meanwhile, if responsible and socially conscious behaviour was expected of the populace, then perhaps the new socialist elite could begin to set a good example to ordinary persons by improving its own conduct. Finally, no useful purpose was served by denying that chauvinism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism were still found in socialist society and even among Communists.

Schaff's book has been published in German (in Austria and Western Germany but not in the German Democratic Republic) but not yet in English. The bluntness of the assertions I have listed is attenuated only slightly by Schaff's insistence that the distortions of socialism could be explained by the historical circumstances of the seizure of power in countries lacking a bourgeois democratic tradition: indeed, the explanation was in itself a highly unorthodox one. Schaff, it should be emphasized, was not simply writing a retrospective critique of Stalinism but analyzing the present situation of Marxist humanism in the countries ruled by Communist regimes.

He begins with an account of the present crisis in ideology and cites Roger Garaudy (the moderately independent French Communist philosopher): all philosophy today is in some way the philosophy of existence, since values are everywhere in question. In the West, the principal question seems to be: how can man live with dignity? In the East, "the wish for a better and happier life shows itself to be stronger than theoretic problems." His own work then (under the title *Marxism and the Human Individual*) is intended as a contribution to the attainment of an improved life for those under socialism. Its focus is on the individual's possibilities of fulfillment in present historical circumstances. He continues: a disciplined revolutionary movement can be as effective in repression as the exploitative system

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it overthrew. A new Marxist theory of the individual, based on old Marxist conceptions but not in contradiction with the findings of the empirical sciences, can help overcome that sort of repression.

Schaff's discussion of Marx's conception of man owes much to the recent discussion in the West — and he does not hesitate to acknowledge his debt to those Western Marxists and Marxologists who have often been abused in Communist writings. Marx distinguished between real man as he is known to us and true man—as he can become. Real man, according to Schaff, still has to contend with alienation:

> In all forms of socialist society known to us until now various forms of alienation have appeared. This implies that no automatic mechanism exists which can introduce the abolition of alienation along with the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. And that for the simple reason that the state continues to exist, just as before, as a power apparatus.

Even an optimum of democratization, far from attained yet in socialist societies, will leave men confronting a state apparatus which in the nature of the case will not wither away. Two real forms of alienation continue in socialist society: the monopolization of power by a privileged group and the necessity of work in an economic organization characterized by the division of labor. The resultant difficulties and oppresiveness can be reduced — but only if the problems are recognized and not if their very existence is denied. A new view of the relationship between the socialist citizen and the state is necessary, and there are circumstances in which the welfare of the collectivity demands a "wise disobedience" from individuals opposed to authority.

It is not surprising that this text, well documented with appropriate citations from Marx, did not please all of its readers. I was told that Gomulka himself was enraged, and that he complained that Schaff had found words to justify his (Gomulka's) imprisonment in the Stalinist period; now that things were improved, the philosopher had nothing better to do than to discover alienation in Poland. The anecdote is probably apocryphal, but if Gomulka complained in these terms, I can understand his feelings. I was shown article after article attacking Schaff in the press, in reviews, in journals. One particularly lengthy attack (to judge by the translation made on the spot for me by a Polish friend, a particularly vituperative one) was made by someone described to me as "a great thinker." "Really great?" I inquired. "Yes, he thinks all the time." "About what?" "He thinks about how

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he can keep his job as head of the state radio system...." The Party convened a special meeting of intellectuals to discuss Schaff's book. They met in great secrecy while I was in Warsaw: that very afternoon, I had several accounts of the meeting. Some, apparently, said that Schaff was "one-sided." Few said he was entirely wrong. Schaff (whom I saw) was very pleased with the controversy; whatever may have been said to him, he continues in his official and public functions.

I also had the privilege of spending some time with the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. Kolakowski has been celebrated in the West as a spiritual hero of the Polish October of 1956 and is best known for his critical studies of the crisis in Marxist political philosophy. It is less well known that he is an immensely distinguished technical philosopher, the author of a significant book on Spinoza, a student of the philosophy of the Counter-Reformation, and a writer fully identified with the national tradition in Polish literature. We did not talk about politics, but about his most recent work. He has written a series of parables on biblical themes and is much occupied with phenomenological philosophy's search for the essence of man and culture. I interpreted this as a withdrawal from the Marxist notion of the realization of philosophy. Marx held that the revolution would make philosophy and metaphysical reflection (including religion) redundant: philosophy developed to its highest point would become life itself, in the form of revolutionary activity. Kolakowski's interest in other aspects of the classical tradition in philosophy seemed to me to be an implicit commentary on the immediate possibilities of realizing philosophy: history still made philosophy necessary. A year after I saw him, he was expelled from the Party—allegedly for remarks made at a political discussion at the University of Warsaw, where he teaches.

A visit to the University was also on my program, and I was invited to talk to sociology teachers and students. The recent achievements of Polish sociology have been considerable: important, lucid, and penetrating studies of Polish society have been made, and some general contributions to our larger understanding of all societies. (The present president of the International Sociological Association is, indeed, a Polish colleague, Jan Szczepanzski, and his election was clearly intended as a tribute to Polish sociology.) There is an important Polish positivist tradition of sociological thought and moral inquiry; this has combined with the regime's obvious need for social accounting to encourage Polish sociologists to work in a rather empirical temper. Ten years ago, this in itself had political implications: to produce responses to a questionnaire which showed workers less than overcome

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with enthusiasm at socialist management required some courage in the immediate post-Stalin period. Today, the emphasis on empirical work may well have a meaning not dissimilar to that which often attaches to this sort of work elsewhere: it is a mode of keeping a certain distance from larger social criticism. I do not really know what the situation in Poland may be in all its complexity. I can simply report that, when I finished my talk, some students told me: "At last, someone who takes Marxism seriously."

IV

After having visited Poland, I went to the German Democratic Republic. I was struck by the German characteristics everywhere evident in the German Communist state: efficiency, orderliness, and the inevitable bureaucratic pedantry (a characteristic much less visible in the other Germany). Here, too, national feeling was not entirely lacking—and where previously it had taken the form of resentment against a regime imposed by military force on a reluctant population, it now expressed itself in identification with the regime's visible economic progress. While I was there, the Communist leader Walter Ulbricht declared that the East German state was not only the legitimate guardian of the national interest, in its policy of alliance with the Soviet Union, but the legitimate heir to Bismarck's foreign policy: I could not imagine that this was received with enthusiasm in Poland.

My visit to Germany brought me to a conference center of the Protestant Church, where I took part in a discussion of "Technology and Humanism" (exactly the sort of theme favored for such discussions in West Germany, too). The participants were mainly Protestant technicians: computer specialists, technologists, agronomists, officials from the various ministries, physicians. It became clear to me rather quickly that they were more technician than Protestant. They were quite delighted with my remarks to the effect that in the new Western class system a technological elite was gaining in importance. Their view was that their own regime was being transformed from one based on dogmatic Marxism to one based on what for want of a better term I shall call technological Marxism. They complained about the slowness of the transformation, announced their willingness—verging on enthusiasm—to collaborate with a Communist party directed by technicians like themselves. Perhaps the most significant of their remarks was made by a younger physicist who declared that the historically privileged class of the future, privileged in the sense of having a historical mission which it alone could fulfill, was not the

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proletariat but the technical intelligentsia. Certainly, some elements in the Communist party believe in something like this: their newest slogan is "Die gebildete Nation" ("the educated nation") and their economic planning seems predicated on their not giving up the advantage they now possess over the other Communist countries — they have the best educated labor force of any of them. What did come rather short in the discussion were both Protestantism and Marxism.

V

My trip had begun, in effect, in Yugoslavia—at the 1965 summer school convened by the *Praxis* group . These philosophers and sociologists, from the universities of Zagreb and Belgrade, worked on the premise that philosophy consists in the relentless criticism of everything that exists. Since they find themselves in a Marxist state with a Marxist official doctrine, they criticize it, much to the displeasure of the more dogmatic elements in the League of Communists. The 1965 summer school, and the two that preceded it, served as a meeting place for critical spirits from both power blocs; the 1966 one, for reasons unclear to me, was cancelled. From the 1965 session I took away some striking memories of the intellectual vivacity and political forthrightness of many in the Yugoslav intellectual elite. I also recalled what had been said by Rudi Supek, a Zagreb professor who is one of the editors of *Praxis,* about the fundamental division which occurs within rather than between the two world power blocs. The real conflict, he declared, was between the libertarian humanists and the bureaucratic technicians; he was later to repeat these views, in a way which was much appreciated by his public, at the World Congress of Sociology in Evian, in 1966.

A considerable over-simplification, no doubt: but one which can focus thought. The Communist societies now proclaim, and their political and economic elites are beginning to practice, a new doctrine of efficacy. Increased production, skillful administration, even a consciously pursued (and publicized) policy of facilitating social ascent are on the new agenda of Communist politics. Domination of a soft-tempered kind, however, remains domination. Wage workers are subject to managerial discipline even in the absence of factory owners; criticisms of "bureaucracy" are aimed at the clumsiness of certain bureaucrats and not at the principle of hierarchical organization. The utopian goals of Marxism have receded from view, or rather, have been replaced by a certain amount of discussion about the "creative" use

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of leisure time — a discussion which could just as well occur (and frequently has) under a capitalist regime. It is quite true that some of the more noxious aspects of the commercialization of culture are missing in Communist Europe; my own impression is that this may be a European trait rather than a specifically Communist one. In these circumstances, and precisely at the moment when a new type of Communist political and economic technician is emerging to begin the replacement of an older and more dogmatic generation in the leaderships of the several parties, the intellectuals have had occasion to refer again to the early Marxist texts on alienation.

The terrible experience of Stalinism is now past. (Where once the East German regime put down a revolution with the aid of the Soviet Army, it now wrings its hands in embarrassed helplessness when attacked by its own Bob Dylan, Wolf Biermann.) The content of routine, as well as its pervasiveness, has encouraged the East European intellectuals to conclude that whatever else they may live in, it is neither utopia nor likely to become so. Their philosophical reflections on this have, for the moment, only limited political implications. But Marx himself proceeded from the elaboration of the doctrine of alienation to devise a new social theory and to prescribe a new politics. Some intellectual processes have their own momentum: it remains to be seen where the recent interest in primitive aspects of Marxism will lead the embattled humanists of Eastern Europe.

Note: Adam Schaff's book was published in 1965 by the State Scientific Publishers in Warsaw under the title *Marksize a jednostka ludzka*. A German translation was published in the same year by the Europa Verlag, Vienna, under the title *Marxismus und das menschliche Individuum*. An essay on Schaff's book by Z. A. Jordan, "Socialism, Alienation and Political Power," appeared in *Survey*, July, 1966.

I am indebted to the Rabinowitz Foundation for support of a continuing study of the intellectuals as a social group, of which this report is a small part.

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Ronald Steel

BEYOND THE POWER BLOCS

With the essay which appears below, DISSENT *begins a series that will examine critically, from a variety of political outlooks, American foregin policy. These essays will form part of a book we are preparing on the general theme of foreign affairs and foreign policy.*—ED.

The cold war has been a demoralizing force in American life, forcing us to concentrate on such questions as security and prestige. It inspired the hysteria of the McCarthy period and the anxiety that has marked our relations with the rest of the world. But the cold war has also been an exhilirating time in American history. It has pushed our frontiers beyond the Western hemisphere to the mainland of Asia and the jungles of Africa. It has made the United States, for the first time in its history, a global power.

Because of the contest with Russia over power and ideology, the United States became involved in countries very remote from traditional American interests and pledged itself to a struggle that knew no territorial limitations. The cold war both caused and justified the creation of a benevolent American empire. Although it made us fear for our safety, the struggle with Communism also excited us with the knowledge that we were one of the world's arbiters. Beginning as a struggle for power in a war-shattered Europe, the cold war soon became an ideological contest embracing all the continents. Soviet messianism—sweeping in its presumptions, although usually tailored in its actions to serve the interests of the Russian state—was matched by an equally fervent American messianism in the form of anti-Communism.

The cold war was real and it was deadly. Yet each time they have been drawing to the brink, the superpowers have pulled back, fearful of a conflict whose destruction would nullify whatever issue was at stake. Provocations—such as Berlin, Korea, Hungary, Cuba—which in an earlier time would almost certainly have led to open war, were smothered and ultimately resolved by compromise. This is not because superpowers today are more reasonable than those of the past, but because the atomic bomb has made full-scale warfare suicidal between major powers. The

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obscene guardian of an uneasy peace, the Bomb has forced America and Russia to find ways of resolving, or of learning to live with, their differences. To invert Clausewitz's famous dictum, it has forced them to resort to diplomacy as a continuation of warfare by other means.

As the balance of terror has become more stable, so the struggle between America and Russia has been muted. Ideological differences remain, but they are no longer proclaimed with the old fervor, nor are they allowed to stand in the way of political agreements. Even the political differences have now been accepted with resignation and a certain mutual respect. Neither Washington nor Moscow has any intention of attacking the other, and each is willing to let his rival reign within his sphere of influence. The cold war between Russia and the West is no longer a contest for world supremacy so much as a kind of military gymnastics with vague moral overtones. Europe—once the major area of contention between America and Russia—has now become a haven of stability. Today it is virtually unthinkable that either side would launch a war over Europe, or that they would allow any situation to arise in Europe that could threaten to ignite such a war.

The superpowers have kept a firm hand on their allies and are in unspoken agreement that territorial changes in Europe will not be settled by force. If this means that they will not be settled at all during the foreseeable future, then so much the better as far as the interests of Moscow and Washington are concerned. The reunification of Germany has been put into the deep-freeze along with the multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Europe today is no longer the cockpit of the world, but a rather tiresome sideshow whose inconveniences the superpowers are willing to tolerate so long as it does not get out of hand. It has now become clear that the focus of American diplomacy is shifting away from Europe, where the Soviet Union has long since been contained, to the impoverished and unstable states of the Third World.

With the achievement of both an ideological and a power balance between America and Russia, the blocs they lead have been subject to severe strain and even the threat of disintegration. The Atlantic Alliance is foundering under the impact of a new European nationalism, and the East European states are no longer behaving as though they were satellites of Moscow. With the lessening of the danger of a European war, the cold-war alliances have lost their cohesion, and even much of their reason for being. There is a new fluidity and even a new independence in European politics as nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain explore new ways of resolving the differences that have kept them separated for more than 20 years.

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Outside the system of rival alliances, the cold-war neutrals have found that their allegiance to one camp or another is no longer so ardently desired by Moscow or Washington, and that it is not impossible to maintain the middle course they have proclaimed as their goal. But as neutralism becomes easier, so the rewards of commitment are less enticing. Now that the superpowers are less interested in the formal loyalty of the neutrals, they are also willing to pay less for it in the form of military assistance and foreign-aid bribes. Removed from the cold-war arsenal, economic assistance to the poorer countries is coming to seem more of a chore than an opportunity to America and Russia. Neutralism has lost its "immorality"; it has also lost some of its economic rewards.

The world of the cold-war period—a world rigidly divided into two rival blocs—has now passed into history. The ideological struggle has shifted from Europe to Asia and the revolution-prone states of the Third World. The atomic monopoly, so long enjoyed by Moscow and Washington, has now been broken by China. Even if the cold war between America and Russia were ressurrected, it could never again take its old form. This can be seen in at least four crucial areas:

• First, there is the disintegration of the Soviet-ruled bloc and the open rebellion of Peking. Soviet control over Eastern Europe has been sharply diminished, and such states as Hungary and Rumania have shown a willingness to pursue their own national policies even in the face of Russian objections. The recent decision by Bucharest to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the West German government in Bonn, over vehement protests from Moscow and Pankow, is simply a case in point. The East European nations, which are satellites no more, are free to pursue their own internal policies, and even their own foreign policies so long as they do not endanger the security of the Soviet Union. "Communism has come to embrace so wide a spectrum of requirements and compulsions on the part of the respective parties and regimes," as George Kennan has written, "that any determined attempt to reimpose unity on the movement would merely cause it to break violently apart at one point or another."

Communism has failed as an economic system in Eastern Europe; it has failed even more dramatically in its effort to provide a more potent ideology than nationalism. Everywhere in the Soviet bloc Communism has been forced to take a back seat to nationalism, as each nation seeks its own road to prosperity—sometimes at the expense of its neighbors. Allegiance to a common ideology did not prevent the Yugoslavs from defying Moscow, nor has it prevented the Rumanians from expanding their Western links over Russia's objections. The revival of nationalism

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is even expressed in territorial disputes once again coming out into the open in the factious Balkans. Eastern Europe may be nominally Communist, but it is burdened with a heavy history of xenophobia and suspicion that two decades of Communist rule have not overcome. In Eastern Europe today there is no "bloc"; there is simply a group of states proclaiming formal allegiance to the same ideology, and dependent upon Soviet power for external protection.

Instead of a single Communist Church centered in Moscow, there are a variety of churches, each with its own Pope. One can no longer be sure what constitutes Communist orthodoxy because there is no single orthodoxy. With considerable reluctance, but with virtually no choice, Moscow has had to accept the equality of its erstwhile dependents in matters of ideology. Thus Communist authorities throughout the world are evolving their own solutions for local problems: the Rumanians are inviting Western investors, the Yugoslavs are creating a mixed capitalist-socialist system, the Czechs are imposing a market economy, and even the Russians themselves are following the lead of their protectorates and experimenting in economics.

In foreign affairs the disintegration of Communist unity has, of course, been even more dramatic. This is not yet pronounced in Eastern Europe, where such states as Poland and East Germany feel themselves dependent upon Moscow for protection against possible West German "revanchism," and where the other Communist states recognize that they must remain formal members of the Warsaw Pact so long as Russia insists upon it. But it is the basic fact of life in Asia, where there has been an open rupture between Russia and China. The rise of an independent, and now defiant, Communist government in Peking has shattered whatever hopes Moscow entertained for controlling the world Communist movement. This is no doubt why Stalin persisted for so long in backing Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung, for he must have realized that a Communist China could be a powerful rival to Russia within the Communist system. Once again masters of their own country, caught up in the flush of their revolution, seething with resentment against the foreigners who dominated them for so long, determined to gain a place in the world commensurate with their immense potential, the Chinese are today challenging the Russians not only over the interpretation of Marxist scripture, but over the disputed territories they claim were seized from them by the Czars during the nineteenth century.

A common ideology has not glossed over the sharp differences separating two giants—one pursuing affluence and "peaceful coexistence," the other mired in poverty and preaching world revolution. Their mu-

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tual dedication to Marxism has apparently only sharpened their differences, for it has added the problem of heresy to the normal conflict of national interest. This break between Moscow and Peking has removed the old fear that world Communism could be put at the service of the Soviet state, a fear that for so long haunted American diplomacy. Further, it has given the smaller Communist nations a remarkable freedom of action to pursue their individual paths—a freedom which has been evidenced in Albania's defiance of Russia, and by North Korea's remarkable warning against Chinese interference.

The breakup of the Communist bloc has made it clear that Communism is no more capable of providing a cement for power alliances than is capitalism or Catholicism. The Communist victory in Yugoslavia did not augment Russian power, any more than a Communist North Korea or a Communist North Vietnam has increased Chinese power. Thus we can no longer assume that a Communist revolution in one country will necessarily benefit an existing Communist regime in any other country. It may, in fact, even weaken it—as a Communist China weakened Russia's hold over other Communist states. This is a phenomenon which we admit in Europe, although we deny it in Asia and are today engaged in demonstrating our denial by the most violent means in Vietnam. Diplomacy has yet to catch up with history.

• A parallel development is decay of the Atlantic Alliance. As the Russian military threat has diminished and as the solidity of the Communist bloc has cracked, so the united front in the West has seemed less important. And in turn this has been reinforced by the extraordinary recovery of Western Europe. Not merely is Russia less of a threat and the Communist bloc less of a reality; but Western Europe is no longer so weak and prey to Communist pressures. Indeed, the reality is quite the reverse. Today it is the Communist states of the East that are subject to grave internal stresses, while it is the nations of Western Europe that are strong, prosperous and relatively stable.

Europe's resurgence from defeat and demoralization to prosperity and self-confidence is one of the most extraordinary success stories of modern history. Only 20 years ago the West Europeans seemed prey to revolution from within and aggression from without. Incapable of protecting themselves, they sought Amercian protection on virtually any terms. Today the Europeans are chafing under what they term American "hegemony" and face with equanimity the day when American soldiers will have departed from the continent. Economic stagnation has been confined to the history books, along with the worst nightmares of

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the Nazi period, and the feeling of political impotence is now being replaced by a new European quest for identity.

The division and occupation of Europe by foreign powers—a division that has now lasted for nearly a quarter century—has come to seem as unnatural as it is undesirable to Europeans on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The American occupation, benevolent though it may have been, is becoming an anachronism to a Europe in quest of reconciliation. As this desire to reconcile the two parts of a divided continent becomes increasingly important to Europeans, the ties of the Atlantic Alliance seem unduly restrictive. To many Europeans it now seems that the rival alliances can be maintained only at the cost of keeping Europe divided, and if the Iron Curtain is to be demolished, it can be done only by dismantling the rival blocs directed from Moscow and Washington.

The resistance of the European allies to American direction can be seen not only in the withdrawal of France from NATO—a withdrawal which is supported by virtually all shades of French opinion—but even in the reluctance of West Germany to accept Washington's lead in such matters as defense costs and nuclear non-proliferation. Long the fulcrum of NATO, and indeed the basic reason for its existence, West Germany is now seeking to play a freer role between East and West. While dependent upon Washington for protection, the new government in Bonn refuses to antagonize Gaullist France and is showing a surprising initiative in launching its own "opening to the East."

Insofar as the containment of Russia is concerned, the European allies are willing to support American strategy—even though they are often reluctant to contribute to it. But outside of Europe they have shown an indifference to American diplomacy that frequently borders on disdain. Not a single European ally has come to our aid in Vietnam, and virtually all of them disapprove of what we are doing there—France publicly, the others mostly privately. They are not gravely concerned by the expansion of Communism in Asia and share none of our apprehension about China. Indeed, they look with favor on the growth of Chinese power, for they see it as a means of balancing Russian power in the East. As far as the containment of Russia is concerned, China is Europe's natural ally, and the Europeans are setting the stage for this alliance by aiding China's attempts at industrialization.

Even in economics the identity of interests between Europe and America—always more apparent than real—has begun to break down. The tortuous negotiations of the "Kennedy round" for mutual tariff reductions and the refusal of the Europeans to lower their tariffs without American concessions have shown that the Europeans have gained a

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great deal of leverage through the Common Market. This refusal to accept American leadership is also shown in the negotiations over the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not only have the Germans declared that they will not sign a treaty which discriminates against them, but so have the Italians—while the French, of course, refuse to sign altogether.

Perhaps these differences over economics, politics, and even military strategy would be less important if there were a common consensus on the basic problems that affect the Atlantic allies. But it is precisely this consensus which now seems to be lacking. There is no common accord between America and her allies on the crucial issues now facing American diplomacy: the war in Vietnam, the containment of China, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the defense of Europe, or the struggle against Communism in the Third World. Even the disintegration of NATO itself is being accepted by most Europeans, who look upon the transfer of its headquarters to Belgium as the final acknowledgement of its descent into bureaucratic irrelevance.

France has shown that the alliance will endure even though NATO is dismantled, and that even if American soldiers were withdrawn from Europe the American guarantee would still remain valid. This is not because of Washington's noble heart, but because America's own interests require that Western Europe be defended from a Russian attack. Now that this elementary fact has begun to be grasped by most European governments, the old loyalty toward NATO has given way to skepticism and even open indifference. Yet while the military organization decays, the alliance will endure so long as it seems to the mutual advantage of America and Europe. But the Atlantic bloc is no more, and America is now faced with allies with a mind, and policies, of their own.

• The decay of the two rival blocs has been accompanied by the sudden rise of the underdeveloped states to global prominence. Only a decade ago much of Africa and even parts of Asia were ruled directly from Europe, or had just begun to emerge from such rule. Today the European colonial empires have virtually disappeared, except for the Portuguese territories in Africa and a few curiosities such as Rio Muni and Timoz. Throughout Africa and Asia scores of new nations have been carved from the remnants of the European empires, and are now demanding their rights to political equality and economic development. With a few fortunate exceptions, these nations are mostly poor and ill-equipped for the ordeals of independence. But what they lack in riches

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and technical skills, they more than compensate for in a fierce nationalism that is Europe's most troublesome legacy to the Third World.

The passage of the colonial world to formal independence is one of the great revolutions of our time—greater in impact than even the Russian Revolution. Through their challenge to the nations of the West, and by the extraordinary human and material potential they possess, these nations have re-framed the world power structure. Less concerned with the differences between Communism and anti-Communism than with the struggle for equality and economic development, they have put the Russo-American cold war into a new focus. These new nations are concerned with political ideology only insofar as it can be used to achieve the goals they want—above all, the development of their economies. Rephrasing diplomacy in terms of economic development, the emerging nations have helped take the ideological sting out of the cold war. They have shown that the real struggle for most of mankind is not between Communists and anti-Communists, or between Americans and Russians, but between the rich and the poor, between the developed nations and the economically-backward ones. Yet in trying to raise themselves from economic primitiveness and exploitation, they have had nowhere to turn for help but to the rich nations—and above all, to the superpowers. In so doing, they have forced America and Russia to realize that as wealthy, stable, and prosperous societies, they have more in common with one another than with the aspiring poor in the Third World.

• A fourth factor contributing to the passing of the cold-war world has been the declining importance of nuclear weapons as a diplomatic tool. Experience has demonstrated that the atomic bomb has not permitted its possessor to impose its will upon any rival. The Bomb serves as a means by which one nuclear power can deter another. This is vitally important, for without the Bomb it is quite likely that America and Russia long ago would have been at war over one of their many areas of disagreement. The Bomb has helped to keep the peace, and in this sense its development may be less of a misfortune than we now realize. But the Bomb has not given its possessors the means to settle their political grievances, nor even to assert their will over non-nuclear powers. For the nuclear powers it has frozen the status quo—as in central Europe. Where the non-nuclear powers are concerned, it has been basically irrelevant. Possession of a Bomb did not help the British avoid costly colonial wars in Malaya and Cyprus; it did not aid the French during the long agony of the Algerian War; and it has not been of any use to the United States during either the Korean or the Vietnam War.

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It is a paradox, but an unavoidable one, that the Bomb has kept the peace between the superpowers, while permitting lesser grievances to be fought in its shadow. Further, it has now become apparent that both Russia and America have had their effective power diminished by the development of the atomic bomb. Without the Bomb they are the two greatest powers on earth, incomparably superior to any current rival. But the development of the Bomb and its gradual dispersal to a host of relatively minor powers has deprived Russia and America of some of their advantages of size and power. It has not made the small equal to the great, but like the pistol it has helped bridge some of the disparities of power.

The present détente, and the joint effort to forge a treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, comes as a result of their realization of this fact. To retain their pre-eminence, the superpowers must prevent other nations, whether allies or foes, from upsetting the nuclear balance or forcing them into a nuclear confrontation. Thus, they have tried to close the atomic club to new members, an act whose self-serving cynicism is not diminished by the fact of its probable desirability. Wealthy giants in a world of restless allies, resentful pygmies, and hostile challengers, America and Russia find themselves drawn together in a search for common solutions to common problems. The implacability of the cold war remains only in the ideological rhetoric of which neither side has been fully able to unburden itself. Behind that rhetoric, however, lie the elements of an accord dictated by common interests.

The rise of new powers and the shattering of the old alliances have threatened the dominance the two nuclear giants have enjoyed. Their ability to control or speak for others is steadily diminishing, and the days of their hegemony appear to be numbered. A world which revolved around the twin poles of Moscow and Washington has been split into scores of minor and major poles. Instead of a "Communist world" and a "free world," there are a confusing series of shifting relationships between great and small powers. Confronted by the insubordination of their allies and the defiance of the neutrals, America and Russia are in the declining days of their condominium. Keeping restless allies in check, trying to maintain a nuclear balance, resentfully financing the development of the emerging nations, and trying to prevent the instability of the new states from drawing them into an open confrontation with one another, Moscow and Washington are moving toward an unacknowledged, but nonetheless real, cooperation. They are learning to carry on their competition in terms of a traditional power rivalry. Each remains committed to its ideology, but the détente and the nuclear balance take precedence over ideological proselytyzing.

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A tacit cooperation between the superpowers has been in effect for some time, even though both would be reluctant to admit it officially. This has been evident not only in the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963 and the proposed non-proliferation treaty, but also in the current war in Vietnam. This pattern of self-restraint dates back to the worst days of the cold war, and has now been reinforced by the dictates of "peaceful coexistence." As the United States refused to support the rebellious East Berliners in 1953 or the Hungarians in 1956, and accepted the Berlin Wall in 1961, so the Russians tolerated the Berlin airlift, have respected the security of West Berlin, and have not challenged our devastation of Communist North Vietnam. Rather than agitate trouble in such places as Laos and Kashmir, the superpowers have tried to smother grievances, and after the dissatisfying experience of the Congo they have sought to keep the cold war out of Africa. Russia has been quiescent in Latin America since the Cuban missile crisis, and the United States has been reluctant to exploit the revived nationalism now sweeping Eastern Europe. They are now engaged in an attempt to stabilize the arms race by an agreement on anti-missile systems, are sharing the burden of building up India as a rival to China, and are apparently agreed that Castro should be kept isolated. This tacit cooperation between Washington and Moscow has gone so far that the United States was embarrassed by the request of Stalin's daughter for asylum, and persuaded her to go to Switzerland instead. Even the propaganda war has come to be considered bad taste in both rival capitals.

Aware of their common interests, determined not to be drawn into a nuclear war against their will by actions of nations such as China or Germany, the superpowers are now forced to reconsider the value of their alliances. Their primary value now seems to be that of keeping recalcitrant allies in line and maintaining an essentially bipolar balance of power. This, of course, is what de Gaulle has warned of all along, what the Chinese mean when they talk about Soviet cooperation with the "imperialists," and what West German Chancellor Kiesinger meant when he accused Russia and America of "a form of atomic complicity" in the non-proliferation treaty. In a sense, all of these complaints are right. There is a kind of collusion taking place between the superpowers: a collusion to keep Europe divided into rival alliances, to restrain China, to keep the lid on the Third World, to prevent new members from joining the atomic club. That this may be true, however, does not necessarily make it undesirable. One might argue that it would be a wholesome development insofar as world peace is concerned. Far better, after all, to have the world controlled by two satiated superpowers acting in cooperation

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than to have it fought over by two implacably hostile nations bent on world dominion. The more serious problem is whether it is still possible.

Roosevelt's vision of a great power directorship over the world is theoretically feasible. But may it not be too late? Can Washington today decree a German settlement without the accord of Bonn? Can Moscow do so without the agreement of Pankow? The disintegration of the cold-war alliances has diminished the usable power of the nuclear giants. It has sharply restricted the agreements they can impose upon other nations. Having been incapable of decreeing a European peace treaty or reaching an accord on nuclear weapons during a time when they could enforce it upon weaker nations, they now find that the agreements they reach may be binding upon no one but themselves. The alliances they maintain are usable only for defense against one another. They are no longer viable instruments by which the superpowers can assert their will upon weaker nations. Gaullist France may have been the first to realize that American military protection need not entail American political domination, but it is Germany and China—two nations with real grievances—that pose the real danger to the unspoken accord of the superpowers.

• The break-up of the power blocs directed from Washington and Moscow has brought a new fluidity, and a new instability, to world affairs. The decay of NATO and the Dulles complex of alliances, the disintegration of the Communist bloc, the spread of nuclear weapons, and the diminution of the Bomb as a means of superpower control, the revolutionary rise of the ex-colonial peoples—all this has radically changed the world power structure from what it was during the cold-war period. The past is now prologue to the post-cold-war world that we are living in.

Relief with the passing of the cold-war struggle between America and Russia is natural, particularly among liberals who all along have decried both the goals and the methods of the cold war. But that relief could well be tempered by even a cursory glance at the new power struggle emerging on the horizon. The coming struggle is not going to be one between Communists and anti-Communists—despite the inflated rhetoric of the war in Vietnam—but rather between rising states and established ones, between those who seek and those who already possess. Although remnants of the cold war remain, particularly in the official language of the State Department, the main dispute between nations is not so much over ideology as it is over power and influence. Gradually, we seem to be returning to an older kind of struggle, the kind Metternich tried to deal with after the Napoleonic wars and the appease-

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ment of ideological fervor in republican France. The language of the French Revolution had spread throughout Europe, even after France herself returned to conservatism and monarchy. But what was important was that this ideology expressed itself in nationalistic fervor and the struggle for political equality by peoples who were, or believed themselves to be, suppressed.

Perhaps the Austro-Hungarian empire was not such a bad thing. It helped to spare Europe a major war for nearly a century, and it tolerated a certain degree of diversity for the states it encompassed. Perhaps historians will decree that the American empire, too, has not been such a bad thing: that it has been maintained with a minimum of overt coercion, that it has helped keep the peace, and that it has been relatively benevolent for most of the peoples who live within its confines. Such a judgment may have a good deal to recommend it, but it is not really to the point, for the real test of an empire is not whether it is beneficent but whether it is viable. On that count the benevolent American empire cannot expect to maintain its cohesion without the use of methods which may be repugnant to the American people. The war in Vietnam can be justified to public opinion in terms of the cold-war rhetoric of Communism v. anti-Communism. But even there that justification no longer carries its old conviction, and much of the uneasiness over the war among people who are neither liberals nor radicals stems from the fact that Communism per se is not considered to be the menace it once was. This is why the Administration has struggled so hard to bring the specter of China into the Vietnam equation, even though this has involved a considerable twisting of logic and evidence.

• It may be that, beneath the fury of an outdated rhetoric, Vietnam is not so much a war of ideology as a war for power and influence: a war to demonstrate to China that the United States is, as the President has said, a Pacific power, and even an Asian power. In this sense it may be not so much a hang-over from the cold war (although to some degree it is, insofar as our assessment of Ho Chi Minh is concerned), as an attempt to stake out the boundaries of America's global power. It would be a tragic irony if the passing of the bipolar cold-war confrontation should be succeeded by the attempt to assert an American suzerainty over the areas lying along the fringes of the Communist giants. This is, however, precisely what we have maintained in Europe, the Middle East, and Japan along the fringes of the Soviet Union, and what we have achieved along the fringes of China everywhere but in Vietnam. Perhaps this is

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why the Administration considers the Vietnam War such a "test case," for it fears that if the war is lost to the Vietcong guerrillas, China will establish a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, and America will no longer be an "Asian power."

At the very least, the war in Vietnam has demonstrated that the break-up of the cold-war power blocs has not brought about the tranquility that many liberals and radicals unrealistically imagined. Even if the United States were to pursue a more restrained concept of where her national interest lay; even if Washington and Moscow were to cooperate overtly in such areas of mutual concern as Central Europe, there is little reason to assume a decline in international tensions. On the contrary, the subsiding of the cold war between the giants has permitted smaller powers to give vent to their grievances against one another, and violence to take place on a local level without necessarily threatening the nuclear balance and the Russo-America détente. When faced with the turmoil of the Third World and with the rise of new powers, such as China, to challenge American pre-eminence, there is the temptation among many to have the United States play the role of a global policeman. But this is not a desirable role for America, and it has now become apparent in Vietnam that it is not even a feasible one.

What lies beyond the cold war and the break-up of the rival power blocs is a world where even such great powers as America and Russia cannot hope to assert their will in areas outside their own vital interests. The best they can do is to seek to smother conflict where it affects them directly, and cooperate, insofar as possible, to isolate the violence in the emerging countries so that they are not dragged into these disorders. Cooperation, accord, even collusion between Washington and Moscow is possible, and in many respects desirable. But above all what is necessary in the post-cold-war world is a clear recognition of where our real interests lie and what are the limitations our actions must be guided by. We cannot contain all the violence in the world, and perhaps the best we can do is to make sure that it does not involve us over causes that are not our own and whose reasons we do not understand. The passing of the cold-war world has not solved our problems; it has only changed them, for, as Churchill said as long ago as 1945, "when the war of the giants is over, the war of the pygmies will begin."

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BOOKS

Henry Pachter

The Political Economy of Fidelismo

MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Monthly Review Press. 402 pp. $8.75.

Baran and Sweezy may have felt that in writing *Monopoly Capital* they were doing for the Space Age what Karl Marx had done for the Textile Age and Lenin for the Steel Age. Let it be said from the outset that in scholarship they don't compare with either and are not on a par even with their own earlier efforts. Their reading is limited, their quotations are often secondhand, and they don't understand the methodological apparatus they have borrowed from Kalecki and Steindl. To prove that capitalism is now bound to collapse or, perhaps worse, to stagnate and lapse into barbaric wars, the authors state that monopoly has wrought a decisive change. Free competition used to keep profits low and hence helped maintain the equilibrium; under monopoly, on the contrary, prices may rise while costs are falling, and the "surplus" which is thus created will spread like a cancer through the whole body of society.

I shall say later why I think that "surplus" is inadequate as a tool of analysis; but first, I shall ask how the authors themselves use it. Surely, in a book which claims to be in the Marxian tradition (though superseding Marx in many respects), one must expect an explanation of the mechanism that translates the economic law into concrete decisions—and indeed the authors raise this claim when they scorn "bourgeois economists" for divorcing micro-economics from macro-economics. But they go further; they devote a third of their space to the cultural, political, and social aspects of monopoly capital; this would be as it should if in these chapters their reading were not even more superficial, and if the connection between their economics and their sociology were comprehensible at all! The final chapters, which deal with the "quality" of monopolistic society and the "irrationality" of the system, generally bemoan "the emptiness, degradation and suffering which poison human existence," and in particular the deterioration in marital relations.

> Under monopoly capitalism . . . the whole vital process of sublimation is in danger of collapsing. . . . The stultifying boredom of leisure, the degeneration of what goes by the name of culture . . . Under these circumstances it is easy to understand why sexuality again has come to the fore

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> as the increasingly predominant means of satisfying libidinous drives.

I have seen similar complaints in the literature of the ages: sixth century B.C., fourth A.D., the middle ages, and eighteenth century. The connection with "monopoly" just eludes me. Baran & Sweezy, however, need this "crisis-of-Western-civilization" wail because they hope that dementia will eventually precipitate capitalism into self-destruction, and neurosis will prevent its agents from defending their system. And why must they thus substitute Freud for Marx? Because, unlike traditional Marxists, they believe neither in the meliorative force of economic interests nor in the possibility of political action:

> The normal political system of capitalism, whether competitive or monopolistic, is bourgeois democracy. Votes are the nominal source of the political power, and money is the real source. . . . All political activities and functions . . . can be carried out only by means of money, lots of money. And since in monopoly capitalism the big corporations are the source of big money, they are also the main sources of political power.

This crude, simplistic view is not mitigated by any mention of trade unions, pressure groups, pluralism, or the conflict character of social systems; nor are the authors even aware that it would be their duty—in the framework of their own theory of an oligopolistic economy—to explain the more subtle mechanisms through which the system asserts the working of its self-perpetuating laws. Again—utter failure to relate the economic theory to the analysis of the society. The latter seems to be seen entirely in terms of brute political power which also uses monopolistic means of economic domination. But if this is so, why then do they deny the possibility of political action for the opponents of the "oligarchy"?

The same point must be raised against Baran & Sweezy's treatment of the race issue. While one may subscribe to every indictment they hurl against American society, they fail to make it clear how the Negro's plight is *specifically* related to the oligopoly structure of American capitalism; hence, their conclusion that integration cannot work "within the confines of the system" is not convincing (though it may be true for other reasons and beyond the system).

While Baran & Sweezy have no hope that the corrupted American worker may change the system, they are confident that the American Negro will overthrow it as part of the general anti-imperialistic uprising of the colonial nations. This is indeed the core and *raison d'être* of the book, which is dedicated "To Che." It is therefore with particular attention that one turns to the chapter on "Militarism and Imperialism." Here, if ever, political and economic motivations must jell into one great vision of monopoly capital's political economy; for we have been told that imperialism is one of the three methods by which the capitalists try to get rid of "the surplus." Strangely enough, the chapter does not tell us; nor is there any comparison of investments abroad for different countries and at different times. There is not even a definition of "neo-colonialism." Instead, "to explain why the U.S. military needs expanded rapidly during the post-war period, we have to go beyond [!] a theory based on past capitalist experience"—and after a lengthy demonstra-

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tion of the congenital peacefulness of the Soviet Union, the real reason for "the oligarchy's need" is revealed as "the same implacable hatred of socialism, the same determination to destroy it, that has dominated the leading nations from the time of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917." Again, no connection with the "surplus," and indeed the authors state that the limit of increasing defense expenditures may have been reached for technical reasons. Nor do they see much hope in conditions, developments or devices that in earlier periods helped capitalism out of the doldrums—a rapid population increase, decisive new inventions, expansion into underdeveloped areas.

The authors find it easy to show that monopolists are not forced to adapt themselves to new conditions, their basic aim being merely to maximize the profit on a given investment. This abstract contention, however, flies in the face of experience, and it is intrinsically untenable. It is based on the idea that "*the* oligarchy" is a monolith acting in unison; that no plurality of national, social, industrial, and other divisions exists; that it is not competition that is imperfect but monopoly that is perfect. In point of fact, there is no "monopoly" which is not competing with other monopolies—say the steel industry with the plastic materials industry—and no governing elite which is not pressed by another elite that would take its place, even in China! At worst, we have oligopoly in the economy, competing elites in the leadership of society, and political pressures which force concessions from "bourgeois democracy."

Having neglected to discuss the new techniques of social, political, and economic stabilization, the authors can lightly dismiss as "exceptions" the "temporary" improvements in the situation of the Negroes, or the government's manipulation of GNP. Since they doubt that any new invention as great as the steam engine, the railroad, and the automobile will come along, they cannot see that the great needs of our age arise precisely in that area of public (i.e. welfare) economy which they dismiss because it fails to fit their definition of "monopoly capitalism." Again, it may well be that the new elites which compete for leadership in this mixed politico-economic management will fail to solve our social problems—but not because they cannot get rid of the surplus or because they are more monopolistic than their grandfathers of laissez faire.

What, finally, is this "surplus" which the capitalists try so desperately to get rid of? It is not Marx's surplus value—once a useful tool to analyze the difference between input and output and the possible sources of a market glut. But more refined methods of analysis have shown that capitalism can overcome the difficulties which still baffled Rosa Luxemburg. Therefore, Baran and Sweezy introduce another "surplus," which they variously define as "the difference between aggregate net output and aggregate real wages" (i.e., not counting capital), or "the difference between what a society produces and the costs of producing it" (i.e., including new investment), or "the difference between the product and the socially necessary cost" (something no system of accounting can determine)—which, to begin with, are three different things. But in an appendix none of these definitions is

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adhered to; rather, by adding all "property income," all government expenditures, and all costs of distribution, styling, finance, insurance, legal and similar services, the "surplus" has been found to rise from 40 per cent in 1933 to 56 per cent in 1964. It would be difficult to find in 300 years of economic literature a more preposterous adding operation. But even if we take these values for what they are not, we should ask: Do they reflect a progression from a less monopolistic to a more monopolistic economy? Or perhaps a correlation between slump and boom conditions? Or perhaps another structural change in response to the increasing productivity of labor and the displacement of factory production workers while service industries increase? Or perhaps just the hundred-year trend of rising rates of surplus value which started long before monopoly had been described and before Baran & Sweezy discovered it?

The authors do not even ask such questions, nor do they do anything else with their "surplus" except to assert that the capitalists cannot sell it. But by at least one of their own definitions, the capitalists need not worry and should be thankful for the surplus. For no matter how big the difference may be between "socially necessary" and actual cost, in the capitalistic economy this difference does not play the slightest role. To take an example from the book: Chromium plating on a car, hair curlers, and customer entertainment are not "socially necessary"; for the capitalistic economy, however, it only matters that these services are sold, and in fact the pyramiding of these unnecessary new industries has created a new structure of consumption and new outlets for the "surplus" they create. For every producer is a customer, and the economic planner's job consists precisely in making sure that this automatism is not broken.

This is so elementary that we must ask ourselves whether perhaps we misunderstand the authors. Otherwise it is incomprehensible that two experienced economists failed to see that their terminology and methodology is faulty. However, three critics who are not unfriendly have made the same observation: Robert Heilbroner in the *New York Review of Books,* David Horowitz in the *Monthly Review,* and Ernest Mandel in the *International Socialist Review,* not to speak of the sharp attacks published in *Science and Society* and *Studies on the Left.* Almost unanimously the critics have pointed out that the concept of "surplus" is vague and has neither hands to grasp any reality nor feet to climb any speculative mountain. It includes many distinct income streams and thereby blurs the class interests which are fighting over the distribution of the "surplus." Instead of a precise analysis of surplus profit and surplus capital, therefore, we get a sentimental distinction between "Oligarchy" (including its retainers, the white workers) and "the poor" which apparently include 99 per cent of the population in underdeveloped countries.

It seems that this Maoist sociology is the real purpose and explanation of the authors' deliberate economic primitivism. The conception of "surplus" makes sense only if it is understood as a theoretical underpinning of the colonial rebellion against white monopolistic domination in the world. Since both authors once knew better,

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one can only surmise that they constructed their economic model to suit their political creed. This required the blurring of class differences in both the old industrial countries and in the newly developing countries, and to stress the world political conflict between the two ideological blocs. But they are not even successful in giving this conflict a solid economic foundation, and in the last resort they do no more than substitute the coming third world war for the world revolution which failed to come.

Sociology as Imagination

THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION, by Robert A. Nisbet. New York: Basic Books. 349 pp. $7.95.

For a discipline that is a regular target for bad jokes about its jargon, the superficiality of its concepts, and the pseudo-scientific quality of its research techniques, sociology has an astonishingly prominent position in the culture. "Anomie," "power structure," "Protestant Ethic," are a regular part of cocktail-party babble while in San Francisco there is a singing group called "Max Weber and the Charismatics"; the President busily peruses the latest public opinion surveys; and, at a more profound level, any work on the problems of modernization in underdeveloped countries shows the influence of sociological thought on other disciplines.

Some of this is mere faddism, but in large measure it is an indication of a feeling that somehow sociology has something relevant to say. This is not a wholly irrational feeling, for the fundamental ideas at the heart of the best of contemporary sociological thinking "are refractions of exactly the same forces that also produced the outlines of modern liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism." That is to say, the perspectives of modern sociology were forged in the nineteenth century as a response to the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and the industrialization of Western Europe. From its inception, then, the sociological tradition has taken as its point of departure the problems of modern societies, and that fact gives the discipline its contemporary relevance. This historical context is the starting point for Robert Nisbet's exploration of the work of the great nineteenth-century theorists.

Those who loom largest and occupy most of his attention are Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel. Nisbet does not recount their "systems"; rather, in the manner of a historian of ideas, he is interested in the way they have treated certain central themes or "unit-ideas" that were elaborated by later theorists. These ideas, the core of the sociological tradition, are *community, authority, status, the sacred,* and *alienation.* Some of the theorists do not fit too comfortably into this somewhat Procrustean categorization, but it permits an exploration of significant aspects of their theories. On the whole, Nisbet is a very knowledgeable and reliable guide, be-

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cause he is fundamentally in sympathy with the style and temper of the work of most of the men he is writing about. Occasionally, however, this sympathy leads him astray. So, for example, in discussing the significance of the conceptual distinction between "class" as used in Marxian theory and the Weberian "status group" Nisbet says, "Today, as a sociological concept, class is dead." Many sociologists will find that a death certificate has been issued rather prematurely.

The above-mentioned ideas are not unique, of course, to sociology; in one form or another they have been the focus of thought in many disciplines. But in sociological theory they have been used in a highly distinctive fashion, so that, for example, the notion of *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* represents a distinguishably different perspective from that found in other discussions of the community from Aristotle to Rousseau. In part, the difference is the result of a self-conscious scientific orientation, and an attempt by most of the theorists to be non-ideological in their intellectual work. Yet there is a complex relationship between the sociological tradition and the conservative ideological thought of the nineteenth century.

The best work in sociology grows out of a "creative paradox." Although sociology "falls in its objectives and in the political and scientific values of its principal figures, in the mainstream of modernism, its essential concepts and its implicit perspectives place it much closer, generally speaking, to philosophical conservatism." The paradox is probably best illustrated by Durkheim, a committed *Dreyfusard*, haunted by a vision of the breakdown of social order. Durkheim's awareness of the socially disorganizing effects of nineteenth-century industrialism and capitalism produced a sociological theory that crucially undermined the atomistic and individualistic social theories that served as the ideological underpinnings for capitalism. But his theoretical views led Durkheim to insist that a strengthening of "such traits as collective conscience, moral authority, community, and the sacred" is the "only appropriate response to modern conditions." A similar emphasis is also to be found in a Bonald or a de Maistre, but Durkheim neither longed for nor advocated a return to a premodern social order.

A nostalgia for the feudal order led the conservative thinkers to see democracy, industrialism, and capitalism as unmitigated evils destroying community, promoting new legitimations of authority, and reordering the traditional status systems. The sociological thinkers, on the other hand, accepted the passing of feudalism and were committed to the new social order, and perhaps because of this, were able to think about society in a different fashion. In their work "community" or "religion" become analytical concepts. In the writings of de Lamennais, Protestantism "represented in its emphasis upon individual faith and its depreciation of ritual and liturgy, a destructive force in European history." In the hands of a Weber or a Durkheim this idea is reshaped to tell us something about the nature of social processes; the idea of religion becomes an "analytic perspective" rather than simply an object of attack or defense.

Yet the cutting edge of the new per-

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spective is the result of a scientific orientation wedded to a moral and artistic vision; behind the new ideas were moral responses to the world and a play of imagination. This latter quality can easily be seen in Simmel's analysis of the urban milieu, and it is also present, though not as transparently, in Weber's use of the idea of rationalization. He saw the old order held together and animated by a pervasive "prophetic pneuma"; it was an "enchanted" world of the spirit. The modern industrial society with its rational-legal order and impersonality in relationships among people represents "the disenchantment of the world." Breaking the magic spell is necessary if one is to reap the benefits of the modern world, and Weber, no more than the Marx to whom he is often opposed, is willing to forgo these benefits. Weber is well aware, though, that enchantment too has its benefits; rationalization represents a loss as well as a gain. But the thrust of his work, e.g., *Politics as a Vocation,* is to warn us against those who wish to enchant us again. There is in Weber, then, a celebration neither of the past nor of the future; rather, a clear-eyed, almost stoical, view of a tragic present. The present was threatened not only by those who rejected the existing social order, but also by the future the present was giving birth to. Others were also terrified of the future: de Tocqueville foresaw egalitarianism spawning mass society, and Durkheim feared the progressive breakdown of social organization. In the main these were "alienated" thinkers: "Alienation, considered as a sociological temper, is the antithesis of the idea of progress and of rationalist individualism"; that is, the perspectives that make up the tradition are sceptical of the inevitability of progress and the inevitability of the growth of human potential. It is this sense of a threat to the present from people and ideologies enthralled by visions of the past or a heady optimism about the future that, in part, gives the conservative cast to the sociological tradition.

So bald a statement is an obvious over-simplification. The present is valued by Marx only insofar as it is a necessary stage for a future society that holds no terrors for him. In this sense Marx was less "alienated" and more in tune with the temper of his time than the politically conservative Max Weber. If Durkheim's concern for order led him to overlook the significance of conflict for anything but disorganization, the same cannot be said of Simmel. After all, no "tradition" is all of a piece, and Nisbet is well aware of this. Yet he is surely correct in stressing the conservative drift of the sociological tradition.

Here, I think, is the explanation for some of the cultural ambivalence toward sociology. The future that frightened the great theorists is our present. They pinpointed our dilemmas, and, because they are in "the mainstream of modernism," they speak our language. Or, more precisely, their vision of today's world was so accurate that it forces us to adopt their language. To adopt a language is to adopt a perspective and a mood; yet the vision and temper of the sociological tradition is one of alienation and disenchantment. And this runs against the American grain. Many, including sociologists, are still firm believers in the inevitability of progress, while

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others, if they have ceased to believe in the inevitability of anything, still try to remain committed to the idea that the future need not be a glossy version of the present. In either case, however, enough of the nineteenth-century heritage remains in contemporary sociology to create a sense of anxiety—therefore, the inevitable jokes.

MURRAY HAUSKNECHT

Obscenity, Censors, and the Movies

MOVIES, CENSORSHIP, AND THE LAW, by Ira H. Carmen. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 339 pp. $7.95.

The censor's work is never secure, for history deals harshly with yesterday's moral judgments. The road from the 1909 Chicago censor's refusal to license two feckless horse operas ("The James Boys" and "Night Riders") to this year's unstinting praise for the frankness of "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?" has been a long and rocky one.

But if past censors have been arbitrary and flinty, Hollywood has also been much to blame. For years the film capital, its eye on the dollar, has obligingly tailored its fare to fit the censor's vision, while introducing as much cheesecake as the law would allow. It is not surprising that film makers who see themselves simply as entertainers, not artists, willingly forfeit their claim to First Amendment rights.

After World War II, the influence of the foreign film market, together with the work of some serious American movie makers, began to force a change in censorship practices. In the now famous "Miracle" case (Burstyn vs. Wilson, 1952), the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position that movies were purely business ventures and therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment; thus began the slow process of liberating films from the smothering effects of the censor. Up to that time the typical censorship statute specified that movies be of a "moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character." The Court's opinion that films contain ideas, thus placing movies within the ambit of the First Amendment, has forced censors to retreat from their vague moral postures, leaving them free only to operate—shears in hand—on the sexually obscene.

The changes in film censorship that have taken place over the past 15 years are astonishing, and Ira H. Carmen's *Movies, Censorship, and the Law* provides a fascinating and learned view of these changes. The first two chapters review the Supreme Court's rulings on free speech from 1915–1965. The steady growth in film freedom is a direct result of the Court's concern with areas of protected speech. Though his arguments are at times subtle, Carmen is always clear in his summaries and explanations of judicial decisions.

There follow detailed examinations of state and local censorship practices. What goes on in a sophisticated metropolis such as Detroit is both illustrative and shocking. Carmen finds that the Detroit License and Censor Bureau (an agency of the Police Department) operates in arbitrary, secre-

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tive, and at times illegal ways. The Bureau is under the exclusive management of policemen, keeps no records, and often employs extra-legal methods to limit a film's exposure and/or audience; in short, there are no "meaningful checks . . . against arbitrary motion picture censorship."

Though Carmen expresses admiration for the judicial opinions of Justices Douglas and Black, he is not an absolutist libertarian. His recommendations rely heavily on his belief that the Supreme Court's opinion in *Roth* (1957)—that for the average adult obscenity appeals to a prurient interest in sex—provides workable judicial standards for determining the censorable. Perhaps by now this faith has been unsettled by the Court's *Ginzburg* opinion (1966) which measures titillating advertising and the "commercial exploitation of erotica" in determining the obscene.

But Carmen's recommendation that prior restraints (pre-censorship) be replaced by prosecution against the offending film, after it has been shown, is one that defenders of the First Amendment should accept. As a first important step, this would bring censors face to face with the producer-distributors in a court of law, thereby removing prosecution from the movie-house operators who are, after all, businessmen, not assigned guardians of the Bill of Rights.

GILBERT R. DAVIS

A Conservative Gargoyle

THE AMERICAN DISSENT: A DECADE OF MODERN CONSERVATISM, by Jeffrey Hart. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company. 262 pp. $4.95.

Bad books are easily ignored. They may waste an unwary reader's time, but this is a minor irritant. Really bad books, however, are noxious: they insult the intelligence of readers; they also injure the cause they avowedly seek to promote. Such a really bad book is *The American Dissent.*

Ostensibly, this is a scholarly examination of American conservatism in the past decade. Actually, it is little more than an uncritical summary of the *National Review* and various other writings by authors associated with it. Since that journal and its writers say many different and often contradictory things, not least on conservatism and liberalism and their applications to contemporary problems, the result is a genial incoherence of doctrine.

Geniality, however, is not Professor Hart's central characteristic; it is rather a vast political innocence, rooted in a disdain for logic and an indifference to unpleasant facts. Predictably, it is also arrogance, blunted only by a comic tediousness. A few examples will make this clear.

1. Hart condemns liberals for deriving their conceptions of conservatism from secondary liberal sources. Whatever the accuracy of this charge—and it can surely not be made against *all*

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liberals—Hart, with rare exceptions, unblushingly commits this error himself. The only liberal he seems to have read is Lionel Trilling. He mentions few others, and then only because in an occasional article they have been critical of so-called liberal positions. But there is no reference to and no sustained examination of the doctrines formulated by such major liberal writers as Morris R. Cohen, R. M. MacIver, and (since Hart is not loath to appeal to English conservatives) Bertrand Russell.

2. As Hart demonstrated in an earlier book (on the eighteenth-century English politician and writer Viscount Bolingbroke), he is neither a qualified historian nor a political theorist. It was not to be expected, therefore, that he would understand the complex and paradoxical thinking of Rousseau; and he does not. He quotes the celebrated sentence with which Rousseau began the first chapter of his *Social Contract:* "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." He then rails against Rousseau, calling him a defender of hypothetical, abstract freedom. Hart seems unaware that Rousseau immediately added: "How did this change come about? I do not know. *What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.*" It is not entirely without reason that Rousseau, who would have us believe that men can be "forced to be free," is called by many the godfather of both modern totalitarianism and modern democracy.

3. One must read through 150 pages before discovering that conservatives can make mistakes. Hart's first admission of this kind involves Frank Meyer, *National Review* editor, who contended that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was really a triumph of Stalinism. Hart believes that this was essentially correct, though he concedes it may have been somewhat overstated. He also admits that the *National Review* was wrong when it argued in 1960 that serious disputes between China and Russia could not arise. However, these and a few later concessions of conservative errors do not impair Hart's confidence in the judgment of Mr. Buckley and his aides.

4. Finally, the most astounding of these observations: Hart informs us that liberal writers are beginning only now to catch up with the conservative discovery that the Supreme Court is a sort of standing constitutional convention whose decisions result no less from political and social considerations than from judicial reasoning. Must Professor Hart really be taught that liberal critics of the Court, not to speak of justices like Holmes and Brandeis, have made precisely this point throughout many decades of this century—not least in the 1930's—and that they were denounced for having done so by a host of conservative writers?

The American Dissent has one somewhat redeeming section—a chapter on the varieties of conservative thought. Here Hart presents, fairly, the diverse positions of a number of conservative sects, shows that they are at loggerheads with one another, and offers some mildly critical observations of his own. Had the book been limited to this one chapter, it would have been a near-respectable if elementary effort. As it is, one can only dismiss it as a simple-minded work for simple-minded people.

DAVID SPITZ

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COMMUNICATIONS

Again: Tolerance, Democracy, Pluralism

We continue the discussion that has been running through several issues of DISSENT, *first occasioned by David Spitz's review of the volume,* The Critique of Pure Tolerance, *by Robert Paul Wolff, Herbert Marcuse, and Barrington Moore, and then followed by contributions from various hands. Brief and significant further comments will be printed.*—ED.

1. Comment by Philip Green

To an observer, the recent controversy over tolerance in the pages of DISSENT has shed more heat than light—chiefly for the reason that the disputants have been talking about different things while seeming to be talking about the same thing. I would like to attempt to offer some clarifying distinctions about "tolerance"—both the word and the act.

One—but only one—aspect of Mill's plea for tolerance in *On Liberty* may be taken as a plea for tolerance of idiosyncratic personal behavior; of, in a word, difference. Mill speaks primarily of acts within the boundaries of one culture. Since his time, this conception of tolerance has been steadily further extended under the rubric of "cultural relativism," and we are nowadays enjoined by enlightened persons to be tolerant both of deviant individuals (or subcultures) within our own culture, and of, more generally, deviant cultures (deviant from our own, that is). I have absolutely no doubt that Robert Paul Wolff's (and probably Herbert Marcuse's) attitudes are in this regard no less Millian than David Spitz's: there is certainly nothing in Wolff's essay in the *Critique of Pure Tolerance* which would lead one to think otherwise. I suspect that *all* the contributors to this ongoing debate (and to that book) would agree with me that contrary attitudes about personal deviance are in most cases to be considered evidence of bigotry, and to be eschewed.

As for *political* speech and action, however—as opposed to merely idiosyncratic personal behavior or mannerisms—the position is quite different. The ideal of tolerance is of only limited value with respect to speech and is subject to grave distortion with respect to action.

"Tolerance" of political ideas can mean nothing more (nor less) than the utopian ideal of complete free speech —the ideal that no utterance about politics is to be legally proscribed. That all ideas should be initially treated with equal weight, or should be indiscriminately encouraged in their dissemination, however, is a doctrine that

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has never been put into practice by anyone—nor should it be. Mill is in the end simply wrong about the supposed value of free expression: that in *every* case we court stagnation, dogma, or the "waste of gifts" (in Morley's phrase), by suppressing objectionable speech. In any of these respects, what can possibly be the "value," after all, of the spread of the doctrines of Nazism, even when they are dissociated from overt acts of violence? How, for example, are virtuous ideas eventually strengthened (Mill's ultimate desideratum) by having to do combat in the marketplace with the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*? Nonsense; one does not have to be a moral absolutist to say that the world can only be better off in every way if such "ideas" are never heard of—not because they are offensive to other persons' sensibilities (the bigot's intolerant reaction to deviant behavior) but because in the end they do damage to other persons' *lives*.

That is not to say that unpleasant or dangerous ideas should be outlawed; nor has Wolff, as I read him, said anything of the kind. It is only to say that in intellectual discourse (as opposed to legal discourse) moral perversity, or the injurious distortion of what one thinks one has discovered, after intelligent and lengthy consideration, to be true, should be treated (as Barrington Moore suggests) with the intolerance that they deserve.

This can be said in full awareness that one's own ideas may be given such treatment by the majority of a society (as might be the case with the ideas of Wolff, Moore, Marcuse, Spitz, or myself). One does not in that circumstance plead for a chimerical "tolerance," which will in any event never be granted; for how can the social pressures that, as Mill correctly saw, threaten freedom of expression be successfully restrained by those against whom the pressure is directed? Rather, one simply resolves to redouble one's efforts to counter "untruth" with "truth" (not dogma) whenever one can, and especially to convince relevant *elites* to enter the lists against such pressures. As for the majority, however, all one can ask of it is that it continue to grant to one the legal right to engage in these activities: and this not because of any claim to be tolerated—why should "they" be any more tolerant of my attempts to lead them into error than I am of their attempts to lie to me?—but because the doctrine of majority rule itself demands free speech as an adjunct.

Without free speech we can never be sure that the majority formed in a supposed democracy is actually a freely-formed majority. Thus the logical demands of majoritarianism itself, not Mill's sometimes specious remarks about the prospects for improving the state of our moral and practical knowledge, are the real justification for the constitutional right of free speech. To confuse this legal tolerance with intellectual tolerance is to vulgarize the intellect. (Of course, one could justify majoritarianism itself on the same grounds Mill uses to justify free speech; indeed, Mill himself seems to do this on occasion. However, I am assuming an independent justification for majority rule, such as the social contract theorists have used. The various contractarian versions of majoritarianism are themselves not free from grave ambiguities—if they were, polit-

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ical philosophy would have ended with them—but one must start somewhere. My starting point is simply to assume at least an initial predilection for majority rule, on unspecified grounds, on the part of all the participants in this discussion.)

Finally, the notion of tolerance with regard to political *action* is easily converted, as it has been in the United States, into a sham, a facade—and since it is this notion with which Wolff's original essay in the *Critique* is chiefly concerned, most of the criticisms which have been made of that essay miss this most important point.

The dominant tendency in American political science today holds that democracy is to be valued primarily to the extent that something called an open democratic process ("the rules of the game") is maintained, rather than by the results for real human beings which are produced by that process. Thus, the laundry workers should be "tolerant" of General Motors' efforts to use its "access" in the pressure system, and vice-versa; both should also have affirmative attitudes toward the system itself. Is the example unfair? On the contrary, it's all too typical. The rules of the game are rigged, sometimes by deliberate manipulation, most often simply as the result of a long historical process. It is not an accident, therefore, that survey research so often shows a positive attitude toward these rules on the part of those who benefit most from them, such as community leaders, the well-to-do, *academics,* etc.—conversely, a negative attitude on the part of those who don't benefit as much. After all, politics is concerned with the struggle for power (ultimately) over the conditions of life and death, and in that struggle who wins and loses matters at least as much as how the game was played. The more powerful can expect the less powerful to abide by the rules only to the extent that they are willing continually to surrender more and more of their power. Otherwise their power must be respected out of prudence, but its *legitimacy* can only be attenuated: maldistribution of power and/or income can only be greeted with *in*tolerance.

In the end, I can think offhand of only two (ideal) types of society in which tolerance should be the *political* norm; that is, in which everyone's engagement in the political process should be equally respected by all regardless of the results of that process:

1) a Rousseauian social contract in which the laws are made equally and directly by all, where there are no permanent minorities, and no extremes of income distribution:

2) a genuinely pluralist society (à la Figgis and the early Laski) in which mutual respect and community-spiritedness are the rule with regard to the allocation of power and income, as well as with regard both to the expression of opinion and to idiosyncratic personal behavior. It need hardly be added that this is a far cry from the pseudo-pluralism of American theory and practice today.

David Spitz—and he has not been alone in making this criticism—asks Wolff what can possibly replace our rules-of-the-game "tolerance" (which, to repeat, is a false tolerance—the tolerance of the strong for the weak as long as the weak play by their rules).

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He dislikes Marcuse's version of Rousseauianism, and I agree with him in this (so does Michael Walzer, and Wolff might too, as the preface of the *Critique* makes clear). Obviously, much work remains to be done in the search for alternatives. As a starter, however, I would refer Spitz and DISSENT readers to the growing literature on decentralization and direct community action; and for another perspective, to the recent work of Peter Bachrach (*The Theory of Democratic Elitism,* e.g.), which represents the beginnings of an attempt to reconstruct for industrial society a genuine pluralism (and which should be read in conjunction with Michael Walzer's recent paper on "The Obligation to Disobey").

But aside from the question of practicable alternatives, there is a minimal expression that we all—especially those of us who are academics—ought to expect of each other. We should, in our teaching, our writing, our speaking, not make the confusion between our own class interest and the interests of all members of society; we should not confuse the particular version of democratic process from which we so fortuitously benefit with social justice. In this respect Wolff's essay in the *Critique of Pure Tolerance* is a real contribution, and deserves more—much more—commendation than criticism.

2. A Rejoinder to Philip Green

Philip Green's communication—strikingly at variance with his sensitive and insightful writings elsewhere—confounds the commonplace distinction between a political principle and the practices of a particular society allegedly committed to that principle.

1. The Wolff-Moore-Marcuse volume is avowedly a critique of Pure Tolerance, that is, an attack on a principle. This is not accomplished by exposing the deficiencies of American practices, however accurate that exposure may be.

2. Philip Green, like the authors of the volume he defends, urges intolerance toward ideas he doesn't like, e.g., Nazism and anti-Semitism; yet he would not outlaw them. Will he forgive me if I find this seeming distinction less than clear?

3. Like tolerance, democracy and pluralism are political principles, not to be identified with the practices and arrangements of any specific system such as the American. If American practices significantly depart from or contradict those principles, we require a careful analysis and set of recommendations that will bring those arrangements into harmony with the principles; otherwise we run the risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

4. No one will deny that vast inequalities of economic and political power characterize the American system. This is to be deplored. But it remains true that within that system a disadvantaged group, say a small union or a racial or ethnic minority, can both plead its cause and unite with others of its kind, and perhaps with sympathetic elements within one of the major political parties, to

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fashion a stronger adversary to its otherwise more powerful opponent, say a giant corporation. Without tolerance and pluralism and democracy —even that "rigged" democracy that distresses Green and Wolff and many others, including myself—the disadvantaged union or racial group would not only be less powerful than it can presently (in concert with others) become; it probably would not exist as a political force at all. In these terms, to call for elitism or for the abandonment of imperfect arrangements in favor of some non-tolerant, non-pluralist, non-democractic system is more than self-defeating; it is a monstrous folly.

Moreover, for Green to condemn American political science for accepting the actual rather than the ideal rules of the game—a condemnation surely inapplicable to all American political scientists, among whose number Professor Green presumably includes himself—and to urge greater decentralization and direct community action (more pluralism?) is to affirm rather than to deny the position I advanced against the authors of *A Critique of Pure Tolerance.*

5. Finally, if Philip Green wants to value—define?—democracy not by its process but only by its results, he might not like to know that in this he is at one with Hitler and Stalin and the leaders of present-day People's Democracies. All of them claimed, and those still alive continue to claim, that their systems and only their systems were "true democracies" precisely because they operated in what their rulers conceived to be or said were the people's interests. DAVID SPITZ

3. Philip Green Answers David Spitz

Our differences may be deeper than I thought, but some are still differences of vocabulary; I'll make one last try to clarify those.

Neither Wolff nor I attack "democracy" or "pluralism" in principle. (I even offer the latter as an alternative!) It is David Spitz who confounds principle with practice by suggesting, as above, that in order to defend those principles one must accept their American versions as one's starting point. What Wolff and I *do* attack is precisely *American*-style democracy and sham pluralism which are maintained by, among other things, the ideology of pure tolerance, of "the rules of the game." Spitz asserts that despite its weaknesses this system offers the only hope for its own improvement, and this because of its emphasis on tolerance. I think he is wrong.

1) The Madisonian system is not majoritarian but is rather decisively *anti*-majoritarian, and favors negativist coalitions of established minorities—this in itself sounds the death-knell for the kind of coalitionism that Spitz offers as the hope of poor Americans.

2) In any event, if the system were reformed to be majoritarian, an effective majority would probably be formed out of those who benefit materially from the system; the problem of social justice for all would still be far from solved. After all, GM is not the only or even the worst enemy of the laundry workers: having the

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rest of the working class and the affluent labor movement for friends, they don't need enemies. What social outsiders *do* need is the kind of spirit that moved, say, the Abolitionists or the sit-down strikers. They won't get it from rules-of-the-game tolerance, which takes from them a potent (non-violent) weapon—radical opposition to, non-cooperation with, disobedience to the prevailing system.

Nor will tolerance ultimately lead to equality in political decision-making, since the rules of our game themselves forbid that: our version of "democracy" is profoundly elitist. It's precisely the system's built-in elitism—a small number of people making decisions for millions without being effectively accountable except in rare cases—that Wolff and I chiefly object to. We're equalitarians, not elitists; it's Spitz who accepts a system which, though it makes "the people" the ultimate rulers in principle, is concretely elitist in operation. And "pure tolerance," because of its effectively ideological and class character, fosters such acceptance of inequalitarianism. If ever the system is so close to achieving a meaningful degree of social justice and political equality that the abstract principle of pure tolerance loses that character, I'm sure Wolff and I will be more receptive to it.

Finally, I'm saddened by the New Left baiting of David Spitz's remarks about Hitler et al. The U. S. today is *not* the Weimar Germany, Czarist Russia, or Batista's Cuba. Exalting social justice and equality above process is less dangerous the better the material prospects for achieving them—and the U. S. surely has good credentials on that score. Somewhat dangerous it remains—but for God's sake it's dangerous to be poor or black in the U. S. right now, and bids fair to remain so for a long time to come.

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- mobilizing young people behind the Freedom Budget
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LETTERS

"Black Power" Article

Editor:

I have just finished reading Paul Feldman's extraordinary article on "black power" in the January–February 1967 DISSENT. It is certainly the best discussion on the subject I have seen, and probably the best article on the civil rights movement I've read in over a year.

To be honest, I must confess it remarkable that an article of this sharpness and insight should have survived the homogenization that I find characteristic not only of your magazine, but, each in its own way, of the *New Republic, The Nation, The Reporter,* etc., as well. Each has its own style—but each reads as if all the articles were written by the same person and as if all its contributors had nearly identical points of view.

Anyhow, you have far outpaced any and all of these other magazines by publishing this enormously useful article. It alone has made my subscription to your magazine over the last couple of years more than worthwhile.

AUGUST MEIER,
Professor of History
Roosevelt University, Chicago

Harlem Schools

Editor:

Jeremy Larner's article in the January-February 1967 issue—"Harlem: Turmoil in the Schools"—was either ghosted by Beryl Banfield or Al Shanker. The article is a testimony to them at the expense of the youth of Harlem. Who cares about Beryl Banfield's former commitment—or even Al Shanker's? What have they done lately?

Al Shanker appears to many educational activists as a John Cassesse in academic robe. Beryl Banfield's behavior at I.S. 201 is best described by Leslie Campbell, J.H.S. 35K, writing in the *Negro Teacher's Forum* in December, 1966, ". . . . the established turned to its best weapon, the Negro professional. The Negro teachers at I.S. 201 helped transfer the victory into defeat."

This statement by Tolstoy best describes what happened at I.S. 201:

> "I sit on a man's back
> Choking him and making him carry me,
> And yet assure myself and others
> That I am sorry for him
> And wish to lighten his load by all means possible—
> Except by getting off his back."

Stay loose!

PRESTON R. WILCOX
Assistant Professor of Social Work

JEREMY LARNER *replies*:

Professor of Social Work Wilcox provides a sad illustration of the impasse my article sought to describe. If he ever reads the article, Prof. Wilcox will discover that Al Shanker took considerable risks to support the Civilian Review Board. If Prof. Wilcox has evidence linking Shanker's activities with those of the PBA's Cassesse, he should publish it—or apologize. But apparently innuendo is his idea of "staying loose."

Yes, Shanker is a union leader and Banfield—like Prof. Wilcox—is a Negro professional. Presumably all three pursue extra interests other than the education of ghetto children. Yet these interests need not conflict: I tried to show how Banfield and Shanker—among others—have a great stake in educational improvment.

"The youth of Harlem" need education and opportunity. Insofar as Prof. Wilcox despises accuracy and glories in a simplistic demonology, he will offer them only purgation.

On Southern Populism

Editor:

I would like to dissent from an otherwise excellent article in your January–February issue by Paul Feldman, "Pathos of Black Power," in which he erroneously stated that "The Southern Populist movement, in which poor whites and Negroes were organized into separate groups, floundered on the rock of race prejudice."

The Populist party was an agrarian political coalition of Western farmers, Southern farmers, tenants, and share-

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croppers, Negro and white alike, which offered a real challenge to the Southern "Power Structure" of the late 19th century. While there were no doubt separate organizations on a local level by race, this movement actually floundered on the "Cross of Gold" speech by William Jennings Bryan that won him the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1896 and split the Populist party.

The Southern Populist party lasted longer than its Western counterpart and persisted until its back was broken by the enactment of poll tax laws disfranchising the poor whites, as well as Negroes. Many of the Southern agrarian rebel leaders, being politicians, returned to the Democratic party and became the worst of the racists. One example is Thomas E. Watson who, in 1892, wrote on "The Negro Question in the South," advocating unity between the Negro and poor white but who repudiated everything he said years later.

There were other revolts in the South that were directly in line with the Populist tradition. In the thirties there came into being another interracial movement that challenged the power structure of the South. This was the Southern Tenant Farmers Union. While many of us were Socialists, we owed more to the Populists than we did to the Marxists. The Communists of the thirties held that the STFU was neither fish nor fowl—because we organized people at the bottom of the agricultural ladder, without regard to whether they were small farm owners, tenants, sharecroppers, or wage workers, Negro or white. Perhaps it could have been said that the STFU floundered because of its refusal to compromise on the race issue. Because some of us were too stubborn to quit when we were licked, that movement continues even today—with remnants in the South organized in the Agricultural And Allied Workers Union Local of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, based on Negroes and whites, small farmers, and wage workers in the fields and in closely related industries. Another group directly descended from the STFU is the current AFL–CIO United Farm Workers Organizing Committee in California and elsewhere. Its leader, Cesar Chavez, though perhaps more influenced by Saul Alinsky, got his baptism of fire in a strike of cotton pickers in California led by our Union in 1949.

There are countless other organizations which united Negroes and whites in the South in the Populist tradition. Among these were the I.W.W. which organized the lumber mill workers in the piney woods of southwest Louisiana just prior to World War I. The worst of racists like George Wallace, and others such as Orvil Faubus of Arkansas and perhaps Lester Maddox of Georgia, base their appeals to the poor white in both the rural areas and the new industrial centers on a kind of bastardized populism—help the poor man, but keep the Negro in his place. If they did not base their appeal on the economic needs of the poor, they could never get elected. The Longs in Louisiana have always gotten the votes of the poor, although (to their credit) let it be said they have not used race prejudice. Huey Long was perhaps the last of the older Populist politicians.

H. L. MITCHELL

Note: The writer of the above letter is too modest to identify himself. He was a pioneer organizer of Southern sharecroppers during the thirties, one of those men who lived out their socialist convictions in their day-to-day work. We are delighted to see that H. L. Mitchell is still at it—good luck!—ED.

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Joseph Buttinger

VIETNAM: FRAUD OF "THE OTHER WAR"

On March 22 *The New York Times* declared editorially that at the Guam meeting of U. S. and South Vietnamese leaders, the emphasis was not on military problems but on "that other side of the war—the progress toward economic and social development and constitutional and representative government in South Vietnam." Only through a government "responsive to the needs of the people," the *Times* warned, can "the kind of victory be achieved that could never be won by military means." The Guam communiqué, the *Times* concluded, "seems implicitly to recognize this fact, by its stress on the so-called Revolutionary Development program, on the importance of the coming village and hamlet elections, on the necessity of financial stability and reform of land policies, on the creation of a 'free modern society' in South Vietnam." The *Times* also quotes premier Ky as saying that the only way to eliminate Communism in South Vietnam is through a "social revolution."

Ky's reference to "social revolution" brings to mind a promise we are obviously supposed to have forgotten: that the need for a vigorous prosecution of "the other war" was precisely what Premier Ky and President Johnson proclaimed at their Honolulu gathering, just over a year ago. In their Declaration of Honolulu dated February 6, 1966, the South Vietnamese leaders stated: "We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people. We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society etc."

Building a new society and dedication to "social revolution" are also the slogans of the report on the Honolulu conference issued by the Saigon Ministry of Information. This publication, which contains both the separate and the Joint Declarations of the Saigon and Washington governments, lists no less than nine firm promises of "democracy," three assurances that "corruption and social injustice" will be eradicated, and four references to the "work of social revolution." Furthermore, there are more than a dozen promises of better education, better medical care, and more "human dignity"—promises which have deluded the American people (unlike the Vietnamese themselves) into believing that something other than death and destruction is being showered on the people of Vietnam.

Part 3 of the Honolulu Declaration also declares: "The United States will give its full support to measures of

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social revolution including *land reform. . . .*" (Italics added.)

I have italicized land reform for two reasons. One, I have been informed that in the original State Department draft of this declaration, land reform was not mentioned; it was included only at the insistance of the counterinsurgency expert Major Gen. Edward C. Lansdale, now stationed in Vietnam, whose experience has apparently taught him that without land reform, the promised "social revolution" would turn out to remain empty talk. The second reason for my stress on land reform is no less important: neither Part 2 of the Honolulu Declaration ("The Purposes of the Government of Vietnam") nor Part 4 ("The Common Commitment") contain any reference to land reform.

South Vietnam, as no one can have forgotten, has had a whole series of "revolutionary" pacification programs under Diem, each of them a disastrous failure. What is less known is that the loudly advertised Honolulu program was the fifth of such programs since the fall of Diem, all of them forgotten soon after having been announced. But the Honolulu program, solemnly cosigned by the United States, was to be the turning point in "the other war." It had to succeed. As late as September 22, 1966, *The New York Times,* in a special report from Saigon, said that this program was "generally regarded as the best conceived and most promising to be initiated in South Vietnam." It also was, as the *Times* put it, "viewed as the key to ultimate success in the guerrilla war against the Vietcong."

One of its instruments, the only one seriously applied, was the 59-member team charged with pacifying villages unfriendly to Saigon—through persuasion, help for the peasants such as social services, and security maneuvers. Only three weeks after Honolulu, Robert Shaplen, a veteran American observer who knew something about previous pacification failures, gave a sober appraisal of what could be expected from these teams. In his "Letter from Saigon" in *The New Yorker* of March 11, Shaplen concluded that if all went well with the new teams, it would take them 10 years to accomplish their task.

II

During all of 1966 no report whatsoever came out of Saigon on measures that would bear any relation to the promised "social revolution."

The Johnson Administration, however, seems to have convinced itself that the Honolulu program was being successfully executed. Washington listens to people who have "confidence" in the success of anything endorsed by the United States. Such a man was Robert Komer, who was then a White House Assistant. According to R. H. Shackford's report in the *Washington News* of October 11, 1966, Komer had submitted to the President a report on the "impressive progress" in the "rural development" program conceived at Honolulu. The President seems to allow himself to be brainwashed by second-rate aides, (*if it fits his tactical needs*). He made the mistake of publishing this report on September 13, 1966. "South Vietnam," it said, "is increasingly coming to grips with the need to modernize

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society, bolster its civil economy, develop its representative institutions and provide a better life for the people. On land reform the GVN [Government of Vietnam] is proceeding with distribution of 1.2 million acres."

Komer was either unaware of or had decided to dismiss what the most prominent Vietnamese leaders themselves had to say about pacification. Shackford, in the same article, quoted Premier Ky as saying that he was "under no illusion" about the pacification program; Ky "conceded that pacification now was little more than a paper program. . . ." Even more outspoken was the head of the program, Major Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development. In discussing the "new life" promised the peasants at Honolulu, Gen. Thang bluntly stated: "Although rural institutions go by the name of 'new life' hamlets, the truth of the matter is that they have not provided a new life for the people in the hamlets." There are, according to this authority, only "old life hamlets" in South Vietnam, and "there has been no social revolution, and the Communists . . . have not been wiped out." (*The New York Times,* Oct. 20, 1966.)

Could it be that the program had failed to "wipe out" the Communists because it had not wiped out some of the causes of Communist strength? At a time when the Honolulu concept of "social revolution" was still not recognized as just another unfulfilled promise, *The New York Times,* on September 22, 1966, raised the rather revealing demand for "greater efforts to stamp out local 'tyrants' among civil servants and the wealthy," indicating that pacification could not succeed without "eradicating tyranny," and explaining "that a hamlet will not be regarded as pacified until 'influential' officials and other persons who oppress the population have been 'wiped out.'" That some "good" Vietnamese exist, nobody can seriously doubt. What one can doubt, however, is that a regime based on force has any use for them, since "tyrants" have been precisely what all Saigon governments, beginning with Diem, have retained in the villages.

Before the end of the year, the Honolulu program was generally recognized as being dead. As another veteran reporter on Saigon failures, Denis Warner, put it in his article "The Ordeal of Pacification" in *The Reporter* of December 1, 1966: "The question is not what new fields there are to conquer, but what may be salvaged from the fiasco of the past." A few days later, an even harsher judgment was made by Marvin L. Stone, in a long article in the December 5, 1966, issue of the *U. S. News & World Report*: "The pacification program, despite its booming send-off last February at the Honolulu 'summit' meeting, all but fell on its face in 1966." In this article Stone reported that all the promises (not only that of a "social revolution"), whether concerning education, medical assistance or other social services, remained as unfulfilled as they were before Johnson and Ky swore to give a "better life" to the people. Stone also pointed to the continued prevalence of corruption, which, as he demonstrates with examples, "starts at the top." He also found evidence of venality and nepot-

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ism wherever he went. In the Mekong Delta ". . . there is hardly a district or province chief who has not bought his job in return for a crack at the available riches."

III

But what most forcefully underlines the failure of the Honolulu program is the need, recognized at the Guam meeting, for a new start in "the other war." This is the need to renew the promises of a better life, of a government "responsive to the needs of the people—of a new effort, as Vice President Humphrey put it shortly before the Guam conference, to get the exploiters "off the peasants' back." Can it be that this time the promise will be followed by deeds?

What has transpired so far in "the other war" hardly justifies this expectation. Guam, unlike Honolulu, produced no formal program, no specific plans or solemn statements. On the contrary, as *The New York Times* of March 22 said, "the necessary lines of authority to give effect to the new machinery already set up by the Americans to carry out this program were left in a state of confusion"; or, as R. W. Apple Jr. put it in the same issue of the *Times*: the participants at the Guam conference "never really came to grips with the vital problems of the pacification program for South Vietnam. . . ."

What, then, is the basis for the new optimism displayed in Washington and Saigon? Has it been decided at last seriously to proceed with land reform, without which the promise of "social revolution" remains empty talk? The contrary is true. The last time we heard anything about land reform was in *The New Rork Times* report of September 22, 1966. The Saigon government, it said, "has decided to extend the scope of its rural pacification program to include more emphasis on land reform. . . . Last week Premier Nguyen Cao Ky spoke of a new emphasis on land reform, so fresh steps in this field are under consideration." But were these "fresh steps" taken? Are they at least still under consideration?

In their so-called Additional Views on the report of October 12, 1966, by the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee on waste and pilferage in the United States Assistance Program, two Republican Representatives, Donald Rumsfield of Illinois and Robert Dole of Kansas, state categorically: *"Land reform is virtually nonexistent."* Marvin L. Stone, in his article quoted above, concurs by saying that "Saigon's land reform program, so vital for the aspirations of the peasants, has never been really put in motion." So much for the claim of the Komer report to the President of September, 1966, that 1.2 million acres are being distributed. No land has in fact been distributed since Diem's abortive program, and all indications are that no land will be distributed in the future either. Fred Emery, the Saigon correspondent of the *London Times,* reported on March 10, 1967, that high officials of the pacification program can talk "for 90 minutes without once mentioning land." And instead of a promise of land reform such as was made at Honolulu, the communiqué of the Guam conference merely makes reference to "reform of land policies and

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tenure provisions," carefully avoiding the heart of the problem, which is *land distribution.*

But even as regards "tenure provisions," the record so far is one of scandalous tenant exploitation in violation of a law on the books since 1955 which limits land rents to 25 per cent of the crop. A report in the *Wall Street Journal* of June 15, 1964, stated: "Lang Anh province just Southwest of Saigon is a potentially rich area. . . . But prosperity hasn't touched most of the province's 300,000 inhabitants. Many live on small plots of rented land and pay 50–75 per cent of their crops to the landlords." More than two years later, nothing had changed. Marvin L. Stone writes in the article quoted above: "In the secure areas, tenant farmers—that means 70 per cent of the farmers in the Delta—still are forced to pay up to 50 per cent and more of their rice crops to absentee landlords who have absolutely no obligation in return." Two months later, in his report to the London *Times* already quoted, Fred Emery is even more specific: *"Absentee landlords are still riding with pacifying troops, not merely to grab their lands but to extort back rents for the time they fled the Vietcong."* And they *"still extort rents as high as 60 per cent of the product of a rice field."* This was written a year after the Honolulu conference, whose participants, according to Denis Warner, intended "to make sure that the landlords don't charge intolerable rents." Even the modest promise that a government decree would abolish back rents has yet to be fulfilled. But even if such a decree were to be issued, experience does not permit any hope that it would be observed.

IV

All of this shows why land distribution, no longer mentioned by the propagandists of "the other war," remains the crucial issue it has been for decades, both under the colonial regime, and since its demise in 1954. Why is nothing meaningful being done about it? Another reporter critical of Saigon's land policies, Richard Critchfield, in a series of articles in the Washington *Evening Star* of January 24–27, 1966, tried to answer the question why the military, the high civil servants, and the various governments since 1954 failed to execute the land reform which they could not help promising again and again. "Most of the military officers," wrote Critchfield, "civil servants and community leaders come from the landowning gentry." He goes on to say that there are now about 3,000 rich Saigon families who, even if they were "victims" of Diem's land reform still make profits as high as $40,000 a year from the 220 acres of rice land they were able to retain. (A policeman's salary in Saigon is $24 a month.) Representative Reid of New York, in the Additional Views quoted above, gives a similar reason for Saigon's failure to promote genuine social reforms. "Representatives of the merchant and landowning families are entrenched in various strata of the bureaucracy. Under the present circumstances, their position is so solidified that even after the cessation of military hostilities, they may be able to perpetrate their control."

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For these people, says Critchfield, the war is not worth winning if they lose their land and all the other privileges derived from their positions of power. A regime that speaks for these people cannot really wage "the other war." And it certainly cannot promote the "social revolution" without which, as *The New York Times* said again on March 22, 1967, the Saigon regime will fail; for without it, "all the military might in the world will be of no avail."

But according to Washington—where the fact that reforms did not materialize after Honolulu must finally have sunk in—decisive progress in "the other war" can at last be confidently predicted. What is the basis of this new optimism of Washington officials? "Their new hope," writes R. W. Apple Jr. in *The New York Times* of March 25, "is the political evolution that has been under way in South Vietnam for 10 months." What is meant by this is simply that there have been elections, that the elected Assembly produced a Constitution which the military Junta accepted, that there will be more elections and that these will eventually lead to a civilian government "responsive to the needs of the people."

Let us for the moment forget that South Vietnam, under Diem, already had both a civilian government and a "democratic" constitution, and that during the nine years of Diem's civilian rule, no less than five elections were held, each one applauded by Washington as having been "free." What reasons do the Vietnamese peasants have to believe that this new hopeful "political evolution" will lead to something better than a return to what they had under Diem?

A brief look at the composition and the work of the Constituent Assembly can supply us with an answer. The vast majority of the elected Assembly members are people who had been screened as candidates by the authorities; there was no freedom of party organization; between 4–5000 Buddhist activists were thrown into jail before the elections were held; there was neither freedom of nomination nor freedom of the press during the campaign. Apart from a number of intellectuals largely associated with the groups that form the social basis of the present regime, the Assembly members belong mostly to the wealthy and the military. There are 20 landlords among its 117 members, but there is not a single peasant.

The new Constitution, as far as it is concerned with the vital question of land, reflects the fact that the Assembly was elected as a parliament of the rich. The indefatigable Dr. Dan, whom the Junta, unlike Diem, did not dare keep out of the Assembly, proposed a special article in the Constitution guaranteeing to every peasant the right to own the land he tilled. The proposal received 3 votes out of 117. Critchfield reported that "many deputies said [Dr. Dan's proposal] sounded too much like Communism." Instead, the Assembly adopted an article guaranteeing the private property of those who *own* the lands that are being tilled by the tenants. If there should be a need for expropriation or requisition "for the common good" (mind you, not for the landless peasants), the landlords must receive

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"speedy and just compensation" (not merely payments in government bonds, as was the method under Diem).

V

A new Assembly, elected under the control of the present regime, will hardly be very different, even if its members should voice criticisms of the regime, in the struggle between the civilian aspirants and the military holders of power. As long as only people who support the war policies of the present regime are allowed to compete in elections, it is a swindle to speak of free elections in South Vietnam. And in any new Assembly, only a minority of the people will be represented. This became perfectly clear in another report by R. W. Apple Jr. in *The New York Times* of March 25. Speaking of the coming village and hamlet elections to be held beginning April 2, Apple says that they will take place in only a third of the country's villages and in a fourth of its hamlets, "because the threat of Vietcong interference is too great elsewhere." (Are we supposed to believe that this threat was so much smaller last year when the government claimed that over 80 per cent of the population went to the polls?) This means that elections, whether for local or national officials, can take place, at best, in the one third of the country controlled by the Saigon regime.

If elections were held in the other two thirds of the country, where "the threat of Vietcong interference is too great," such elections would produce Vietcong-controlled village and hamlet councils. (Villages are townships comprising several hamlets.) But is this not proof that the claim of a pro-government turnout of 80 per cent of the people, which we have heard last year and will hear again next September, is as brazen a lie as was Diem's claim that his brother Nhu received 99.9 per cent of the votes in a district under total Communist control? The new Assembly, and the new President, will therefore be elected by a minority of the people, under conditions that are the opposite of a fair democratic process. And these prospects of the "political evolution" lead Washington to believe that the promise of a social revolution will at last be fulfilled!

Even taking into account the American inclination for using radical words to describe basically conservative attitudes, the question remains whether the talk of "social revolution" is conscious political deception or results from an inability to understand what the term implies. I tend to believe that our leaders, the President included, believe "social revolution" to be the sum of good deeds, social services, and pseudo-democratic reforms they honestly intend, but have so far failed, to bestow on the wretched people of South Vietnam. For most Americans, ignorant of the true need for drastic social reforms, it is now more important to be "nice" to the peasants than to give them land—a corollary to the urge of many of our soldiers to comfort a child with candy whose father has been accidentally killed by our bombs.

The hero of the new pacification efforts, consequently, has become Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, who honestly admitted last fall that the Honolulu

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program was a flop. According to a report by Charles Mohr in *The New York Times* of April 1, Gen. Thang now insists that the members of his pacification team be polite to the peasants. He sets an example (in the presence of foreign correspondents) by taking off his cap when he speaks to a peasant woman. He even gave one peasant, whose bamboos the team had cut down to build a fence around the village, a present of 500 piasters (about $4). And he invited the peasants to complain to him if they feel abused by members of the pacification teams (as they were under Diem, when, according to David Halbestam and Neil Sheehan, some team members were distributing government leafllets while others stole ducks). This is now the road to the "better life" for the peasants.

This is not to say that the Americans in charge of pacification lack good intentions. But even if there were true energy behind good will, the allocation of resources between the requirements of the real war and the so-called war without guns, as pacification is now called, leaves them without the means for this tremendous task. What we are doing is less than the proverbial drop in the bucket; it is a drop into a river, instantly carried away by the rising flood of misery which the steady intensification of the war creates. The real point, however, is that even a volume of assistance ten times greater than what we are now able to render would still not constitute a "social revolution," and would therefore leave the unsatisfactory conditions of most Vietnamese peasants basically untouched.

About another fundamental defect in the entire program of "Revolutionary Development" or "Rural Reconstruction" only a few words have to be said. The men in charge of this program, ever since the sorry times of Diem, have searched for security largely with police methods. The failure of Diem's Agrovilles and strategic hamlets seems to have taught little to the men who now seek to gain popular support by establishing population control with their 59-member pacification teams. As Denis Warner put it in the article quoted above: "For the past six years, a succession of administrations has flattered the Vietcong by copying their methods and tactics." If the task is thus conceived, local "tyrants" will remain more suitable instruments of Saigon than "good" Vietnamese; and the hope that they will be "wiped out" would be justified only if there were prospects for "wiping out" the present regime which, for the sake of our war aims, Washington ardently supports.

But why, I ask myself every day, have the many liberals whose anti-Communism makes them supporters of these war aims, why have they failed to raise the demand that "the other war"—the war that will in the end decide what will become of Vietnam—be conducted with measures that conform, at least to some degree, with the need for a "social revolution" in South Vietnam? Why do they, like their deglamorized hero Humphrey, avoid raising the question of land distribution, since there is little else for them to demand that might improve the rotten political conditions in the state of South Vietnam? Although I

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hardly believe that even drastic measures of reform could any longer remedy a situation made hopeless by the constant empty promises, I would still, if only for the sake of revealing the mendacity of the Saigon rulers and their Washington supporters, propose that certain demands be raised and thrown into the face of any official who claims that in "the other war" something meaningful is being done.

Of these demands, the simplest and most practical would be a radical program of land distribution through a reduction of landholdings to ten hectars (the limit imposed in Japan); a distribution to needy peasants of the land which the government acquired from the French landowners (whom the French government paid off); and parceling out the large landholdings of the Catholic Church. These measures would take care of all the land needs of all poor peasants and tenants in South Vietnam. No payments should be requested from the peasants: they have paid for the land they till more than ten times over since they were made landless by the colonial regime. The argument that as long as the war lasts, the complex task of land distribution is impossible to execute must be rejected as a feeble excuse. To be sure, the proper legislation and the issuance of legal title to the land for the peasants would require more will and ability than the present administration possesses. But there is at this juncture no need either for complex legislation or long drawn-out administrative procedure. All that is needed is a single sheet of paper containing one short sweeping decree:

Beginning July 11, no peasant living in government-controlled areas shall henceforth pay any land rent whatsoever to any landlord.

Land rents are illegal, and the attempt to collect them (by local "tyrants" or the "wealthy") shall be punished with five years in prison (now reserved for people suspected of favoring "neutralism"). The peasant owns the land he tills, and will get legal title once peace has been restored. As an extra bonus, the government will also decree a total moratorium on all peasant taxes for the duration of hostilities: let the Vietcong tax and otherwise exploit the villagers; on our side, they shall henceforth be unmolested by the people who have plagued them for so long.

To be sure, Washington, with its instinctive tendency to side with the rich, would want to compensate the landlords. Let Washington compensate!

It would cost no more than 150 million dollars to compensate landlords—less than 10 per cent of what we spend on the war each month.

Those who believe that all is not yet lost in South Vietnam must admit that such a radical land reform program could give substance and credibility to the "social revolution."

There is more that should be asked, but let our liberal friends restrict themselves to the land question and see how their demands will be dealt with; and if they fail, as all proponents of reforms have failed in the past, let them admit that the entire pacification program has no relation whatsoever to "social revolution," and that the much advertised "other war" remains what it has been for the last 13 years: a fraud.

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